Leningrad siege statistics - gistory - LiveJournal. Blockade in numbers. Terrible statistics from besieged Leningrad Population in Leningrad 1941

The siege of Leningrad became the most difficult test for city residents in the entire history of the Northern capital. In the besieged city, according to various estimates, up to half of the population of Leningrad died. The survivors did not even have the strength to mourn the dead: some were extremely exhausted, others were seriously injured. Despite hunger, cold and constant bombing, people found the courage to survive and defeat the Nazis. One can judge what the residents of the besieged city had to endure in those terrible years by statistical data - the language of numbers of besieged Leningrad.

872 days and nights

The siege of Leningrad lasted exactly 872 days. The Germans encircled the city on September 8, 1941, and on January 27, 1944, residents of the Northern capital rejoiced at the complete liberation of the city from the fascist blockade. For six months after the blockade was lifted, the enemies still remained near Leningrad: their troops were in Petrozavodsk and Vyborg. Red Army soldiers drove the Nazis away from the approaches to the city during an offensive operation in the summer of 1944.

150 thousand shells

Over the long months of the blockade, the Nazis dropped 150 thousand heavy artillery shells and over 107 thousand incendiary and high-explosive bombs on Leningrad. They destroyed 3 thousand buildings and damaged more than 7 thousand. All the main monuments of the city survived: Leningraders hid them, covering them with sandbags and plywood shields. Some sculptures - for example, from the Summer Garden and horses from the Anichkov Bridge - were removed from their pedestals and buried in the ground until the end of the war.

Bombings in Leningrad took place every day. Photo: AiF/ Yana Khvatova

13 hours 14 minutes of shelling

Shelling in besieged Leningrad was daily: sometimes the Nazis attacked the city several times a day. People hid from the bombings in the basements of houses. On August 17, 1943, Leningrad was subjected to the longest shelling during the entire siege. It lasted 13 hours and 14 minutes, during which the Germans dropped 2 thousand shells on the city. Residents of besieged Leningrad admitted that the noise of enemy planes and exploding shells continued to ring in their heads for a long time.

Up to 1.5 million dead

By September 1941, the population of Leningrad and its suburbs was about 2.9 million people. The siege of Leningrad, according to various estimates, claimed the lives of from 600 thousand to 1.5 million city residents. Only 3% of people died from fascist bombing, the remaining 97% died from hunger: about 4 thousand people died every day from exhaustion. When food supplies ran out, people began to eat cake, wallpaper paste, leather belts and shoes. There were dead bodies lying on the streets of the city: this was considered a normal situation. Often, when someone died in families, people had to bury their relatives themselves.

1 million 615 thousand tons of cargo

On September 12, 1941, the Road of Life opened - the only highway connecting the besieged city with the country. The road of life, laid on the ice of Lake Ladoga, saved Leningrad: along it, about 1 million 615 thousand tons of cargo were delivered to the city - food, fuel and clothing. During the blockade, more than a million people were evacuated from Leningrad along the highway through Ladoga.

125 grams of bread

Until the end of the first month of the blockade, the residents of the besieged city received a fairly good bread ration. When it became obvious that flour supplies would not last long, the quota was sharply reduced. Thus, in November and December 1941, city employees, dependents and children received only 125 grams of bread per day. Workers were given 250 grams of bread, and paramilitary guards, fire brigades and extermination squads were given 300 grams each. Contemporaries would not have been able to eat the siege bread, because it was made from practically inedible impurities. The bread was baked from rye and oat flour with the addition of cellulose, wallpaper dust, pine needles, cake and unfiltered malt. The loaf turned out to be very bitter in taste and completely black.

1500 loudspeakers

After the start of the blockade, until the end of 1941, 1,500 loudspeakers were installed on the walls of Leningrad houses. Radio broadcasting in Leningrad was carried out around the clock, and city residents were forbidden to turn off their receivers: radio announcers talked about the situation in the city. When the broadcast stopped, the sound of a metronome was broadcast on the radio. In case of alarm, the rhythm of the metronome accelerated, and after the shelling ended, it slowed down. Leningraders called the sound of the metronome on the radio the living heartbeat of the city.

98 thousand newborns

During the blockade, 95 thousand children were born in Leningrad. Most of them, about 68 thousand newborns, were born in the autumn and winter of 1941. In 1942, 12.5 thousand children were born, and in 1943 - only 7.5 thousand. In order for the babies to survive, the Pediatric Institute of the city organized a farm of three purebred cows so that the children could receive fresh milk: in most cases, young mothers did not have milk.

The children of besieged Leningrad suffered from dystrophy. Photo: Archive photo

-32° below zero

The first winter of the blockade became the coldest in the besieged city. On some days the thermometer dropped to -32°C. The situation was aggravated by heavy snowfalls: by April 1942, when the snow should have melted, the height of the snowdrifts reached 53 centimeters. Leningraders lived without heating or electricity in their houses. To keep warm, city residents lit stoves. Due to the lack of firewood, everything inedible that was in the apartments was burned in them: furniture, old things and books.

144 thousand liters of blood

Despite hunger and the harshest living conditions, Leningraders were ready to give their last for the front in order to speed up the victory of the Soviet troops. Every day, from 300 to 700 city residents donated blood for the wounded in hospitals, donating the resulting financial compensation to the defense fund. Subsequently, the Leningrad Donor aircraft will be built with this money. In total, during the blockade, Leningraders donated 144 thousand liters of blood for front-line soldiers.

Life itself, concern for the present and future of Russia and its peoples, with particular urgency, have confronted society and science with the problems of demography, the study of the system of population reproduction at different, distant and close, stages of the country’s historical path. Statisticians, demographers, political scientists, social scientists of many other specialties are actively involved and participate in this work, the significance of which is difficult to overestimate. 1

Historical demography has made significant progress, which has enriched not only historical science, but also related disciplines with a number of major studies that open up the possibility of studying long-term processes that determine the vector of population reproduction in Russia, the USSR, the RSFSR and the Russian Federation. 2

The scope of work devoted to the study of demographic processes in individual regions is expanding. In addition to the above-mentioned works on the population of Moscow and Siberia, St. Petersburg demographers and historians are actively working in the mentioned area. 3

The results of the war and the new division of Europe led to serious changes in the geopolitical and geo-economic situation of Leningrad. The role of Moscow as one of the centers of the bipolar world that was emerging in the post-war years has increased immeasurably. The highly centralized economic and political system greatly strengthened the functions of the capital in the life of the state and country. Other large centers, including Leningrad, were relegated to the background.

From a border city, the largest naval base in the Baltic, it turned into a rear city, a secondary naval harbor. From the “window to Europe” - one of the few transit trade points connecting the USSR with the West, Leningrad became far from the most convenient hub of land and sea communications. They naturally shifted to the ports of the Baltic states and the Black Sea region, which were more convenient for year-round navigation, to points of railway connections that ensured rapidly growing trade within the emerging socialist camp. As for the functions of the center of human, information connections with the Western world, which were inherent in pre-revolutionary St. Petersburg, they were largely lost even earlier. The flaring up Cold War put an end to their remains. These objective changes largely determined the post-war fate of the city, its economy, and influenced science, culture and, of course, residents.

The war and blockade had a catastrophic impact on the population, its demographic and other characteristics. Of the 3,119 thousand residents recorded by the 1939 census within the city proper, and 3,401 thousand with the suburbs subordinate to the Leningrad City Council, by mid-1943 only approximately 600 thousand remained, and on January 1, 1944 - even 546 thousand 4

After breaking the blockade and especially its final lifting, the number of inhabitants of the city began to increase rapidly. In 1944, the average annual population reached 707.4 thousand, and in the second half of 1945 it amounted to 1,240 thousand (36.6% of the pre-war level). 5 In the suburbs that were under occupation (Petrodvorets, Pushkin), the number of residents decreased much more noticeably than in Kolpino and Kronstadt. 6

In terms of composition, the Leningraders of 1945 were mainly survivors of yesterday's siege, workers of the first re-evacuated enterprises and institutions, retired soldiers and officers of the initial stage of mass demobilization, disabled war veterans - that is, predominantly native Leningraders. The second group consisted of a contingent that arrived from other regions on the banks of the Neva in 1943-1945. in the order of labor mobilization.

But many, many Leningraders were no longer destined to return and taste the joy of victory or participate in the revival of their native city. It is extremely difficult to establish even approximately the total number of this category. However, to understand the future destinies of the city, its economy, culture, the nature and characteristics of the continuity and reproduction of generations, the preservation of the mentality and everything that is called St. Petersburg, Leningrad, is necessary. This is also important for studying the specifics of socio-economic processes.

Let's consider one of the possible options for calculating the total demographic losses of Leningrad during the war and, therefore, we will try to determine the human resources that the city had after its completion.

In the last peaceful year of 1939, as already mentioned, 3119 thousand lived in Leningrad, and with cities and workers’ settlements subordinate to the city council, 3401 thousand (according to other sources, 3015 thousand and 3321 thousand). 7

After the start of the war and until the end of August 1941, 488.7 thousand were evacuated from the city. Not all of them were Leningraders. A large category consisted of refugees from the Baltic states and other areas who rushed to the banks of the Neva in the first weeks of the war in search of salvation. Approximately 85 thousand remained in the German-occupied suburbs. From September 1941 (after the establishment of the blockade) and until the end of 1942, by water, air, and across the ice of Ladoga, it was possible to send 871,180 Leningraders to the mainland (according to specialist estimates and sources). 8 Thus, the total number of evacuated citizens was 1359.9 thousand.

After many years of debate and research, most historians abandoned the figures that estimated the number of victims of the blockade at 1-1.2 million and even 2 million people. The prevailing estimate was that the number of deaths during the blockade ranged from 700-800 thousand. 9 In addition, in 1941 (before the blockade was established), at least 40-50 thousand died naturally; in 1944 (i.e. after the blockade was lifted) - 12.5 thousand 10

Therefore, the total number of dead, dead population during the war years can be determined at 750-860 thousand.

There is another method for calculating mortality in the city in 1941, 1942, 1943 and 1944. According to the city statistics office, 318 people died on average daily in Leningrad in 1941, or 116,070 people per year; in 1942, respectively 1406 people and 500536 per year; in 1943 - 60 people and 21,900; in 1944, 12,500 died. During the four years of the war, including the blockade, according to these data, 651,006 Leningraders died. 11 Then the lower threshold from 750 thousand is reduced to approximately 650 thousand.

To determine the scale of mortality among evacuees, one must have at least average data on mortality in the USSR during the war years. According to information given in V. A. Isupov’s monograph “Demographic catastrophes and crises in Russia in the first half of the 20th century,” the mortality rate of the rear population of the RSFSR ranged from 27.7 per thousand population in 1942 to 16.5 in 1943 d. The average coefficient during the war years was 18.35. In the regions of the Urals and Siberia, where many Leningrad factories were evacuated, the average coefficient was 18.9 and 17.7 per thousand inhabitants, respectively. 12 Naturally, the living conditions of the evacuees, and especially the mortality rate during the evacuation period, were increased. Therefore, we will focus on the average mortality rate in 1942-1943. - 22.1 per thousand evacuees (out of 1359.9 thousand). Then the number of deaths during evacuation will be 30.1 thousand per year. For three years (1942, 1943 and 1944) - 90.3 thousand. However, the obtained approximate data is still likely to somewhat underestimate the real figure, because they are based on information about the state of general mortality in the rear areas .

All sources clearly emphasize that the mortality rate among the evacuated population of Leningrad was extremely high, primarily on the road and in the first months upon arrival at their new places of residence. Suffice it to say that in only one direction of evacuation - in the Vologda and Yaroslavl regions (according to a special study) about 20 thousand Leningraders died. 13 The actual evacuation area was much wider. These are the Urals, Siberia, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan. So, in general, mortality in evacuation areas and on the road approximately claimed the lives of at least 120-160 thousand people.

Another independent category was losses among military personnel and persons who fought the enemy in the people's militia, in the ranks of the partisans. The military martyrology, published in the 18th volume of the “Book of Memory of the Defenders of Leningrad,” contains the names of 265,967 Leningraders who died on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War and the war with the Japanese militarists - slightly less than half of the mobilized citizens. Among them, 116,624 died in battle, 111,387 went missing, 36,308 died from wounds and illnesses, and 1,648 perished in captivity. 14 It is hardly possible to call these figures exhaustive. So the total losses at the fronts and in the partisan rear could be estimated at 266-300 thousand people.

Thus, during the war years, they died a natural death in the city, in evacuation, died in the blockade, on the fronts, approximately: from 650 to 800 thousand (in the blockade) + 40-50 thousand (in 1941) + 12, 5 thousand (in 1944) + 120-160 thousand (over three years of evacuation) + 266-300 thousand (at the fronts). Total 1088.5 thousand - 1322.5 thousand.

Not all Leningraders returned from evacuation. Some of the personnel of the enterprises were left at the new locations and formed the main backbone of the plant teams that continued to work in the Urals, Siberia and other regions. Some simply assimilated due to various circumstances. At a minimum, judging by fragmentary information from individual factories, this category amounted to 3-5%. Based on this, the mentioned contingent can be approximately estimated at 40-80 thousand people.

And finally, the last group is the military, who were scattered by the war and the conditions of military service and who were unable to return to Leningrad after the war. We have not yet discovered any information about the population here. Approximately 2-3 percent of the number mobilized (approximately 600 thousand): 12-18 thousand. In total, the category of 15 who did not return to the city will be approximately 52-98 thousand.

In total, therefore, approximately 1.2–1.4 million of its pre-war residents did not return to Leningrad, i.e., from 40 to 47%. And this despite the fact that in 1941-1944. 115.9 thousand were born, i.e. 10-12 times less than died!

According to other calculations, taking into account data on population migration, as well as losses of the Red Army, extrapolated to the number of Leningrad conscripts, losses could amount to 27-36%. 16

Thus, according to the most rough estimates, from 27 to 47% of the pre-war population of the city did not return to Leningrad after the war. The spread is great. But it once again demonstrates the initial stage of developing the issue.

When, as a result of a cataclysm, a significant number of residents go into oblivion and leave a city in a short period of time, this is reflected not only in the demographic state, the mechanism of population reproduction. The natural process of transmission from generation to generation of a unique way of life, style of behavior, cultural stereotype - everything that was and is called “Petersburg”, “Leningrad” - is being disrupted. Cultural monuments remain. They can be restored. But the bearer of culture - a person, an individual, a significant part of a generation cannot be recreated. Even with the help of cloning. Thus, the war and blockade were not just accompanied by enormous human casualties and irreparable genetic damage. The natural mechanism of spiritual and cultural reproduction was disrupted.

If the general demographic losses of the townspeople (as well as in the country as a whole) did not attract much attention from those in power in those years, then the number of residents who, through no fault of their own, found themselves in the occupation and, because of this, aroused suspicion of loyalty, was taken into account in a special line. In 1945, among city residents this category numbered 14,234 people (1.1%). 17

One of the characteristic features of the demographic situation in the city in the post-war years was the wide scale of migration processes. The latter characterized pre-war Leningrad, when about half a million people arrived and left the city every year. Now the scale of migration has expanded even more. Their general dynamics for 1944-1960. The following table of migration balance reveals: 18

Table No. 1.

	Balance of migration		Balance of migration

The information provided allows us to distinguish five periods: the first 1944-1946. It was characterized by large-scale migration. Over three years, the migration balance amounted to 1,294,217 people. Including 899,340 for the last two years. The peak was 1945, when the positive balance reached 571,696 people. Undoubtedly, this number included re-evacuated and transferred front-line soldiers, as well as migrants sent to the city from other regions. It is not yet possible to accurately determine the share of each category. However, the annual final statistical report for 1945 states that the arrival “was mainly due to the return from the Red Army and re-evacuation.” 19 The city resembled a huge camp. Subsequently, the share of these categories began to decrease, although in them native Leningraders still formed a noticeable group. However, the migration balance figures given in the table do not fully characterize the scale of the huge population movement. Suffice it to say that in 1945 alone, a total of 719,014 people arrived and left Leningrad. 20 In 1947 and 1948 The migration increase, although noticeably decreasing, still has the character of a huge flow of people who have experienced terrible shocks and are returning to their homes, simply looking for a new place in life after the shocks they have suffered.

And only from the late 40s did migration take on a different character. It begins to primarily satisfy the current needs of the national economy, the growing education system, and reflects fluctuations in economic policy. A new stage is coming. The positive balance of migration fluctuates from year to year, but in 1949-1954. does not exceed 30-40 thousand per year. The only exception is 1953 (93,931 people). This is explained not by intra-city reasons, but by the first massive reduction in the Armed Forces that began after the war and, apparently, an amnesty. Among the migrants, retired officers who returned to their hometown again occupy a prominent place. Some of them arrived the following year, 1954, which again affected the number of arrivals.

The new one, the third cycle, began in 1955. The scale of migration began to drop noticeably: in 1956 there were 6,119 people, in 1957 the balance even became negative. In 1958, the migration curve climbed up again, but its size still turned out to be small. This “break” is connected with an attempt to change the economic course on a city scale using the command method “turn everything around suddenly.” After the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Leningrad was given the task of increasing production without attracting new labor, that is, by sharply intensifying and increasing labor productivity. 21 However, neither industry, nor, especially, the urban economy were ready for this. Therefore, we had to return to the traditional source - extensive elements of development, and solve the problems of intensification step by step and gradually.

In 1959 and 1960 The migration flow began to gain strength again: from 20,294 people to 48,724, i.e., in two years (compared to 1958) it increased almost 8 times. While before the war, the majority of migrants were rural residents (75.2% in 1940), in the early 50s. Among them, city dwellers already predominated (1954 - 51.5%, in 1955 - 53.3%). 22 Mostly these people came from the Leningrad, Kalinin, Novgorod, Pskov, and Yaroslavl regions.

Despite the scale of migration processes, Leningrad remained Russian in national composition. According to the 1959 census, they accounted for 88.9% of the inhabitants. Second place belonged to Jews - 5%, third - to Ukrainians - 2%. 23 And in the future, the proportion of the Russian population invariably increased.

Young people dominated among the migrants. Many came to enroll in educational institutions. A significant part were young people sent to enterprises and urban services. Prominent in the 40s and early 50s. belonged to girls and women hired as housekeepers. In those years, this was one of the possible channels of escape from collective farms, a kind of intermediate link between the collective farm and the enterprise. 24 As for the people leaving the city, in the first years they went mainly to the places where they had previously lived. Later, in the second half of the 50s, the main part moved to Moscow, as well as to the Urals and Siberia, i.e. to high-impact construction sites. 25

Total for 1946-1950 Due to mechanical growth, the population of Leningrad increased by 528.3 thousand. During the same time, 145.8 thousand were born alive in the city. Over the next five years, 249.7 thousand arrived, and 131.9 thousand were born. 26 High birth rates were observed in Leningrad only in 1944 and 1945. 27

Table No. 2.

Number, birth rate and death rate of the population of Leningrad (without cities and towns subordinate to the Leningrad City Council). 28

	Population at the beginning of the year, thousand	born			Per 1000 inhabitants

In 1944, 23.5 thousand were born with a population of 707.4 thousand (annual average) and in 1945, as can be seen from the table, 45.2 thousand 29 with a population of 1240 thousand (by the middle of the year), i.e., 33.2 and 38.2, respectively, for every 1000 inhabitants. In 1946, 63.1 thousand were born, in 1947 - 59.9 thousand. 30 This was the peak. This increased birth rate, according to demographers, was compensatory in nature. After the First World War, a similar phenomenon was observed, but less pronounced. The birth rate of 38.2 per 1,000 inhabitants was one of the highest in the city's history in the 20th century. Among the newborns, boys predominated. 31 In the next five difficult years, the birth rate dropped by more than half—to 15.5 per 1000 population. It decreased gradually: in 1948 to 46.8 thousand, 1949 - 47.6 thousand (21.2, 18.5 per 100 population). 32 From 1951 to 1955, the birth rate almost stabilized, amounting to 14.8 per 1000 Leningrad residents in 1955. From 1956 to 1960 there was a decrease again: to 13.6-13.0 (in 1959), however, it is impossible to explain this decline by the deterioration of living conditions. Demographers of that time, noting the decline in the birth rate, tried to link it with an increase in abortions. Indeed, there was an obvious increase in abortions. In 1940 - 42.4 thousand, in 1950 - 44.7 thousand, in 1955 - 76.9 thousand, in 1956 - 130.3 thousand, 1957 - 138, 9 thousand, 1959 - 159.4 thousand, 1960 - 167.0 thousand. 33 In 1959, as indicated above, 159.4 thousand abortions were registered, and in 1964 - 171,119. In the same year, 43.2 thousand births were recorded. In total, 214.4 thousand pregnancies were conditionally registered. Of these, only 20.1% of women had children. 34

Abortion in the USSR was banned in 1936. The influence of this measure on the birth rate in Leningrad turned out to be noticeable, but relatively short-lived. In addition, abortions were often performed in circumvention of the law, but were not taken into account. In 1955, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR of November 23, the ban on abortion was abolished. In 1957, the tax on bachelors and small families was abolished. This certainly affected the figures taken into account by the statistics. Such measures probably had a much smaller impact on the actual birth rate. The data given in the table - 15.2 per 1000 population in 1955, 13.9 in 1956 and 13.8 in 1957 - partially reflect the impact of such measures on the birth rate. They only slowed down the fall. After the decline in 1955-1956. by 1.3 points, a period of relative stability began: from 1956 to 1960, the birth rate either increased or decreased slightly. The overall reduction was 0.5 points. After 1960 and before 1965, there was another significant decline of more than two points.

In general, this trend reflected the influence of a whole complex of factors - from changes in the main unit of society - the family, the demographic behavior of the population, to the influence of social, political, ideological, and psychological factors on the reproductive processes. This includes the education of parents, the provision of childcare facilities, satisfaction with material living conditions, the danger of war, etc.

“When I carried out important tasks at the front, I mentally saw a future peaceful life in front of me<...>, but those days are behind us. They promised us a lot back then, but now they have forgotten. Now we are not needed, because there is no danger<...>" “For six years now we have been denying ourselves the most essential things.<...>. Not only adults, but also children are malnourished.” 35 This is only a small part of the sentiments of Leningraders recorded in the political reports of the MGB and district committees. Naturally, they could not help but affect the consciously planned composition of the family. It was the latter that became an increasingly important factor in demographic growth.

Comparison of the birth rate in Leningrad at the beginning of the second half of the 50s. with the birth rate in other cities shows that only three large cities had lower rates - Moscow (14.5 per 1000 inhabitants), Kharkov (15.1) and Odessa (13.6). In other cities, the same figure was noticeably higher: Kyiv - 16.1; Gorky - 20.2: Tbilisi - 20.2; Omsk - 26.9; Baku - 28.9. This situation continued to persist in subsequent years. 36

As for mortality, after the blockade disaster, when its rate per 1000 inhabitants reached approximately 389.8 (according to other sources - 332.4 37), the situation in 1944 and 1945 was quickly returned to normal. In 1939, 14.9 people died in the city for every 1000 inhabitants, in 1945 - 14.9; in 1950 - 8.1; in 1955 - 6.4. And pour in the first half of the 60s. a new trend emerged: in 1959 - 7.0; in 1960 - 6.9; in 1965 - 7.8; in 1966 - 8.2. This mortality dynamics coincided with the all-Union one. However, specific weather indicators in Leningrad in the 50s. were lower. Probably, the overall higher level of medical care had an effect. As the latter leveled off, the ratio changed not in favor of the city on the Neva.

One more feature worth paying attention to is the structure of mortality. In 1950, 18.9% of deaths were children under the age of 1 year. 8.9% for children and youth from 1 to 19 years old, 41.8% for residents from 20 to 59 years old and 30.4% for older Leningraders. In 1959, infant mortality dropped sharply and amounted to only 4.5%, children and youth - 2.9%, working age - 39.7%. More than half of the deaths (52.9%) occurred among people 60 years of age and older. 38 The figures thus indicate that the age structure of mortality was step by step approaching natural boundaries.

As noted above, the birth rate in Leningrad decreased gradually in the first years after a short-term rise. Mortality fell much faster. This is what ensured the relative stability of natural population growth rates and the smooth and gradual vector of its decline in the 50s. (see table No. 2). From + 20.6 per 1000 population, the increase decreased by 1950 to +9.3, i.e., very noticeably. In the next five years it fluctuated slightly, remaining mainly at this level. In 1956-1960 There was a slight drop again - to +6.9, + 6.4 which reached a minimum in 1965 + 3.4. A sharp decline in the first half of the 60s. is explained by the influence of the demographic “echo of war”: the small wartime generation has reached reproductive age.

Modest, constantly falling indicators of natural growth, as noted above, relegated it to second place as a source of increase in the city's population. In the foreground throughout the post-war years there was mechanical growth - migration mainly from nearby areas.

To a certain extent, the authorities controlled population growth using the registration mechanism introduced in 1932. But this mechanism was not self-sufficient. In turn, it was influenced by the needs of the national economy, primarily in those years by the needs of industry for labor. The demands of businessmen, who sought to fulfill planned targets at all costs, without bothering themselves with risky experiments associated with innovation, large capital investments (which were already in short supply), pushed them to the extensive path of attracting additional labor. Requests addressed to party bodies to obtain more and more new registration limits poured in as if from a cornucopia. And only during the years of massive reductions in the Armed Forces did the usual mechanism cease to operate.

The population growth of Leningrad in the 40s, although it was at a fairly high pace (by 2.4 times in 1945-1950), nevertheless, the number of citizens as of 1950 was only 87% pre-war This figure, as noted above, noticeably lagged behind many large cities of the USSR, which by that time had far surpassed the pre-war line. Over the next six years - from 1950 to 1955. the increase was 23.9%; for 1955-1960 - 4.8% and in 1960-1965. - 10.3% (see Table 2). The pre-war number of inhabitants (with cities and towns subordinate to the Leningrad City Council) was achieved only at the turn of 1959-1960. Actually in the city - and even later - in 1962-1963. 39 In 1965, the number of residents of Leningrad amounted to 3,641 thousand people (107.5% of the 1939 level).

And yet, such a very modest figure for those times exceeded the outline of the General Plan for the development of the city. And this, in turn, led to a constant lag of the entire city infrastructure from the growing needs of Leningraders, reproduced disproportions, and aggravated the social situation in the city.

Hereditary townspeople - natives of Leningrad, people who lived in the city for many years, with such a mechanism of population reproduction did not constitute the predominant contingent, which complicated the process of generational succession, already disrupted by the war and blockade.

It was these deviations that reflected the influence of stable trends in reproductive behavior and family relationships—the fundamental principles of demographic reproduction.

During the years of the siege, the marriage rate in Leningrad dropped sharply. But already from 1943 a steep rise began and in 1944-1946. it exceeded the pre-war level. At the same time, the divorce rate has decreased. In 1944, due to the introduction of new legislation that complicated the divorce procedure, the latter initially decreased. However, their slow growth subsequently resumed. And yet, in the first half of 1946, the frequency of divorces (per year) was, according to medical workers, 8 times lower than in 1938-1939. (3.5 per 1000 inhabitants in 1940). In 1945, 32,163 marriages were concluded in 19 registry offices (in the city and suburbs) and 434 divorces were registered. The next year, 36.3 thousand marriages were concluded and 540 divorces were filed (i.e. approximately 25.9 and 0.35 per 1000 inhabitants). In 1950 there were 36.3 thousand marriages, 4.2 thousand divorces (15.8 and 1.8 per 1000 population); in 1960, marriages - 46.5 thousand, divorces - 10.3 thousand, i.e. 13.7 and 3.0. In 1965, there were, respectively, 10.3 thousand marriages and 3.1 thousand divorces. 40 For every thousand marriages, there were 6.7 divorces in 1920, 182 in 1939, 219 in 1942, 12 in 1945, 25 in 1946, 11 in 1950 ,1. in 1955 - 136, in 1960 - 221, in 1965 - 321. 41

In addition to the internal processes of family evolution and the increase in its instability, the nature of the latter also changed. The medium-sized family was replaced by a small family with 1-2 children, which did not even provide simple replacement of generations. 42

The following table reveals the distribution of those born by birth order for the 50s. 43

Table 3. Total Of them: Fourth Fifth and latest Not indicated

Already by 1950, the absolute majority were first-born children (55.7%). Together with secondborns, their share reached 82.3% of births, and by 1965 - 96.3%. This, as already noted, did not ensure not only expanded, but also simple reproduction of the population. The share of third children fell from 9.5% to 2.8%, and fourth children - eight times (from 4% to 0.5%). The birth of fifth or more children has also decreased by more than ten times. The birth of the tenth, eleventh and subsequent children became rare. In 1950, 78 such children were born, in 1965 - 5 for the entire city of more than three million. 44

The long-term process of transition from a large, medium-sized family to a small family in the 50s, thus, became a fait accompli in Leningrad. The war, the blockade, the employment of women in social production, the rapid growth of education, and many other factors played a big role in this. 45 According to the 1959 census, a total of 1453.9 thousand were married - 44%, including 51.5% of men and only 38.3% of all women. Out of 1,000 men aged 16 years and older, 697 were married, which almost coincided with the all-Union indicators (695). Out of 1000 women - 466, which is 10.7% less than the average for the USSR (522). 46

There have been no studies of the influence of women’s education on their demographic behavior in Leningrad. They were in Moscow and showed that there is an inverse relationship between the level of education and lifestyle, including demographic behavior. 47

The feminization of the population was one of the characteristic features of post-war Leningrad. If in 1910 there were 91 women per 100 men in St. Petersburg, then in 1920 - 139, in 1939 - 120, in 1946 - 190, in 1959 - 142, in 1960 - 139, in 1965 - 133. 48

The population of pre-war and pre-revolutionary St. Petersburg was clearly urbanized. The overwhelming majority of workers - a significant part of the capital's residents - lived in the city without families. In the post-revolutionary period, the consequences of the First World and Civil Wars and changes in the life of workers affected the gender composition of Petrograd-Leningrad residents. They began to live with their families. The resulting disproportionality smoothed out somewhat (from 139 to 120). However, by 1946 it had acquired an unprecedented scale: 190 women per 100 men. This was the result of both the war and the blockade, during which men were the most vulnerable. Maximum demasking was observed among young people aged 20-29 years, as well as in old age (60 years and older). 49 The first suffered the greatest losses in the war and continued to serve in the Army. The majority of the latter did not endure the hardships of the blockade.

Women predominated not only in the population, but also in the main groups of workers. In the clothing industry, for example, they made up 98.6% of workers, in the textile industry - 90.2%, in the metalworking industry - 69.5%, and in power plants - 69.1%. 50

The equalization of the sex ratio, as the data in the table below shows, proceeded slowly in the city and lasted for many decades. 51 It never recovered until the end of the twentieth century.

Table No. 4. Sex composition of the population of Leningrad. 1939-1967

For the beginning of the year.

For the middle of the year.

According to census data.

As already mentioned, more boys were born. So, according to information for 1946, 49,216 boys aged 0 to 4 years were counted, and 48,754 girls. But already in the next age group - from 5 to 9 years old, girls predominated. (81447 and 86405, respectively). 52

And yet, the equalization of the gender composition of the Leningrad population among youth and youth occurred relatively faster. Among the Leningraders who survived the war and the siege, the disproportions between men and women not only did not smooth out over the years, but also grew, because the mortality rate among men was higher and life expectancy was shorter. Thus, overcoming the imbalances exacerbated by the war was characterized by different trends. In general, as Table No. 4 shows, in the second half of the 1960s, that is, over 20-25 years, the disproportionality between the sexes smoothed out significantly.

Similar processes characterized the age composition of the population of Leningrad. 53

Table No. 5.

Age composition of the population of Leningrad. 1946—1965

Age groups	Numerical (thousands)			As a percentage of the total population
10 – 19 years
20 - 29 years old
30 - 39 years old
40 - 49 years old
50 - 59 years 60 years and

First of all, the size of the group under 9 years old needs comment. The relatively high figure - 15.6% in 1946 - is not at all explained by the high proportion of children of all ages included in it. On the contrary, the share of children born during the war and blockade was very modest - 5.8%. The majority were children born before the war, who in 1946 were 5-9 years old. If the former numbered only 98 thousand, then the latter numbered 167.9 thousand, i.e. 1.7 times more. 54

The demographic collapse - a direct legacy of the war - affected many aspects of urban life throughout the 20th century. In the late 40s - early 50s, it disrupted the normal functioning of the public education system, in the early 60s (when the military generation reached working and reproductive age) - it aggravated the labor problem in the city to an extreme extent, influencing the -fertility indicators.

The next “failing” group was the category of 20-29 year olds. It was she who suffered the greatest losses in the war. In addition, part of this small age contingent continued to serve in the Armed Forces; even at the beginning of the city’s revival, they were not discharged from military service. The above two circumstances explain, in our opinion, both the low number and the insignificant share of this group among Leningrad residents in 1946. By 1959, the number of 20-29-year-olds increased from 272.8 thousand to 671.7 thousand (in 2 ,3 times), and its share in the population - from 16 to 20.2%. By 1965, the group’s share had dropped again to 16.4%, as it again began to include small contingents who had suffered from the war.

Also noteworthy is the sharp reduction in the proportion of elderly people (50-59 years old) and especially Leningraders over 60 years old in 1946. And here by 1959, over a relatively short period for demographic processes, the ratio was noticeably optimized. The first group from 7.8% increased its share in the population to 12.2% and 14.1%, and the second - from 4.2% to 8.7%, 12.1%.

The largest contingent in 1946 were 30-49 year olds (39.5%). This means that the migration policy of the authorities, first of all, ensured the saturation of the city with residents of working age. The male population 30-54 years old accounted for 42.1% of all men in post-war Leningrad. By 1959, the share of the first contingent decreased slightly - to 32.5%. In general, residents of working age 20-59 years old in 1946 amounted to 63.3%, and in 1959 - 64.9%, in 1965 - 61.7%. The labor potential of the Leningrad population, thus, remained significant and relatively stable throughout all the years under review.

To summarize what has been said, it can be argued that the ratio of age groups in 1946 was characterized by significant unevenness, sharp disproportions, and a clear predominance of young people. 10-39 year olds accounted for 56.8% of the population. The city began to be revived primarily by young people: both native Leningraders and non-natives, whose fate later turned out to be firmly connected with the city on the Neva. At the same time, contrasts prevailed here too. Men, in comparison with pre-war times, are younger, and women are older. 55 By 1959, the contrasts had largely smoothed out.

Gender and age composition are elements of the qualitative characteristics of the population that determine its most important characteristics: reproduction, labor potential.

Qualitative characteristics also include the state of physical, moral, and psychological health of residents.

The epidemiological situation in Leningrad in the first years of peace remained quite difficult. But there is no comparison with the period of transition from war to peace in the 20s. didn't go. It is characterized by the following data: 56

Table No. 6.

Morbidity in Leningrad. 1939-1965

	Registered for 10 thousand.
Typhoid fever
Dysentery
Typhus
Relapsing fever
Scarlet fever
Diphtheria
Infectious jaundice

The most widespread diseases in 1945, despite a noticeable decrease in comparison with 1939 and 1944, remained dysentery among adults, measles and scarlet fever among children. This was explained in those years by the sharp increase in the mobility of the population and, of course, by the unfavorable sanitary conditions of life in the hostels, in which a significant part of the labor mobilized and re-evacuated then lived. Many are with children. 57 Infectious disease specialists also explained the increase in the number of cases of typhoid fever by these same circumstances. And yet, if we compare it with the last peaceful year of 1939, we notice some improvement in the epidemic situation in the city regarding measles, scarlet fever, diphtheria, and infectious jaundice. In subsequent years, infectious diseases generally decreased, although outbreaks of epidemics of measles and scarlet fever were noted. No longer by the mid-60s. Diphtheria went away. In 1950, the mortality rate from typhoid fever was 0.05 per 10 thousand population, from typhus - 0.004 (only 1 person fell ill), from measles - 0.1, scarlet fever - 0.1, dysentery and hemocolitis - 2 ,9, etc. Dysentery receded most slowly. 58 Thus, the epidemic situation in the city continuously improved.

As noted above, infant mortality also decreased sharply. Out of 100 births in 1939, an average of 14.4 died; in 1950 - 8.4; in 1951 - 6.0, in 1961 - 2.2. in 1965 - 2.0. 59

Against this generally positive background, the flu stood out. In 1945, more than a quarter of the population of Leningrad fell ill with it, although the flu that year was not particularly severe. In 1961, 1.4 million Leningrad residents suffered from influenza and acute respiratory diseases, in 1965 - 1.7 million. At the same time, in the first post-war years, a significant increase in the number of malaria diseases was observed in the city. Later it was managed to be eliminated.

The most serious danger was tuberculosis. In 1945, statistics registered over 6 thousand cases of this terrible social disease. 695 people became infected with syphilis. 60

The most severe diseases, accompanied by death, in the first post-war years were tuberculosis and pneumonia. Per 10 thousand inhabitants in 1939 in Leningrad, 19.2 died from tuberculosis; in 1944 - 21.0 and in 1945 - 24.2; in 1960 - 2.3 and in 1965 - 1.4. The mortality rate from pneumonia reached 30 (in 1960 - 1.1). Cancer and other malignant neoplasms had a lower, but still significant mortality rate: in 1939 - 13.2; in 1944 - 11.7; in 1945 - 11.6. They accounted for 7.2% of the total number of deaths. Next on the funeral list were pellagra, vitamin deficiency, and nutritional dystrophy. From these diseases associated with malnutrition (a direct result of the blockade), 0.04 died in 1939; in 1944 - 7.6 and in 1945 - 1.1 (including from nutritional dystrophy 00, 4.9 and 0.8, respectively). 61 The authors of medical statistics of that time believed that deaths from malnutrition in Leningrad in the first post-war year applied only to the newcomer population, and the townspeople quickly overcame this severe consequence of the war and blockade. Subsequent years proved that they were overly optimistic. 62 In general, 13.2% of deaths died from diseases of the digestive organs in 1939, and in 1945 -

• %. These diseases were ahead of cancer in mortality that year.

Hypertensive disease became widespread during the war. In 1945, the death rate from it was 6.2 per 10 thousand population (in 1960 - 16.4), and in general from diseases of the circulatory system - 9.9. 63

The structure of mortality in 1945, so to speak, still bore the mark of war. In subsequent years it changed significantly. The available documents, however, do not make it possible to summarize the information in one table. Therefore, we will limit ourselves to data for 1950 and partially for 1960 and 1965. Causes of mortality were distributed as follows: 64

Table No. 7.

Mortality and its causes. 1950—1965 Heart diseases Infectious and Malignant neoplasms Organ diseases Organ diseases digestive diseases nervous Newborn diseases. and congenital vices Other diseases

Cardiovascular diseases took first place. They killed more than a quarter of all deaths, and by 1965 - 34.2%. The proportion of respiratory diseases has sharply decreased. In 1945, 11.6 per 10 thousand inhabitants died from cancer and other malignant neoplasms. In 1950 - already 13.2 and, accordingly, in percentage - 7.2 and 16.2%, in 1960 17.2 per 10 thousand, in 1965 - 21.6 and 29.6%. At the end of this sad list were diseases of the nervous system and diseases of newborns. Mortality from the former increased from 4.0 per 10 thousand to 5.2 and 14.4.

In the first post-war year, the picture was somewhat different in this area: 65

Table No. 8. Per 10 thousand population Suicides Murders Prod. injuries Other injuries War injuries

In general, diseases of the nervous system (including suicides) accounted for a significant proportion of deaths. This indicates that mental and psychological overstrain continues to take place in society. As for injuries, the rate dropped from 10 (for all types of injuries) in 1945 to 6.1 in 1950.

The high mortality rate from murders is noteworthy - evidence of the tense criminal situation in the city.

Concluding the story about the state of health of Leningrad residents in the post-war years, one cannot help but say about the physical development of children, disabled people and the situation with sexually transmitted diseases and alcoholism. In children, there were disturbances in body proportions and retardation in physical development. 66 A grave legacy of the war was increased disability. By the summer of 1945, 94,837 disabled people were registered in the city (35 thousand war invalids and 59 thousand disabled people “from general causes”), i.e. 7.8% of the population. 67 In 1939, 0.9 per 10 thousand people died from syphilis; in 1944 - 0.7 and in 1945 - 0.6. From alcoholism, 2.1, 0.5 and 0.8, respectively. The statistical series shows that these social diseases were gradually losing ground, although a certain increase in mortality from alcoholism in 1945 could not but cause alarm. However, it was not possible to find a reliable barrier against such a disaster either then or later.

Thus, the health status - one of the qualitative characteristics of the population of Leningrad - in the post-war years continued to be affected by the consequences of the war. They got rid of them gradually. The high level of state medicine at that time made it possible to control and limit morbidity. Vaccinations of the population were widespread. In 1945 alone, 646,323 vaccinations were given against typhoid fever, and 717,233 against dysentery. 68 Year after year, measures to combat tuberculosis and pneumonia were strengthened. Venereal diseases and suicides also subsided.

A general characteristic of health is the average life expectancy; its quality changed in a positive direction, especially in the late 40s and 50s. 69

Table No. 9.

What is noteworthy is the fact that in the post-war period, average life expectancy, compared with the end of the twenties, increased by more than 20 years. The history of the city has never known such a leap either before or since.

An essential component of a qualitative assessment of the population is education. The war had a negative impact on the educational program of the Soviet government. Although schools continued to operate even in the besieged city, nevertheless, the implementation of universal seven-year education after the war had to be continued. Before the war, this problem had already been solved once. Many children and teenagers could not attend school during the hard times of war and worked in factories. In January 1946, a special survey of factories, factories, and organizations was carried out in order to identify illiterate and semi-literate people among the working population. According to far from complete information, then it was possible to count 4,197 illiterate and 23,991 semi-literate. 70

Training for these categories, as in the past, was conducted in groups and individually at enterprises. But things moved slowly. At the Bolshevik plant, for example, out of 145 illiterate people, 12 were trained; out of 860 illiterate people - only 28. Everyday adversity, difficult life, and a host of other worries made learning difficult. Some simply refused to study. In 1958, the status of accounting and the reliability of data on the elimination of illiteracy and semi-literacy among adult Leningraders was again checked. 4089 illiterates and 18316 semi-literate people were identified. 71 Consequently, residual illiteracy and illiteracy were eliminated very slowly.

As for school-age children, universal education has been strictly observed from the first days of the world. In the 1945/46 school year, 158.6 thousand studied in grades 1–4 (68.8% of the total number of Leningrad students). In grades 5-8 - 51.4 thousand (22.2%) and in grades 9-10 - 14.1 thousand (6.1%). Thus, at first in the post-war years, the bulk of children studied in the lower grades. Over the years, the proportion of high school students has increased. In 1950/51, only 39% learned the basics of science in grades 1–4. In grades 5-8 - 50% and in grades 9-10 - 9.3%. Ten years later (in 1960/61) respectively - 43%, 40% and 14.8%. 72

The number of students in schools for working youth (on-the-job) increased steadily: 1945/46 - 20.7 thousand; 1950/51 - 41.7 thousand; 1960/61 - 85.4 thousand. The number of young people in colleges, vocational schools, and general education institutions fell before the reform of this system in 1958: 1945/46 - 31.2 thousand; 1950/51 - 27.3 thousand; 1960/61 - 26.5 thousand. And only in the mid-60s. There was a steady growth of vocational schools. (1966/1967 - 37.2 thousand). 73

The number of young people in technical schools and universities increased at a high rate. The number of students at technical schools increased almost threefold from 1945/46 to 1960/61, and at universities - by 3.8 times. 74

The 1959 population census showed that already 560 Leningraders out of every 1000 had higher, secondary (complete and incomplete) education, including 113 - higher (completed and incomplete), 84 - specialized secondary, 122 - general secondary and 241 - incomplete secondary school. According to the 1939 census, only 34 out of 1000 city residents had higher education, and 219 had complete or incomplete secondary education. 75 Thus, the level of education of the Leningrad population more than doubled in the 15 post-war years. Education, in fact, turned out to be the only qualitative demographic characteristic that responded relatively quickly to the measures taken by the authorities. The remaining characteristics had more or less inertia and changed slowly. Taken together, they determined another qualitative feature - the labor and intellectual potential of the population.

The table below gives an idea of ​​changes in labor potential. 76

	In absolute numbers (thousand people)			In percentages
Everything is populated.
population
Including
employees
dependents
pensioners

Table No. 10. Composition of the employed population of Leningrad. 1950-1965

Before analyzing the data in the table, let us turn to the balance of labor resources in Leningrad as of the beginning of March 1946. It is not entirely comparable with the table. According to the balance, the total number of employed people in the spring of 1946 reached 1243.8 thousand (out of a total of 1759.6 thousand city residents), i.e., it was slightly inferior to the number of employed population in 1950 (1289.6 ). 77 This included: persons of working age - 1118.9 thousand, who were obliged to work or study, working old people - 110.6 thousand, working teenagers - 0.9 thousand, non-residents who worked at Leningrad enterprises - 13.4 thousand. The share of employed people in the total number of residents reached 69.9%. These data indicate, first of all, that the labor potential by the beginning of 1946 still largely continued to bear the imprint of wartime. The labor of elderly people, partly teenagers, etc. was widely used. A significant part, as especially emphasized in the document, consisted of contingents who had newly arrived in Leningrad. It is impossible not to take into account prisoners, prisoners of war, and repatriated people, who were not reflected in official statistics.

Most of the mentioned sources gradually disappeared. Employed population of the late 40s and 50s. already almost free from military vestiges. In 1950 it accounted for less than half of the total population. However, the number of employed people is not reliable enough. The 1959 census provides a complete picture. According to its data, the employed population was 55.7% and dependents were 44.3%. Moreover, the share of the employed population, as can be seen from the table, gradually increased to 55.8% by 1965. This situation is explained, first of all, not so much by the improvement in the age structure, but by the tough measures taken in the early 60s. to attract to work all non-working people and people employed in the household. The work of this constantly growing quantitatively and qualitatively contingent primarily restored and developed the city’s national economy.

The post-war demographic movement of the population of Leningrad - the creator of its economy, culture, moral principles - bore the indelible imprint of the cataclysms of the first decades of the century and, first of all, the Patriotic War and the blockade. For the third time in less than fifty years (after the revolution, civil war and industrialization), the composition of the city’s residents has changed greatly.

Complete demographic damage caused to the population of Leningrad in 1941-1945. cannot be accurately counted. According to rough estimates, losses ranged from 27% to 47% of the pre-war population. Such a large scatter is a consequence of both the imperfection of the proposed methodology, which needs further refinement, and the inconsistency in the initial statistical information recorded in the sources, and often the absence thereof.

However, even indicative results give grounds to assert that the composition of the townspeople, compared to pre-war times, has changed significantly. The natural process of demographic, social, and spiritual reproduction turned out to be disrupted. These violations were aggravated by large-scale migration and increased mobility of the population, especially in the first post-war years. The prerequisites for intensifying the processes of marginalization of the population increased.

The growth in the number of Leningrad residents, although it lagged behind the rate of increase in the urban population in the country, in most large cities, nevertheless, proceeded quite intensively. The pace was fading, although it was ahead of the forecasts laid down in the 1948 master plan.

Only by the mid-60s. population movements began to gradually stabilize. The migration balance reached the level of 0.6% per year of the total population. The composition of migrants has also changed. If in the 40s rural residents predominated among them, then in the 50s and especially in the 60s. Residents of small and medium-sized cities began to dominate. Conditions were emerging for strengthening the elements of stabilization processes, creating favorable preconditions for strengthening the system of reproduction of labor, social, and moral qualities from one generation of Leningraders to the next. Only the 1979 population census recorded that over three quarters of the city’s residents either lived in it for over 10 years (approximately 800 thousand people) or were natives of Leningrad (2.4 million). 78

The slow formation of the prerequisites for demographic stabilization was complicated by the general stable trend of replacement of medium-sized families by families with small children. Family planning became a stable tradition, an important element of reproductive behavior. The stability of the family, as the main unit of society, ensuring its growth and the reproduction of social, moral and other qualities of young people, was weakening. This situation was also facilitated by the gender disproportion that persisted for many years, especially among the generation that survived the war, the age disproportions generated by it, and the high level of women’s employment in the national economy. In general, the optimal age-sex structure was restored slowly.

Inertia, although on a more limited scale, also manifested itself in changes in such qualitative characteristics as physical health. Gradually, not immediately, tuberculosis and childhood infections receded. The extreme years of the blockade did not pass without leaving a mark on the physical condition of the population, although mortality from malnutrition decreased relatively quickly. After a short-term decline during the war years, alcoholism began to spread again.

The structure of causes of death among Leningrad residents acquired features characteristic of an industrial society. Among them, circulatory diseases and neoplasms predominated.

General physical health did not improve quickly, but steadily. By the mid-60s. life expectancy has reached its maximum reached in the 20th century.

Labor and intellectual potential has also increased. The number of able-bodied city residents employed in the national economy has increased noticeably. Among them prevailed the generation that bore on its shoulders the burdens of the war and the restoration of the city, which became the breeding ground for Khrushchev’s reforms. In the 60s The generation born during the war and after it declared itself, which not only picked up the baton of creation, but also presented its own largely new demands on life and power. How did the gap between generations, caused by the severe losses of the war and the blockade, affect it, what was its mechanism and did it really exist? These extremely important questions, which not only explain the past, but are also relevant today for understanding the modern demographic catastrophe and its consequences, are still waiting to be studied.

A. 3. Waxer

From the collection “RUSSIA IN THE XX CENTURY”, published for the 70th anniversary of the birth of Corresponding Member of the RAS, Professor Valery Aleksandrovich Shishkin. (St. Petersburg, 2005)

Notes

1. See Andreev E. M. Population of the Soviet Union. 1921-1991. M., 1993; The population of Russia in the 20th century. Historical essays. T. 1-3. M., 2000-2003; Population of the Soviet Union. 1922-1991. M., 1993; Population of Moscow. Past. The present. Future. M., 1992; Quality of the population. M., 1993. Issue. 6; Zakharova O. D. Evolution of fertility in Russia in the 20th century. M., 1993; Simchera Ya. V. To assess the population size and the scale of human potential in Russia over 100 years // Questions of Statistics. 2001. No. 12; Rutkevich M.N. Demographic catastrophe. Where is the exit? // Free thought. 2002. No. 6; Population of Russia. Annual issues, etc.
2. See Problems of historical demography of the USSR. Kyiv, 1988; Problems of interaction between social structure and population reproduction in Russia and the USSR. M., 1988; Historical demography. Problems. Judgments. Tasks. M., 1989; Historical demography: new approaches. M., 1992; Population of Russia in the 1920s—1950s: Numbers, losses, migration. Collection of scientific papers. M., 1994; Isupov V. A. Urban population of Siberia: From disaster to rebirth (late 30s - late 50s). Novosibirsk, 1991, etc.
3. See Quality of the population of St. Petersburg. Proceedings of the St. Petersburg Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Series 3. St. Petersburg, 1993; Klupt M.A. Population of St. Petersburg // St. Petersburg in the mirror of statistics. St. Petersburg, 1993; The situation in St. Petersburg: The birth rate is falling - the mortality rate is rising // Youth: Figures. Data. Opinions // 1993. No. 1; Chistyakova N. E. Statistical study of the influence of age and sex structure on the reproduction of the population of a large city (using the example of Leningrad). Abstract of the dissertation for academic competition. step. Ph.D. eq. Sci. M., 1988; Kovalchuk V. M. Tragic figures of the blockade (On the question of establishing the number of victims of blockaded Leningrad) // Russia in the XIX-XX centuries. St. Petersburg, 1998; Life and death in besieged Leningrad. Historical and medical aspect. Proceedings of the international conference April 26-27, 2001 St. Petersburg, 2001; Vakser A. 3. Political and economic cataclysms in Russia in the 20th century and the population of Petrograd - Leningrad - St. Petersburg // Russia in the 19th-20th centuries. St. Petersburg, 1998; Rabzhaeva M., Semenkov V. In search of St. Petersburg identity // Free Thought. 2002. No. 11 and others.
4. St. Petersburg 1703-2003. Anniversary statistical collection. Vol. 2. St. Petersburg, 2003. P. 16; Essays on the history of Leningrad. T. V. L., 1967. P. 486; Life and death in besieged Leningrad. Historical and medical aspect. P. 7.
5. Vakser A. 3. Political and economic cataclysms in Russia of the 20th century and the population of Petrograd - Leningrad - St. Petersburg. P. 349.
6. Leningrad for 50 years. Statistical collection. L., 1967. S. 20-21; The national economy of Leningrad and the Leningrad region in the 10th five-year plan. Statistical collection. L., 1981.S. 23; TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 4965. Op. 8. D. 738. L. 7.
7. Leningrad is under siege. Collection of documents about the heroic defense of Leningrad during the Great Patriotic War. 1941-1945. St. Petersburg, 1995. P. 339; Koval-chuk V. M. Tragic figures of the blockade. (On the issue of establishing the number of victims of blockaded Leningrad). P. 365.
8. Kovalchuk V. M. Decree. op. P. 365; The Second World War. Book 2. M., 1966. P. 161; Life and death in besieged Leningrad. pp. 89-90.
9. Vakser A. 3. Decree. op. P. 349.
10. Right there.
11. Isupov V. A. Demographic catastrophes and crises in Russia in the first half of the 20th century. Novosibirsk, 2000. P. 142, 158-159 (counting).
12. Frolov M.I. On the question of the number of those killed during the siege (based on materials from house books) // Life and death in besieged Leningrad. P. 20.
13. St. Petersburg Gazette. 1994, December 8; 1998, January 22.
14. The secrecy has been removed. Losses of the USSR Armed Forces in wars, hostilities and military conflicts. M., 1993. P. 139-140 (counting); Chistyakova N. E. Problems of studying demographic processes in Leningrad (St. Petersburg): 1930-1950 // Population: current state and prospects for the development of our knowledge. M., 1997. S. 175-176; TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 4965. Op. 3. D. 105. L. 21.
15. Right there. L. 14.
16. Chistyakova N. E. Decree. op. pp. 175-176; Leningrad for 50 years. P. 24.
17. TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 4965. Op. 3. D. 209. L. 22, 55-56.
18. Right there. L. 52.
19. Right there. F. 7384. Op. 37. D. 1316. L. 3.
20. Right there. D. 1214. L. 2-3.
21. Leningrad for 50 years... P. 22.
22. TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 4965. Op. 3. D. 1237. L. 3.
23. Right there. D. 1062. L. 13.
24. Right there. D. 1236. L. 2.
25. Chistyakova N. E. Decree. op. P. 173; Leningrad for 50 years. pp. 21, 130; The national economy of Leningrad and the Leningrad region in the 10th five-year plan... L., 1981. P. 23, 27; TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 7384. Op. 37. D. 1236. L. 2, 3; F. 4965. Op. 3. D. 1139. L. 23.
26. Leningrad for 50 years. pp. 20, 130; The national economy of Leningrad and the Leningrad region for 60 years. Statistical collection. L., 1977. P. 14: St. Petersburg 1703—2003. Anniversary statistical collection. St. Petersburg, 2003. P. 63; TsGAIPD SPb. F. 24. Op. 2c. D. 7666. L. 101-102; TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 4965. Op. 3. D. 105.L. 21; D. 521. L. 1; See also TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 4965. Op. 8. D. 557. L. 4; D. 738. L. 4-4a, 6-6a.
27. TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 4965. Op. 8. D. 738. L. 6-6a.
28. Right there.
29. TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 4965. Op. 3. D. 209. L. 39.
30. Right there. Op. 8. D. 738. L. 6-6a.
31. Right there. F. 7384. Op. 37. D. 1236. L. 2; F. 4965. Op. 3. D. 1136. L. 23.
32. Right there. F. 4965. Op. 3. D. 1062. P. 12; Op. 8. D. 557. L. 5a, 16a.
33. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 24. Op. 2nd century D. 7702. L. 58.
34. National economy of the USSR. 1922-1972. Anniversary statistical collection. M., 1967. P. 130; Leningrad for 50 years. P. 130; TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 7384. Op. 37. D. 1236. L. 6.
35. TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 4965. Op. 8. D. 738. L. 6-6a.
36. TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 4965. Op. 3. D. 1062. P. 27.
37. Right there. Op. 8. D. 738. L. 4-4a.
38. Nikolsky S.A. The influence of war and blockade on changes in the age and sex composition of the population, on marriage rates and the frequency of divorces in Leningrad // Medical and sanitary consequences of the war and measures to eliminate them. Proceedings of the conference December 17-19, 1946. T. 2. M., 1948. P. 9; The national economy of Leningrad and the Leningrad region in the 10th five-year plan... L., 1981. P. 27; TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 4965. Op. 3. D. 521. L. 1; D. 1139. L. 23; D. 209. L. 14.
39. TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 4965. Op. 8. D. 738. L. 7-7a.
40. See Volkov A. Population of Russia on the threshold of the 21st century: trends and prospects // Society and Economics. 1998. No. 8-9. pp. 31-51; Family crisis and depopulation in Russia // Sociological Research. 1999. No. 11. P. 50-52.
41. TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 4965. Op. 3. D. 1062. L. 25; Op. 8. D. 557. L. 7.
42. Right there.
43. See Population of Moscow. Past. The present. Future. M., 1992.
44. TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 4965. Op. 3. D. 1062. L. 11.
45. Population of Moscow. S. 5, 22.
46. Leningrad for 50 years. P. 21; TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 4965. Op. 3. D. 209. L. 22.
47. TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 4965. Op. 3. D. 209. L. 26.
48. Babayants R. A. On the progress of studying and eliminating the consequences of the war and blockade in Leningrad // Medical and sanitary consequences of the war and measures to eliminate them. Proceedings of the conference. T. 1. M., 1948. P. 30.
49. Leningrad for 50 years. P. 21; TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 4965. Op. 3. D. 209. L. 19 (counting).
50. TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 4965. Op. 3. D. 209. L. 19.
51. Leningrad for 50 years. P. 22; TsGA St. Petersburg. F. 4965. Op. 3. D. 209. L. 19; Op. 8 D. 557. L. 5.

About the number of deaths in 1941 and 1942.

"In September 1941, 6808 died, in October - 7353, in November - 11083.1 The peak of mortality occurred in December-March 1942. According to the city statistical office, 52881 people died in December 1941, in January 1942 - 101,583 people, in February - 107,477 people, in March 98,966 people.2 It seems that these figures are still approximate, although the dynamics of mortality are expressed correctly. These assumptions are confirmed by the "Certificate of the NKVD LO in the OK and the Civil Code of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" on the mortality rate of the city's population in January - March 1942." It provides slightly different data: in January 1942, 96,751 people died, in February - 96,015 people and in March 81,507 people.3 According to calculations by N.Yu. Cherepenina based on archival data in January In 1942, the death of 127 thousand Leningraders was registered."

Below the cut are more evacuation statistics by month.

1941
September - 6,808
October - 7,353
November - 11,083
December - 52,881
1942
January - 101,583 (96,751)
February - 107,477 (96,015)
March - 98,966 (81,507)

“According to official post-war data (presented, in particular, at the Nuremberg trials), the number of losses among the civilian population amounted to 649 thousand people (without taking into account the losses of the population of the city’s suburbs caught in the blockade ring), however, most researchers consider this number to be underestimated (numbers are given up to up to two million people).For comparison, in Hiroshima 78,150 people died and 13,983 people went missing.

The table below shows the number of deaths registered registry offices of 15 urban districts, as well as Kolpino and Kronstadt for 1942. Most researchers believe that registry offices recorded only a portion of the deaths."

Month	Men	Women	Total
January	89151	37838	126989
February	67448	55232	122680
March	41404	57077	98481
April	24854	41511	66365
May	14044	29083	43127
June	7511	17161	24672
July	4378	10788	15176
August	2214	5398	7612
September	1354	3160	4514
October	1028	2490	3518
November	1032	2349	3381
December	1602	2433	4035
Total	256020	264530	520550

(Materials from the book “Life and Death in Blockaded Leningrad. Historical and Medical Aspect”, St. Petersburg: 2001)

About evacuation.

Urodkov S.A. “Evacuation of the population of Leningrad in 1941-1942.”Bulletin of Leningrad University. 1958. 8. pp. 88-102.

"The planned evacuation of the population began on June 29 and continued until September 6, 1941 inclusive. During this time, 706,283 people were evacuated, including factories evacuated 164,320 people, district councils - 401,748 people, evacuation points 117,580 people and the city railway station - 22,635 people.

In October and November 1941, the evacuation of the population of Leningrad took place by water - through Lake Ladoga. During this time, 33,479 people were transported to the rear. At the end of November 1941, the evacuation of the population by air began. By the end of December of the same year, 35,114 people were transported by plane.”

“The issue of evacuating the population from Leningrad was considered by the State Defense Committee, whose decision proposed evacuating 500,000 people along the ice route.”

“From December 2, 1941 to April 15, 1942, 502,800 people arrived in Borisov Griva. A significantly smaller part of the evacuees traveled by passing cars and walked along the Ladoga highway to Zhikharevo, Kabony and Lavrovo without entering Borisov Griva. The most massive evacuation took place in March and April 1942, when the transport of the ice route worked most clearly. During the same time, 45% of the total number of evacuees received from Borisovaya Griva were sent to Zhikharevo and Voybokalo, 30% to Lavrovo and 25% to Kabona."

The Siege of Leningrad was a siege of one of the largest Russian cities that lasted more than two and a half years, which was waged by the German Army Group North with the help of Finnish troops on the Eastern Front of World War II. The blockade began on September 8, 1941, when the last route to Leningrad was blocked by the Germans. Although on January 18, 1943, Soviet troops managed to open a narrow corridor of communication with the city by land, the blockade was finally lifted only on January 27, 1944, 872 days after it began. It was one of the longest and most destructive sieges in history and perhaps the most costly in terms of casualties.

Prerequisites

The capture of Leningrad was one of the three strategic goals of the German Operation Barbarossa - and the main one for Army Group North. This importance was determined by the political status of Leningrad as the former capital of Russia and the Russian Revolution, its military significance as the main base of the Soviet Baltic Fleet, and the industrial power of the city, where there were many factories producing army equipment. By 1939 Leningrad produced 11% of all Soviet industrial output. It is said that Adolf Hitler was so confident of the capture of the city that, on his orders, invitations had already been printed to celebrate this event at the Astoria Hotel in Leningrad.

There are various assumptions about Germany's plans for Leningrad after its capture. Soviet journalist Lev Bezymensky argued that his city was supposed to be renamed Adolfsburg and turned into the capital of the new Ingermanland province of the Reich. Others claim that Hitler intended to completely destroy both Leningrad and its population. According to a directive sent to Army Group North on September 29, 1941, “After the defeat of Soviet Russia there is no interest in the continued existence of this major urban center. [...] Following the encirclement of the city, requests for negotiations for surrender should be rejected, since the problem of moving and feeding the population cannot and should not be solved by us. In this war for our existence, we cannot have an interest in preserving even a part of this very large urban population." It follows that Hitler's final plan was to raze Leningrad to the ground and give the areas north of the Neva to the Finns.

872 days of Leningrad. In a hungry loop

Preparing the blockade

Army Group North was moving towards Leningrad, its main goal (see Baltic operation 1941 and Leningrad operation 1941). Its commander, Field Marshal von Leeb, initially thought to take the city outright. But due to Hitler’s recall of the 4th Panzer Group (chief of the General Staff Halder persuaded him to transfer it further south, so that Feodor von Bock could attack Moscow) von Leeb had to begin a siege. He reached the shore of Lake Ladoga, trying to complete the encirclement of the city and connect with the Finnish army of the marshal Mannerheim, waiting for him on the Svir River.

Finnish troops were located north of Leningrad, and German troops approached the city from the south. Both had the goal of cutting off all communications to the city’s defenders, although Finland’s participation in the blockade mainly consisted of recapturing lands lost in the recent Soviet-Finnish war. The Germans hoped that their main weapon would be hunger.

Already on June 27, 1941, the Leningrad Soviet organized armed detachments of civilian militias. In the coming days, the entire population of Leningrad was informed of the danger. More than a million people were mobilized to build fortifications. Several defense lines were created along the perimeter of the city, from the north and south, defended mainly by civilians. In the south, one of the fortified lines ran from the mouth of the Luga River to Chudov, Gatchina, Uritsk, Pulkovo, and then across the Neva River. Another line ran through Peterhof to Gatchina, Pulkovo, Kolpino and Koltushi. The line of defense against the Finns in the north (Karelian fortified area) had been maintained in the northern suburbs of Leningrad since the 1930s and has now been renewed.

As R. Colley writes in his book “The Siege of Leningrad”:

...By order of June 27, 1941, all men from 16 to 50 years old and women from 16 to 45 were involved in the construction of fortifications, except for the sick, pregnant women and those caring for babies. Those conscripted were required to work for seven days, followed by four days of “rest,” during which they were required to return to their regular workplace or continue their studies. In August, the age limits were expanded to 55 years for men and 50 for women. The length of work shifts has also increased - seven days of work and one day of rest.

However, in reality these norms were never followed. One 57-year-old woman wrote that for eighteen days in a row, twelve hours a day, she hammered the ground, “hard as stone”... Teenage girls with delicate hands, who came in summer sundresses and sandals, had to dig the ground and drag heavy concrete blocks , having only a crowbar ... The civilian population erecting defensive structures often found themselves in the bombing zone or were shot at by German fighters from strafing flight.

It was a titanic effort, but some considered it in vain, confident that the Germans would easily overcome all these defensive lines...

The civilian population constructed a total of 306 km of wooden barricades, 635 km of wire fences, 700 km of anti-tank ditches, 5,000 earthen and wooden and reinforced concrete bunkers and 25,000 km of open trenches. Even the guns from the cruiser Aurora were moved to the Pulkovo Heights, south of Leningrad.

G. Zhukov claims that in the first three months of the war, 10 voluntary militia divisions, as well as 16 separate artillery and machine-gun militia battalions, were formed in Leningrad.

…[City party leader] Zhdanov announced the creation of a “people’s militia” in Leningrad... Neither age nor health were an obstacle. By the end of August 1941, over 160,000 Leningraders, of which 32,000 were women, had enlisted in the militia [voluntarily or under duress].

The militias were poorly trained, they were given old rifles and grenades, and were also taught to make incendiary bombs, which later became known as Molotov cocktails. The first division of militia was formed on July 10 and already on July 14, practically without preparation, it was sent to the front to help the regular units of the Red Army. Almost all the militia died. Women and children were warned that if the Germans broke into the city, they would have to throw stones at them and pour boiling water on their heads.

... Loudspeakers continuously reported on the successes of the Red Army, holding back the onslaught of the Nazis, but kept silent about the huge losses of poorly trained, poorly armed troops...

On July 18, food distribution was introduced. People were given food cards that expired in a month. A total of four categories of cards were established; the highest category corresponded to the largest ration. It was possible to maintain the highest category only through hard work.

The 18th Army of the Wehrmacht accelerated its rush to Ostrov and Pskov, and the Soviet troops of the North-Western Front retreated to Leningrad. On July 10, 1941, Ostrov and Pskov were taken, and the 18th Army reached Narva and Kingisepp, from where it continued to advance towards Leningrad from the Luga River line. The German 4th Panzer Group of General Hoepner, attacking from East Prussia, reached Novgorod by August 16 after a rapid advance and, having taken it, also rushed to Leningrad. Soon the Germans created a continuous front from the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ladoga, expecting that the Finnish army would meet them halfway along the eastern shore of Ladoga.

On August 6, Hitler repeated his order: “Leningrad should be taken first, Donbass second, Moscow third.” From August 1941 to January 1944, everything that happened in the military theater between the Arctic Ocean and Lake Ilmen in one way or another related to the operation near Leningrad. Arctic convoys carried American Lend-Lease and British supplies along the Northern Sea Route to the railway station of Murmansk (although its railway connection with Leningrad was cut off by Finnish troops) and to several other places in Lapland.

Troops participating in the operation

Germany

Army Group North (Field Marshal von Leeb). It included:

18th Army (von Küchler): XXXXII Corps (2 infantry divisions) and XXVI Corps (3 infantry divisions).

16th Army (Bush): XXVIII Corps (von Wiktorin) (2 Infantry, 1 Panzer Division 1), I Corps (2 Infantry Divisions), X Corps (3 Infantry Divisions), II Corps (3 Infantry Divisions), (L Corps - from the 9th Army) (2 infantry divisions).

4th Panzer Group (Göpner): XXXVIII Corps (von Chappius) (1st Infantry Division), XXXXI Motorized Corps (Reinhardt) (1 infantry, 1 motorized, 1 tank divisions), LVI Motorized Corps (von Manstein) (1 infantry, 1 motorized, 1 tank, 1 tank-grenadier divisions).

Finland

Finnish Defense Forces HQ (Marshal Mannerheim). They included: I Corps (2 infantry divisions), II Corps (2 infantry divisions), IV Corps (3 infantry divisions).

Northern Front (Lieutenant General Popov). It included:

7th Army (2 rifle divisions, 1 militia division, 1 marine brigade, 3 motorized rifle and 1 tank regiment).

8th Army: Xth Rifle Corps (2 rifle divisions), XI Rifle Corps (3 rifle divisions), separate units (3 rifle divisions).

14th Army: XXXXII Rifle Corps (2 rifle divisions), separate units (2 rifle divisions, 1 fortified area, 1 motorized rifle regiment).

23rd Army: XIXth Rifle Corps (3 rifle divisions), Separate units (2 rifle, 1 motorized division, 2 fortified areas, 1 rifle regiment).

Luga operational group: XXXXI Rifle Corps (3 rifle divisions); separate units (1 tank brigade, 1 rifle regiment).

Kingisepp operational group: separate units (2 rifle, 1 tank division, 2 militia divisions, 1 fortified area).

Separate units (3 rifle divisions, 4 guard militia divisions, 3 fortified areas, 1 rifle brigade).

Of these, the 14th Army defended Murmansk, and the 7th Army defended areas of Karelia near Lake Ladoga. Thus, they did not take part in the initial stages of the siege. The 8th Army was originally part of the Northwestern Front. Retreating from the Germans through the Baltic states, on July 14, 1941 it was transferred to the Northern Front.

On August 23, 1941, the Northern Front was divided into the Leningrad and Karelian fronts, since the front headquarters could no longer control all operations between Murmansk and Leningrad.

Environment of Leningrad

Finnish intelligence had broken some of the Soviet military codes and was able to read a number of enemy communications. This was especially useful for Hitler, who constantly asked for intelligence information about Leningrad. The role of Finland in Operation Barbarossa was defined by Hitler’s “Directive 21” as follows: “The mass of the Finnish army will be given the task, together with the advance of the northern wing of the German armies, to bind the maximum of Russian forces with an attack from the west or from both sides of Lake Ladoga.”

The last railway connection with Leningrad was cut off on August 30, 1941, when the Germans reached the Neva. On September 8, the Germans reached Lake Ladoga near Shlisselburg and interrupted the last land road to the besieged city, stopping only 11 km from the city limits. The Axis troops did not occupy only the land corridor between Lake Ladoga and Leningrad. The shelling on September 8, 1941 caused 178 fires in the city.

Line of greatest advance of German and Finnish troops near Leningrad

On September 21, the German command considered options for the destruction of Leningrad. The idea of ​​occupying the city was rejected with the instruction: “we would then have to supply food to the residents.” The Germans decided to keep the city under siege and bombard it, leaving the population to starve. “Early next year we will enter the city (if the Finns do this first, we will not object), sending those who are still alive to internal Russia or into captivity, wipe Leningrad from the face of the earth, and hand over the area north of the Neva to the Finns " On October 7, 1941, Hitler sent another directive, reminding that Army Group North should not accept surrender from the Leningraders.

Finland's participation in the siege of Leningrad

In August 1941, the Finns approached 20 km to the northern suburbs of Leningrad, reaching the Finnish-Soviet border in 1939. Threatening the city from the north, they also advanced through Karelia to the east of Lake Ladoga, creating a danger to the city from the east. Finnish troops crossed the border that existed before the “Winter War” on the Karelian Isthmus, “cutting off” the Soviet protrusions on Beloostrov and Kiryasalo and thereby straightening the front line. Soviet historiography claimed that the Finnish movement stopped in September due to resistance from the Karelian fortified area. However, Finnish troops already at the beginning of August 1941 received orders to stop the offensive after achieving its goals, some of which lay beyond the pre-war 1939 border.

Over the next three years, the Finns contributed to the Battle of Leningrad by holding their lines. Their command rejected German entreaties to launch air attacks on Leningrad. The Finns did not go south of the Svir River in Eastern Karelia (160 km northeast of Leningrad), which they reached on September 7, 1941. In the southeast, the Germans captured Tikhvin on November 8, 1941, but were unable to complete the final encirclement of Leningrad by pushing further north , to connect with the Finns on Svir. On December 9, a counterattack by the Volkhov Front forced the Wehrmacht to retreat from its positions at Tikhvin to the line of the Volkhov River. Thanks to this, the line of communication with Leningrad along Lake Ladoga was preserved.

September 6, 1941 chief of the operational department of the Wehrmacht headquarters Alfred Jodl visited Helsinki in order to convince Field Marshal Mannerheim to continue the offensive. Finnish President Ryti, meanwhile, told his parliament that the purpose of the war was to regain areas lost during the "Winter War" of 1939-1940 and gain even more territory in the east, which would create a "Greater Finland". After the war, Ryti stated: “On August 24, 1941, I visited the headquarters of Field Marshal Mannerheim. The Germans encouraged us to cross the old border and continue the attack on Leningrad. I said that the capture of Leningrad was not part of our plans and that we would not take part in it. Mannerheim and War Minister Walden agreed with me and rejected the German proposals. As a result, a paradoxical situation arose: the Germans could not approach Leningrad from the north...”

Trying to whitewash himself in the eyes of the victors, Ryti thus assured that the Finns almost prevented the complete encirclement of the city by the Germans. In fact, German and Finnish forces held the siege together until January 1944, but there was very little systematic shelling and bombing of Leningrad by the Finns. However, the proximity of the Finnish positions - 33-35 km from the center of Leningrad - and the threat of a possible attack from them complicated the defense of the city. Until Mannerheim stopped his offensive (August 31, 1941), the commander of the Soviet Northern Front, Popov, could not release the reserves that stood against the Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus in order to turn them against the Germans. Popov managed to redeploy two divisions to the German sector only on September 5, 1941.

Borders of advance of the Finnish army in Karelia. Map. The gray line marks the Soviet-Finnish border in 1939.

Soon Finnish troops cut off the ledges at Beloostrov and Kiryasalo, which threatened their positions on the seashore and south of the Vuoksi River. Lieutenant General Paavo Talvela and Colonel Järvinen, the commander of the Finnish coastal brigade, responsible for the Ladoga sector, proposed to the German headquarters to block Soviet convoys on Lake Ladoga. The German command formed an “international” detachment of sailors under Finnish command (this included the Italian XII Squadriglia MAS) and the naval formation Einsatzstab Fähre Ost under German command. In the summer and autumn of 1942, these water forces interfered with communications with the besieged Leningraders along Ladoga. The appearance of ice forced the removal of these lightly armed units. They were never restored later due to changes in the front line.

City defense

The command of the Leningrad Front, formed after the division of the Northern Front in two, was entrusted to Marshal Voroshilov. The front included the 23rd Army (in the north, between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga) and the 48th Army (in the west, between the Gulf of Finland and the Slutsk-Mga position). It also included the Leningrad fortified area, the Leningrad garrison, the forces of the Baltic Fleet and the operational groups Koporye, Yuzhnaya (on the Pulkovo Heights) and Slutsk - Kolpino.

...By order of Voroshilov, units of the people's militia were sent to the front line just three days after formation, untrained, without military uniforms and weapons. Due to a shortage of weapons, Voroshilov ordered the militia to be armed with “hunting rifles, homemade grenades, sabers and daggers from Leningrad museums.”

The shortage of uniforms was so acute that Voroshilov addressed the population with an appeal, and teenagers went from house to house, collecting donations of money or clothing...

The shortsightedness of Voroshilov and Zhdanov had tragic consequences. They were repeatedly advised to disperse the main food supplies stored in the Badayev warehouses. These warehouses, located in the south of the city, extended over an area of ​​one and a half hectares. The wooden buildings were closely adjacent to each other; almost all the city's food supplies were stored in them. Despite the vulnerability of the old wooden buildings, neither Voroshilov nor Zhdanov heeded the advice. On September 8, incendiary bombs were dropped on warehouses. 3,000 tons of flour burned, thousands of tons of grain turned to ash, meat was charred, butter melted, melted chocolate flowed into the cellars. “That night, molten burnt sugar flowed through the streets,” said one of the eyewitnesses. Thick smoke was visible for many kilometers away, and with it the hopes of the city disappeared.

(R. Colley. “Siege of Leningrad.”)

By September 8, German troops had almost completely surrounded the city. Dissatisfied with Voroshilov's inability, Stalin removed him and replaced him for a time with G. Zhukov. Zhukov only managed to prevent the capture of Leningrad by the Germans, but they were not driven back from the city and laid siege to it for “900 days and nights.” As A.I. Solzhenitsyn writes in the story “On the Edges”:

Voroshilov failed the Finnish war, was removed for a while, but already during Hitler’s attack he received the entire North-West, immediately failed both it and Leningrad - and was removed, but again - a successful marshal and in his closest trusted circle, like the two Semyons - Tymoshenko and the hopeless Budyonny, who failed both the South-West and the Reserve Front, and all of them were still members of the Headquarters, where Stalin had not yet included a single Vasilevsky, neither Vatutina, – and of course everyone remained marshals. Zhukov - did not give a marshal either for the salvation of Leningrad, or for the salvation of Moscow, or for the Stalingrad victory. What then is the meaning of the title if Zhukov handled affairs above all the marshals? Only after the Leningrad blockade was lifted - he suddenly gave it.

Rupert Colley reports:

...Stalin was fed up with Voroshilov's incompetence. He sent Georgy Zhukov to Leningrad to save the situation... Zhukov was flying to Leningrad from Moscow under the cover of clouds, but as soon as the clouds cleared, two Messerschmitts rushed in pursuit of his plane. Zhukov landed safely and was immediately taken to Smolny. First of all, Zhukov handed Voroshilov an envelope. It contained an order addressed to Voroshilov to immediately return to Moscow...

On September 11, the German 4th Panzer Army was transferred from near Leningrad to the south to increase the pressure on Moscow. In desperation, Zhukov nevertheless made several attempts to attack the German positions, but the Germans had already managed to erect defensive structures and received reinforcements, so all attacks were repulsed. When Stalin called Zhukov on October 5 to find out the latest news, he proudly reported that the German offensive had stopped. Stalin recalled Zhukov back to Moscow to lead the defense of the capital. After Zhukov's departure, command of the troops in the city was entrusted to Major General Ivan Fedyuninsky.

(R. Colley. “Siege of Leningrad.”)

Bombing and shelling of Leningrad

... On September 4, the first shell fell on Leningrad, and two days later it was followed by the first bomb. Artillery shelling of the city began... The most striking example of devastating destruction was the destruction of the Badayevsky warehouses and dairy plant on September 8. The carefully camouflaged Smolny did not receive a single scratch throughout the entire blockade, despite the fact that all neighboring buildings suffered from hits...

Leningraders had to stand guard on roofs and stairwells, keeping buckets of water and sand ready to extinguish incendiary bombs. Fires raged throughout the city, caused by incendiary bombs dropped by German planes. Street barricades, designed to block the way for German tanks and armored vehicles if they broke into the city, only impeded the passage of fire trucks and ambulances. It often happened that no one extinguished a building that was on fire and it burned out completely, because the fire trucks did not have enough water to douse the fire, or there was no fuel to get to the place.

(R. Colley. “Siege of Leningrad.”)

The air attack on September 19, 1941 was the worst air raid that Leningrad suffered during the war. A strike on the city by 276 German bombers killed 1,000 people. Many of those killed were soldiers being treated for wounds in hospitals. During six air raids that day, five hospitals and the city's largest market were damaged.

The intensity of artillery shelling of Leningrad increased in 1942 with the delivery of new equipment to the Germans. They intensified even more in 1943, when they began to use shells and bombs several times larger than the year before. German shelling and bombing during the siege killed 5,723 civilians and injured 20,507 civilians. The aviation of the Soviet Baltic Fleet, for its part, made more than 100 thousand sorties against the besiegers.

Evacuation of residents from besieged Leningrad

According to G. Zhukov, “before the war, Leningrad had a population of 3,103,000 people, and with its suburbs - 3,385,000. Of these, 1,743,129, including 414,148 children, were evacuated from June 29, 1941 to March 31, 1943. They were transported to the regions of the Volga region, the Urals, Siberia and Kazakhstan.”

By September 1941, the connection between Leningrad and the Volkhov Front (commander - K. Meretskov) was cut off. The defensive sectors were held by four armies: the 23rd Army in the north, the 42nd Army in the west, the 55th Army in the south, and the 67th Army in the east. The 8th Army of the Volkhov Front and the Ladoga Flotilla were responsible for maintaining the communication route with the city across Ladoga. Leningrad was defended from air attacks by the air defense forces of the Leningrad Military District and the naval aviation of the Baltic Fleet.

The actions to evacuate residents were led by Zhdanov, Voroshilov and A. Kuznetsov. Additional military operations were carried out in coordination with the Baltic Fleet forces under the overall command of Admiral V. Tributs. The Ladoga flotilla under the command of V. Baranovsky, S. Zemlyanichenko, P. Trainin and B. Khoroshikhin also played an important role in the evacuation of the civilian population.

...After the first few days, the city authorities decided that too many women were leaving the city, while their labor was needed here, and they began to send the children alone. A mandatory evacuation was declared for all children under the age of fourteen. Many children arrived at the station or collection point, and then, due to confusion, waited four days for departure. The food, carefully collected by caring mothers, was eaten in the very first hours. Of particular concern were rumors that German planes were shooting down trains containing evacuees. The authorities denied these rumors, calling them “hostile and provocative,” but confirmation soon came. The worst tragedy occurred on August 18 at the Lychkovo station. A German bomber dropped bombs on a train carrying evacuated children. The panic began. An eyewitness said that there was a scream and through the smoke he saw severed limbs and dying children...

By the end of August, over 630,000 civilians were evacuated from Leningrad. However, the city's population did not decline due to refugees fleeing the German advance in the west. The authorities were going to continue the evacuation, sending 30,000 people a day from the city, however, when the city of Mga, located 50 kilometers from Leningrad, fell on August 30, the encirclement was practically completed. The evacuation stopped. Due to the unknown number of refugees in the city, estimates vary, but approximately there were up to 3,500,000 [people] within the blockade ring. There was only enough food left for three weeks.

(R. Colley. “Siege of Leningrad.”)

Famine in besieged Leningrad

The two and a half year German siege of Leningrad caused the worst destruction and greatest loss of life in the history of modern cities. By order of Hitler, most of the royal palaces (Catherine, Peterhof, Ropsha, Strelna, Gatchina) and other historical attractions located outside the city’s defense lines were looted and destroyed, many art collections were transported to Germany. A number of factories, schools, hospitals and other civilian structures were destroyed by air raids and shelling.

The 872-day siege caused severe famine in the Leningrad region due to the destruction of engineering structures, water, energy and food. It led to the death of up to 1,500,000 people, not counting those who died during the evacuation. Half a million victims of the siege are buried at the Piskarevskoye Memorial Cemetery in Leningrad alone. Human losses in Leningrad on both sides exceeded those suffered in the Battle of Stalingrad, the Battle of Moscow and atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Siege of Leningrad became the deadliest siege in world history. Some historians consider it necessary to say that in its course genocide was carried out - “racially motivated famine” - an integral part of the German war of extermination against the population of the Soviet Union.

The diary of a Leningrad girl Tanya Savicheva with entries about the death of all members of her family. Tanya herself also died from progressive dystrophy shortly after the blockade. Her diary as a girl was shown at the Nuremberg trials

Civilians of the city especially suffered from hunger in the winter of 1941/42. From November 1941 to February 1942, only 125 grams of bread were given per person per day, which consisted of 50-60% sawdust and other non-food impurities. For about two weeks in early January 1942, even this food was available only to workers and soldiers. Mortality peaked in January–February 1942 at 100 thousand people per month, mostly from starvation.

...After several months there were almost no dogs, cats or birds left in cages in the city. Suddenly, one of the last sources of fat, castor oil, was in demand. His supplies soon ran out.

Bread baked from flour swept from the floor along with garbage, nicknamed the “siege loaf,” turned out black as coal and had almost the same composition. The broth was nothing more than boiled water with a pinch of salt and, if you were lucky, a cabbage leaf. Money lost all value, as did any non-food items and jewelry—it was impossible to buy a crust of bread with family silver. Even birds and rodents suffered without food until they all disappeared: they either died of hunger or were eaten by desperate people... People, while they still had strength left, stood in long lines for food, sometimes for whole days in the piercing cold, and often returned home empty-handed, filled with despair - if they remained alive. The Germans, seeing the long lines of Leningraders, dropped shells on the unfortunate residents of the city. And yet people stood in lines: death from a shell was possible, while death from hunger was inevitable.

Everyone had to decide for themselves how to use the tiny daily ration - eat it in one sitting... or spread it out over the whole day. Relatives and friends helped each other, but the very next day they quarreled desperately among themselves over who got how much. When all alternative food sources ran out, people in desperation turned to inedible things - livestock feed, flaxseed oil and leather belts. Soon, belts, which people initially ate out of desperation, were already considered a luxury. Wood glue and paste containing animal fat were scraped off furniture and walls and boiled. People ate soil collected in the vicinity of the Badaevsky warehouses for the sake of the particles of molten sugar it contained.

The city lost water because water pipes froze and pumping stations were bombed. Without water, the taps dried up, the sewer system stopped working... City residents made holes in the frozen Neva and scooped up water in buckets. Without water, bakeries could not bake bread. In January 1942, when the water shortage became particularly acute, 8,000 people who had remained strong enough formed a human chain and passed hundreds of buckets of water from hand to hand, just to get the bakeries working again.

Numerous stories have been preserved about unfortunate people who stood in line for many hours for a loaf of bread only to have it snatched from their hands and greedily devoured by a man mad with hunger. The theft of bread cards became widespread; the desperate robbed people in broad daylight or picked the pockets of corpses and those wounded during German shelling. Obtaining a duplicate turned into such a long and painful process that many died without waiting for the wandering of a new ration card in the wilds of the bureaucratic system to end...

Hunger turned people into living skeletons. Rations reached a minimum in November 1941. The ration of manual workers was 700 calories per day, while the minimum ration was approximately 3,000 calories. Employees received 473 calories per day, compared with the normal 2,000 to 2,500 calories, and children received 423 calories per day, less than a quarter of what a newborn needs.

The limbs were swollen, the stomachs were swollen, the skin was tight on the face, the eyes were sunken, the gums were bleeding, the teeth were enlarged from malnutrition, the skin was covered with ulcers.

The fingers became numb and refused to straighten. Children with wrinkled faces resembled old people, and old people looked like the living dead... Children, left overnight orphans, wandered the streets as lifeless shadows in search of food... Any movement caused pain. Even the process of chewing food became unbearable...

By the end of September, we ran out of kerosene for our home stoves. Coal and fuel oil were not enough to fuel residential buildings. The power supply was irregular, for an hour or two a day... The apartments were freezing, frost appeared on the walls, the clocks stopped working because their hands froze. Winters in Leningrad are often harsh, but the winter of 1941/42 was particularly severe. Wooden fences were dismantled for firewood, and wooden crosses were stolen from cemeteries. After the supply of firewood on the street completely dried up, people began to burn furniture and books in the stoves - today a chair leg, tomorrow a floorboard, the next day the first volume of Anna Karenina, and the whole family huddled around the only source of heat... Soon Desperate people found another use for books: the torn pages were soaked in water and eaten.

The sight of a man carrying a body wrapped in a blanket, tablecloth or curtain to a cemetery on a sled became a common sight... The dead were laid out in rows, but the gravediggers could not dig graves: the ground was frozen through, and they, equally hungry, did not have enough strength for the grueling work . There were no coffins: all the wood was used as fuel.

The courtyards of the hospitals were “littered with mountains of corpses, blue, emaciated, terrible”... Finally, excavators began to dig deep ditches for the mass burial of the dead. Soon these excavators were the only machines that could be seen on the city streets. There were no more cars, no trams, no buses, which were all requisitioned for the “Road of Life”...

Corpses were lying everywhere, and their number was growing every day... No one had the strength left to remove the corpses. The fatigue was so all-consuming that I wanted to stop, despite the cold, sit down and rest. But the crouched man could no longer rise without outside help and froze to death. At the first stage of the blockade, compassion and the desire to help were common, but as the weeks passed, food became less and less, the body and mind weakened, and people became withdrawn into themselves, as if they were walking in their sleep... Accustomed to the sight of death, they became almost indifferent towards him, people increasingly lost the ability to help others...

And amid all this despair, beyond human understanding, German shells and bombs continued to fall on the city

(R. Colley. “Siege of Leningrad.”)

Cannibalism during the siege

Documentation NKVD Cannibalism during the siege of Leningrad was not published until 2004. Most of the evidence of cannibalism that had surfaced up to this time was tried to be presented as unreliable anecdotes.

NKVD records record the first consumption of human flesh on December 13, 1941. The report describes thirteen cases, from a mother who strangled her 18-month-old child to feed three older ones to a plumber who killed his wife to feed his sons and nephews.

By December 1942, the NKVD had arrested 2,105 cannibals, dividing them into two categories: “corpse eaters” and “cannibals.” The latter (those who killed and ate living people) were usually shot, and the former were imprisoned. The Soviet Criminal Code did not have a clause on cannibalism, so all sentences were passed under Article 59 (“a special case of banditry”).

There were significantly fewer cannibals than corpse eaters; of the 300 people arrested in April 1942 for cannibalism, only 44 were murderers. 64% of the cannibals were women, 44% were unemployed, 90% were illiterate, only 2% had a previous criminal record. Women with young children and no criminal records, deprived of male support, often became cannibals, which gave the courts a reason for some leniency.

Considering the gigantic scale of the famine, the extent of cannibalism in besieged Leningrad can be considered relatively insignificant. No less common were murders over bread cards. In the first six months of 1942, 1,216 of them occurred in Leningrad. Many historians believe that the small number of cases of cannibalism “only emphasized that the majority of Leningraders maintained their cultural norms in the most unimaginable circumstances.”

Connection with blockaded Leningrad

It was vitally important to establish a route for constant supplies to Leningrad. It passed through the southern part of Lake Ladoga and the land corridor to the city west of Ladoga, which remained unoccupied by the Germans. Transportation across Lake Ladoga was carried out by water in the warm season and by truck on ice in winter. The security of the supply route was ensured by the Ladoga Flotilla, the Leningrad Air Defense Corps and the Road Security Troops. Food supplies were delivered to the village of Osinovets, from where they were transported 45 km to a small commuter railway to Leningrad. This route was also used to evacuate civilians from the besieged city.

In the chaos of the first war winter, no evacuation plan was developed. Until the ice road across Lake Ladoga opened on November 20, 1941, Leningrad was completely isolated.

The path along Ladoga was called the “Road of Life”. She was very dangerous. Cars often got stuck in the snow and fell through the ice, on which the Germans dropped bombs. Due to the large number of people who died in winter, this route was also called the “Road of Death.” However, it made it possible to bring in ammunition and food and pick up civilians and wounded soldiers from the city.

...The road was laid in terrible conditions - among snow storms, under an incessant barrage of German shells and bombs. When construction was finally completed, traffic along it also proved to be fraught with great risk. Trucks fell into huge cracks that suddenly appeared in the ice. To avoid such cracks, the trucks drove with their headlights on, which made them perfect targets for German planes... The trucks skidded, collided with each other, and the engines froze at temperatures below 20 °C. Along its entire length, the Road of Life was littered with broken down cars abandoned right on the ice of the lake. During the first crossing alone in early December, over 150 trucks were lost.

By the end of December 1941, 700 tons of food and fuel were delivered to Leningrad daily along the Road of Life. This was not enough, but thin ice forced the trucks to be loaded only halfway. By the end of January, the lake had frozen almost a full meter, allowing the daily supply volume to increase to 2,000 tons. And this was still not enough, but the Road of Life gave Leningraders the most important thing - hope. Vera Inber in her diary on January 13, 1942 wrote about the Road of Life like this: “... maybe our salvation will begin from here.” Truck drivers, loaders, mechanics, and orderlies worked around the clock. They went to rest only when they were already collapsing from fatigue. By March, the city received so much food that it became possible to create a small reserve.

Plans to resume the evacuation of civilians were initially rejected by Stalin, who feared unfavorable political repercussions, but he eventually gave permission for the most defenseless to leave the city along the Road of Life. By April, 5,000 people were transported from Leningrad every day...

The evacuation process itself was a great shock. The thirty-kilometer journey across the ice of the lake took up to twelve hours in an unheated truck bed, covered only with a tarpaulin. There were so many people packed that people had to grab the sides; mothers often held their children in their arms. For these unfortunate evacuees, the Road of Life became the “Road of Death.” One eyewitness tells how a mother, exhausted after several hours of riding in the back of a snowstorm, dropped her bundled child. The driver could not stop the truck on the ice, and the child was left to die from the cold... If the car broke down, as often happened, those who were traveling in it had to wait for several hours on the ice, in the cold, under the snow, under bullets and bombs from German planes . The trucks drove in convoys, but they could not stop if one of them broke down or fell through the ice. One woman watched in horror as the car in front fell through the ice. Her two children were traveling in it.

The spring of 1942 brought a thaw, which made further use of the ice Road of Life impossible. Warming has brought about a new scourge: disease. Piles of corpses and mountains of excrement, which had until now remained frozen, began to decompose with the advent of warmth. Due to the lack of normal water supply and sewerage, dysentery, smallpox and typhus quickly spread in the city, affecting already weakened people...

It seemed that the spread of epidemics would finally wipe out the population of Leningrad, which had already been considerably thinned out, but in March 1942 people gathered and together began a grandiose operation to clear the city. Weakened by malnutrition, Leningraders made superhuman efforts... Since they had to use tools hastily made from scrap materials, the work progressed very slowly, however... the work of cleaning the city, which ended in victory, marked the beginning of a collective spiritual awakening.

The coming spring brought a new source of food - pine needles and oak bark. These plant components provided people with the vitamins they needed, protecting them from scurvy and epidemics. By mid-April, the ice on Lake Ladoga had become too thin to withstand the Road of Life, but rations still remained significantly better than they were in the darkest days of December and January, not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively: the bread now tasted like real bread. To everyone’s joy, the first grass appeared and vegetable gardens were planted everywhere...

April 15, 1942... the power supply generators, which had been inactive for so long, were repaired and, as a result, the tram lines began to function again.

One nurse describes how the sick and wounded, who were near death, crawled to the windows of the hospital to see with their own eyes the trams rushing past, which had not run for so long... People began to trust each other again, they washed themselves, changed their clothes, women began to use cosmetics, again theaters and museums opened.

(R. Colley. “Siege of Leningrad.”)

Death of the Second Shock Army near Leningrad

In the winter of 1941-1942, after repelling the Nazis from near Moscow, Stalin gave the order to go on the offensive along the entire front. About this broad, but failed offensive (which included the famous, disastrous for Zhukov Rzhev meat grinder) was little reported in previous Soviet textbooks. During it, an attempt was made to break the blockade of Leningrad. The hastily formed Second Shock Army was rushed towards the city. The Nazis cut it off. In March 1942, the deputy commander of the Volkhov Front (Meretskova), a famous fighter against communism, general, was sent to command the army already in the “bag”. Andrey Vlasov. A. I. Solzhenitsyn reports in “The Gulag Archipelago”:

...The last winter routes were still holding out, but Stalin forbade withdrawal; on the contrary, he drove the dangerously deepened army to advance further - through the abandoned swampy terrain, without food, without weapons, without air support. After two months of starvation and the drying out of the army (the soldiers from there later told me in the Butyrka cells that they trimmed the hooves of dead, rotting horses, cooked the shavings and ate them), the German concentric offensive against the encircled army began on May 14, 1942 (and in the air, of course, only German planes ). And only then, in mockery, was Stalin’s permission to return beyond the Volkhov received. And then there were these hopeless attempts to break through! - until the beginning of July.

The Second Shock Army was lost almost entirely. Captured, Vlasov ended up in Vinnitsa in a special camp for senior captured officers, which was formed by Count Stauffenberg, a future conspirator against Hitler. There, from the Soviet commanders who deservedly hated Stalin, with the help of German military circles in opposition to the Fuhrer, a Russian Liberation Army.

Performance of Shostakovich's Seventh Symphony in besieged Leningrad

...However, the event that was destined to make the greatest contribution to the spiritual revival of Leningrad was still ahead. This event proved to the whole country and the whole world that Leningraders had survived the most terrible times and their beloved city would live on. This miracle was created by a native Leningrader who loved his city and was a great composer.

On September 17, 1942, Dmitri Shostakovich, speaking on the radio, said: “An hour ago I finished the score of the second part of my new large symphonic work.” This work was the Seventh Symphony, later called the Leningrad Symphony.

Evacuated to Kuibyshev (now Samara)... Shostakovich continued to work hard on the symphony... The premiere of this symphony, dedicated to “our fight against fascism, our upcoming victory and my native Leningrad,” took place in Kuibyshev on March 5, 1942...

...The most prominent conductors began to argue for the right to perform this work. It was first performed by the London Symphony Orchestra under the baton of Sir Henry Wood, and on July 19 it was performed in New York, conducted by Arthur Toscanini...

Then it was decided to perform the Seventh Symphony in Leningrad itself. According to Zhdanov, this was supposed to raise the morale of the city... The main orchestra of Leningrad, the Leningrad Philharmonic, was evacuated, but the orchestra of the Leningrad Radio Committee remained in the city. Its conductor, forty-two-year-old Carl Eliasberg, was tasked with gathering the musicians. But out of one hundred orchestra members, only fourteen people remained in the city, the rest were drafted into the army, killed or died of hunger... A call was spread throughout the troops: all those who knew how to play any musical instrument had to report to their superiors... Knowing how weakened by the musicians who gathered in March 1942 for the first rehearsal, Eliasberg understood the difficult task facing him. “Dear friends,” he said, “we are weak, but we must force ourselves to start working.” And this work was difficult: despite the additional rations, many musicians, primarily wind players, lost consciousness from the stress that playing their instruments required... Only once during all the rehearsals did the orchestra have enough strength to perform the entire symphony - three days before public speaking.

The concert was scheduled for August 9, 1942 - several months earlier, the Nazis had chosen this date for a magnificent celebration at the Astoria Hotel in Leningrad for the expected capture of the city. Invitations were even printed and remained unsent.

The Philharmonic Concert Hall was filled to capacity. People came in their best clothes... The musicians, despite the warm August weather, wore coats and gloves with their fingers cut off - the starving body was constantly experiencing the cold. All over the city, people gathered in the streets near loudspeakers. Lieutenant General Leonid Govorov, who had headed the defense of Leningrad since April 1942, ordered a barrage of artillery shells to be rained down on German positions several hours before the concert to ensure silence at least for the duration of the symphony. The loudspeakers turned on at full power were directed towards the Germans - the city wanted the enemy to listen too.

“The very performance of the Seventh Symphony in besieged Leningrad,” the announcer announced, “is evidence of the ineradicable patriotic spirit of Leningraders, their perseverance, their faith in victory. Listen, comrades! And the city listened. The Germans who approached him listened. The whole world listened...

Many years after the war, Eliasberg met German soldiers sitting in trenches on the outskirts of the city. They told the conductor that when they heard the music, they cried:

Then, on August 9, 1942, we realized that we would lose the war. We have felt your strength, capable of overcoming hunger, fear and even death. “Who are we shooting at? – we asked ourselves. “We will never be able to take Leningrad because its people are so selfless.”

(R. Colley. “Siege of Leningrad.”)

Offensive at Sinyavino

A few days later, the Soviet offensive began at Sinyavino. It was an attempt to break the blockade of the city by the beginning of autumn. The Volkhov and Leningrad fronts were given the task of uniting. At the same time, the Germans, having brought up the troops freed after capture of Sevastopol, were preparing for an offensive (Operation Northern Light) with the goal of capturing Leningrad. Neither side knew of the other's plans until the fighting began.

The offensive at Sinyavino was several weeks ahead of the Northern Light. It was launched on August 27, 1942 (the Leningrad Front opened small attacks on the 19th). The successful start of the operation forced the Germans to redirect the troops intended for the “Northern Light” to counterattack. In this counteroffensive they were used for the first time (and with rather weak results) Tiger tanks. Units of the 2nd Shock Army were surrounded and destroyed, and the Soviet offensive stopped. However, German troops also had to abandon the attack on Leningrad.

Operation Spark

On the morning of January 12, 1943, Soviet troops launched Operation Iskra - a powerful offensive of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts. After stubborn fighting, Red Army units overcame German fortifications south of Lake Ladoga. On January 18, 1943, the 372nd Rifle Division of the Volkhov Front met with the troops of the 123rd Rifle Brigade of the Leningrad Front, opening a land corridor of 10 - 12 km, which gave some relief to the besieged population of Leningrad.

...January 12, 1943... Soviet troops under the command of Govorov launched Operation Iskra. A two-hour artillery bombardment fell on the German positions, after which masses of infantry, covered from the air by aircraft, moved across the ice of the frozen Neva. They were followed by tanks crossing the river on special wooden platforms. Three days later, the second wave of the offensive crossed the frozen Lake Ladoga from the east, hitting the Germans in Shlisselburg... The next day, the Red Army liberated Shlisselburg, and on January 18 at 23.00 a message was broadcast on the radio: “The blockade of Leningrad has been broken!” That evening there was a general celebration in the city.

Yes, the blockade was broken, but Leningrad was still under siege. Under continuous enemy fire, the Russians built a 35-kilometer-long railway line to bring food into the city. The first train, having eluded German bombers, arrived in Leningrad on February 6, 1943. It brought flour, meat, cigarettes and vodka.

A second railway line, completed in May, made it possible to deliver even larger quantities of food while simultaneously evacuating civilians. By September, supply by rail had become so efficient that there was no longer any need to use the route across Lake Ladoga... Rations increased significantly... The Germans continued their artillery bombardment of Leningrad, causing significant losses. But the city was returning to life, and food and fuel were, if not in abundance, then sufficient... The city was still in a state of siege, but no longer shuddered in its death throes.

(R. Colley. “Siege of Leningrad.”)

Lifting the blockade of Leningrad

The blockade lasted until January 27, 1944, when the Soviet "Leningrad-Novgorod Strategic Offensive" of the Leningrad, Volkhov, 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts expelled German troops from the southern outskirts of the city. The Baltic Fleet provided 30% of the air power for the final blow to the enemy.

...On January 15, 1944, the most powerful artillery shelling of the war began - half a million shells rained down on German positions in just an hour and a half, after which Soviet troops launched a decisive offensive. One by one, cities that had been in German hands for so long were liberated, and German troops, under pressure from twice the Red Army in numbers, rolled back uncontrollably. It took twelve days, and at eight o’clock in the evening on January 27, 1944, Govorov was finally able to report: “The city of Leningrad has been completely liberated!”

That evening, shells exploded in the night sky over the city - but it was not German artillery, but a festive salute from 324 guns!

It lasted 872 days, or 29 months, and finally this moment came - the siege of Leningrad ended. It took another five weeks to completely drive the Germans out of the Leningrad region...

In the autumn of 1944, Leningraders silently looked at the columns of German prisoners of war who entered the city to restore what they themselves had destroyed. Looking at them, Leningraders felt neither joy, nor anger, nor thirst for revenge: it was a process of purification, they just needed to look into the eyes of those who had caused them unbearable suffering for so long.

(R. Colley. “Siege of Leningrad.”)

In the summer of 1944, Finnish troops were pushed back beyond the Vyborg Bay and the Vuoksa River.

Museum of the Defense and Siege of Leningrad

Even during the blockade itself, the city authorities collected and showed to the public military artifacts - like the German plane that was shot down and fell to the ground in the Tauride Garden. Such objects were assembled in a specially designated building (in Salt Town). The exhibition soon turned into a full-scale Museum of the Defense of Leningrad (now the State Memorial Museum of the Defense and Siege of Leningrad). In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Stalin exterminated many Leningrad leaders in the so-called Leningrad case. This happened before the war, after murder of Sergei Kirov in 1934, and now another generation of local government and party functionaries was destroyed for allegedly publicly overestimating the importance of the city as an independent fighting unit and their own role in defeating the enemy. Their brainchild, the Leningrad Defense Museum, was destroyed and many valuable exhibits were destroyed.

The museum was revived in the late 1980s with the then wave of “glasnost”, when new shocking facts were published showing the heroism of the city during the war. The exhibition opened in its former building, but has not yet been restored to its original size and area. Most of its former premises had already been transferred to various military and government institutions. Plans to build a new modern museum building were put on hold due to the financial crisis, but the current Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu He still promised to expand the museum.

Green Belt of Glory and monuments in memory of the blockade

Commemoration of the siege received a second wind in the 1960s. Leningrad artists dedicated their works to the Victory and the memory of the war, which they themselves witnessed. The leading local poet and war participant, Mikhail Dudin, proposed erecting a ring of monuments on the battlefields of the most difficult period of the siege and connecting them with green spaces around the entire city. This was the beginning of the Green Belt of Glory.

On October 29, 1966, at the 40th km of the Road of Life, on the shore of Lake Ladoga near the village of Kokorevo, the “Broken Ring” monument was erected. Designed by Konstantin Simun, it was dedicated both to those who escaped through frozen Ladoga and to those who died during the siege.

On May 9, 1975, a monument to the heroic defenders of the city was erected on Victory Square in Leningrad. This monument is a huge bronze ring with a gap that marks the spot where Soviet troops eventually broke through the German encirclement. In the center, a Russian mother cradles her dying soldier son. The inscription on the monument reads: “900 days and 900 nights.” The exhibition below the monument contains visual evidence of this period.

The Siege of Leningrad was a military blockade by German, Finnish and Spanish (Blue Division) troops involving volunteers from North Africa, Europe and the Italian Navy during the Great Patriotic War of Leningrad (now St. Petersburg). Lasted from September 8, 1941 to January 27, 1944 (the blockade ring was broken on January 18, 1943) - 872 days.

By the beginning of the blockade, the city did not have sufficient supplies of food and fuel. The only route of communication with Leningrad remained Lake Ladoga, which was within the reach of the artillery and aviation of the besiegers; a united enemy naval flotilla was also operating on the lake. The capacity of this transport artery did not meet the needs of the city. As a result, a massive famine that began in Leningrad, aggravated by the particularly harsh first blockade winter, problems with heating and transport, led to hundreds of thousands of deaths among residents.

After breaking the blockade, the siege of Leningrad by enemy troops and navy continued until September 1944. To force the enemy to lift the siege of the city, in June - August 1944, Soviet troops, with the support of ships and aircraft of the Baltic Fleet, carried out the Vyborg and Svir-Petrozavodsk operations, liberated Vyborg on June 20, and Petrozavodsk on June 28. In September 1944, the island of Gogland was liberated.

For mass heroism and courage in defending the Motherland in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, shown by the defenders of besieged Leningrad, according to the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 8, 1965, the city was awarded the highest degree of distinction - the title of Hero City.

January 27 is the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the complete liberation by Soviet troops of the city of Leningrad from the blockade of its fascist German troops (1944).

German attack on the USSR

The capture of Leningrad was an integral part of the war plan developed by Nazi Germany against the USSR - Plan Barbarossa. It stipulated that the Soviet Union should be completely defeated within 3-4 months of the summer and autumn of 1941, that is, during a lightning war (“blitzkrieg”). By November 1941, German troops were supposed to capture the entire European part of the USSR. According to the Ost (East) plan, it was planned to exterminate within a few years a significant part of the population of the Soviet Union, primarily Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians, as well as all Jews and Gypsies - at least 30 million people in total. None of the peoples inhabiting the USSR should have had the right to their own statehood or even autonomy.

Already on June 23, the commander of the Leningrad Military District, Lieutenant General M. M. Popov, ordered the start of work to create an additional line of defense in the Pskov direction in the Luga area.

On July 4, this decision was confirmed by the Directive of the Headquarters of the High Command signed by G.K. Zhukov.

Finland's entry into the war

On June 17, 1941, a decree was issued in Finland on the mobilization of the entire field army, and on June 20, the mobilized army concentrated on the Soviet-Finnish border. On June 21-25, German naval and air forces operated from the territory of Finland against the USSR. On the morning of June 25, 1941, by order of the Headquarters, the Air Force of the Northern Front, together with the aviation of the Baltic Fleet, launched a massive attack on nineteen (according to other sources - 18) airfields in Finland and Northern Norway. Aircraft from the Finnish Air Force and the German 5th Air Force were based there. On the same day, the Finnish parliament voted for war with the USSR.

On June 29, 1941, Finnish troops crossed the state border and began a ground operation against the USSR.

Entry of enemy troops to Leningrad

In the first 18 days of the offensive, the enemy's 4th tank group fought more than 600 kilometers (at a rate of 30-35 km per day), crossed the Western Dvina and Velikaya rivers.

On July 4, Wehrmacht units entered the Leningrad region, crossing the Velikaya River and overcoming the fortifications of the “Stalin Line” in the direction of Ostrov.

On July 5-6, enemy troops occupied the city, and on July 9 - Pskov, located 280 kilometers from Leningrad. From Pskov, the shortest route to Leningrad is along the Kyiv Highway, passing through Luga.

On July 19, by the time the advanced German units left, the Luga defensive line was well prepared in engineering terms: defensive structures with a length of 175 kilometers and a total depth of 10-15 kilometers were built. Defensive structures were built by the hands of Leningraders, mostly women and teenagers (men went into the army and militia).

The German offensive was delayed at the Luga fortified area. Reports from German commanders to headquarters:

Gepner's tank group, whose vanguards were exhausted and tired, advanced only slightly in the direction of Leningrad.

Gepner's offensive has been stopped... People are fighting, as before, with great ferocity.

The command of the Leningrad Front took advantage of the delay of Gepner, who was waiting for reinforcements, and prepared to meet the enemy, using, among other things, the latest heavy tanks KV-1 and KV-2, just released by the Kirov plant. More than 700 tanks were built in 1941 alone and remain in the city. During the same time, 480 armored vehicles and 58 armored trains, often armed with powerful naval guns, were produced. At the Rzhev artillery range, a 406 mm caliber naval gun was found operational. It was intended for the lead battleship Sovetsky Soyuz, which was already on the slipway. This weapon was used when shelling German positions. The German offensive was suspended for several weeks. Enemy troops failed to capture the city on the move. This delay caused sharp dissatisfaction with Hitler, who made a special trip to Army Group North with the aim of preparing a plan for the capture of Leningrad no later than September 1941. In conversations with military leaders, the Fuhrer, in addition to purely military arguments, brought up many political arguments. He believed that the capture of Leningrad would not only provide a military gain (control over all the Baltic coasts and the destruction of the Baltic Fleet), but would also bring huge political dividends. The Soviet Union will lose the city, which, being the cradle of the October Revolution, has a special symbolic meaning for the Soviet state. In addition, Hitler considered it very important not to give the Soviet command the opportunity to withdraw troops from the Leningrad area and use them in other sectors of the front. He hoped to destroy the troops defending the city.

In long, exhausting battles, overcoming crises in different places, German troops spent a month preparing to storm the city. The Baltic Fleet approached the city with its 153 guns of the main caliber of naval artillery, as the experience of the defense of Tallinn showed, in its combat effectiveness superior to guns of the same caliber of coastal artillery, which also numbered 207 guns near Leningrad. The city's sky was protected by the 2nd Air Defense Corps. The highest density of anti-aircraft artillery during the defense of Moscow, Leningrad and Baku was 8-10 times greater than during the defense of Berlin and London.

On August 14-15, the Germans managed to break through the swampy area, bypassing the Luga fortified area from the west and, having crossed the Luga River at Bolshoy Sabsk, entering the operational space in front of Leningrad.

On June 29, having crossed the border, the Finnish army began military operations on the Karelian Isthmus. On July 31, a major Finnish offensive began in the direction of Leningrad. By the beginning of September, the Finns crossed the old Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus, which existed before the signing of the 1940 peace treaty, to a depth of 20 km, and stopped at the border of the Karelian fortified area. Leningrad's connection with the rest of the country through the territories occupied by Finland was restored in the summer of 1944.

On September 4, 1941, the Chief of the Main Staff of the German Armed Forces, General Jodl, was sent to Mannerheim's headquarters in Mikkeli. But he was refused participation of the Finns in the attack on Leningrad. Instead, Mannerheim led a successful offensive in the north of Ladoga, cutting the Kirov Railway and the White Sea-Baltic Canal in the area of ​​Lake Onega, thereby blocking the route for supplies to Leningrad.

It was on September 4, 1941 that the city was subjected to the first artillery shelling from the city of Tosno occupied by German troops:

“In September 1941, a small group of officers, on instructions from the command, was driving a semi-truck along Lesnoy Prospekt from the Levashovo airfield. A little ahead of us was a tram crowded with people. He slows down to a stop where there is a large group of people waiting. A shell explodes, and many at a stop fall, bleeding profusely. The second gap, the third... The tram is smashed to pieces. Heaps of dead. The wounded and maimed, mostly women and children, are scattered on the cobblestone streets, moaning and crying. A blond boy of about seven or eight years old, who miraculously survived at the bus stop, covering his face with both hands, sobs over his murdered mother and repeats: “Mommy, what have they done…”

On September 6, 1941, Hitler, with his order (Weisung No. 35), stops the advance of the North group of troops on Leningrad, which had already reached the suburbs of the city, and gives the order to Field Marshal Leeb to hand over all Gepner tanks and a significant number of troops in order to begin “as quickly as possible.” attack on Moscow. Subsequently, the Germans, having transferred their tanks to the central section of the front, continued to surround the city with a blockade ring, no more than 15 km from the city center, and moved on to a long blockade. In this situation, Hitler, realistically imagining the enormous losses that he would suffer if he entered into urban battles, doomed his population to starvation by his decision.

On September 8, soldiers of the North group captured the city of Shlisselburg (Petrokrepost). From this day the blockade of the city began, which lasted 872 days.

On the same day, German troops unexpectedly quickly found themselves in the suburbs of the city. German motorcyclists even stopped the tram on the southern outskirts of the city (route No. 28 Stremyannaya St. - Strelna). At the same time, information about the closure of the encirclement was not reported to the Soviet high command, hoping for a breakthrough. And on September 13, Leningradskaya Pravda wrote:

The Germans' claim that they managed to cut all the railways connecting Leningrad with the Soviet Union is an exaggeration usual for the German command

This silence cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of citizens, since the decision to supply food was made too late.

All summer, day and night, about half a million people created defense lines in the city. One of them, the most fortified, called the “Stalin Line” ran along the Obvodny Canal. Many houses on the defensive lines were turned into long-term strongholds of resistance.

On September 13, Zhukov arrived in the city, and took command of the front on September 14, when, contrary to popular belief, disseminated in numerous feature films, the German offensive had already been stopped, the front was stabilized, and the enemy canceled his decision to attack.

Problems of evacuation of residents

The situation at the beginning of the blockade

The evacuation of city residents began already on June 29, 1941 (the first trains) and was of an organized nature. At the end of June, the City Evacuation Commission was created. Explanatory work began among the population about the need to leave Leningrad, since many residents did not want to leave their homes. Before the German attack on the USSR, there were no pre-developed plans for the evacuation of the population of Leningrad. The possibility of the Germans reaching the city was considered minimal.

First wave of evacuation

The very first stage of the evacuation lasted from June 29 to August 27, when Wehrmacht units captured the railway connecting Leningrad with the regions lying to the east of it. This period was characterized by two features:

• Reluctance of residents to leave the city;
• Many children from Leningrad were evacuated to areas of the Leningrad region. This subsequently led to 175,000 children being returned back to Leningrad.

During this period, 488,703 people were taken out of the city, of which 219,691 were children (395,091 were taken out, but subsequently 175,000 were returned) and 164,320 workers and employees were evacuated along with enterprises.

Second wave of evacuation

In the second period, evacuation was carried out in three ways:

• evacuation across Lake Ladoga by water transport to Novaya Ladoga, and then to the station. Volkhovstroy motor transport;
• evacuation by air;
• evacuation along the ice road across Lake Ladoga.

During this period, 33,479 people were transported by water transport (of which 14,854 people were not from the Leningrad population), by aviation - 35,114 (of which 16,956 were from non-Leningrad population), by march through Lake Ladoga and by unorganized motor transport from the end of December 1941 to January 22, 1942 - 36,118 people (population not from Leningrad), from January 22 to April 15, 1942 along the “Road of Life” - 554,186 people.

In total, during the second evacuation period - from September 1941 to April 1942 - about 659 thousand people were taken out of the city, mainly along the “Road of Life” across Lake Ladoga.

Third wave of evacuation

From May to October 1942, 403 thousand people were taken out. In total, 1.5 million people were evacuated from the city during the blockade. By October 1942, the evacuation was completed.

Consequences

Consequences for evacuees

Some of the exhausted people taken from the city could not be saved. Several thousand people died from the consequences of hunger after they were transported to the “Mainland”. Doctors did not immediately learn how to care for starving people. There were cases when they died after receiving a large amount of high-quality food, which turned out to be essentially poison for the exhausted body. At the same time, there could have been much more casualties if the local authorities of the regions where the evacuees were accommodated had not made extraordinary efforts to provide Leningraders with food and qualified medical care.

Implications for city leadership

The blockade became a brutal test for all city services and departments that ensured the functioning of the huge city. Leningrad provided a unique experience in organizing life in conditions of famine. The following fact is noteworthy: during the blockade, unlike many other cases of mass famine, no major epidemics occurred, despite the fact that hygiene in the city was, of course, much lower than normal due to the almost complete absence of running water, sewerage and heating. Of course, the harsh winter of 1941-1942 helped prevent epidemics. At the same time, researchers also point to effective preventive measures taken by the authorities and medical services.

“The most difficult thing during the blockade was hunger, as a result of which the residents developed dystrophy. At the end of March 1942, an epidemic of cholera, typhoid fever, and typhus broke out, but due to the professionalism and high qualifications of doctors, the outbreak was kept to a minimum.”

Autumn 1941

Blitzkrieg attempt failed

At the end of August 1941, the German offensive resumed. German units broke through the Luga defensive line and rushed towards Leningrad. On September 8, the enemy reached Lake Ladoga, captured Shlisselburg, taking control of the source of the Neva, and blocked Leningrad from land. This day is considered the day the blockade began. All railway, river and road communications were severed. Communication with Leningrad was now maintained only by air and Lake Ladoga. From the north, the city was blocked by Finnish troops, who were stopped by the 23rd Army at the Karelian Ur. Only the only railway connection to the coast of Lake Ladoga from the Finlyandsky Station has been preserved - the “Road of Life”.

This partly confirms that the Finns stopped on the orders of Mannerheim (according to his memoirs, he agreed to take the post of supreme commander of the Finnish forces on the condition that he would not launch an offensive against the city), at the turn of the state border of 1939, that is, the border that existed between The USSR and Finland on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, on the other hand, is disputed by Isaev and N.I. Baryshnikov:

The legend that the Finnish army had only the task of returning what was taken by the Soviet Union in 1940 was later invented retroactively. If on the Karelian Isthmus the crossing of the 1939 border was episodic in nature and was caused by tactical tasks, then between Lakes Ladoga and Onega the old border was crossed along its entire length and to great depth.

— Isaev A.V. Boilers of the 41st. The history of the Second World War that we did not know. — P. 54.

Back on September 11, 1941, Finnish President Risto Ryti told the German envoy in Helsinki:

If St. Petersburg no longer exists as a large city, then the Neva would be the best border on the Karelian Isthmus... Leningrad must be liquidated as a large city.

- from a statement by Risto Ryti to the German ambassador on September 11, 1941 (words by Baryshnikov, the reliability of the source has not been verified).

The total area of ​​Leningrad and its suburbs encircled was about 5,000 km².

The situation at the front from June 22 to December 5, 1941

According to G.K. Zhukov, “Stalin at that moment assessed the situation that had developed near Leningrad as catastrophic. He even used the word "hopeless" once. He said that, apparently, a few more days would pass, and Leningrad would have to be considered lost.” After the end of the Elninsky operation, by order of September 11, G. K. Zhukov was appointed commander of the Leningrad Front, and began his duties on September 14.

On September 4, 1941, the Germans began regular artillery shelling of Leningrad, although their decision to storm the city remained in force until September 12, when Hitler ordered its cancellation, that is, Zhukov arrived two days after the order to storm was canceled (September 14). The local leadership prepared the main factories for the explosion. All ships of the Baltic Fleet were to be scuttled. Trying to stop the enemy offensive, Zhukov did not stop at the most brutal measures. At the end of the month he signed ciphergram No. 4976 with the following text:

“Explain to all personnel that all families of those who surrendered to the enemy will be shot, and upon returning from captivity they will also all be shot.”

He, in particular, issued an order that for unauthorized retreat and abandonment of the defense line around the city, all commanders and soldiers were subject to immediate execution. The retreat stopped.

The soldiers defending Leningrad these days fought to the death. Leeb continued successful operations on the nearest approaches to the city. Its goal was to strengthen the blockade ring and divert the forces of the Leningrad Front from helping the 54th Army, which had begun to relieve the blockade of the city. In the end, the enemy stopped 4-7 km from the city, actually in the suburbs. The front line, that is, the trenches where the soldiers were sitting, was only 4 km from the Kirov Plant and 16 km from the Winter Palace. Despite the proximity of the front, the Kirov plant did not stop working throughout the entire period of the blockade. There was even a tram running from the factory to the front line. It was a regular tram line from the city center to the suburbs, but now it was used to transport soldiers and ammunition.

The beginning of the food crisis

Ideology of the German side

Hitler's Directive No. 1601 of September 22, 1941, “The Future of the City of St. Petersburg” (German: Weisung Nr. Ia 1601/41 vom 22. September 1941 “Die Zukunft der Stadt Petersburg”) stated with certainty:

"2. The Fuhrer decided to wipe the city of Leningrad off the face of the earth. After the defeat of Soviet Russia, the continued existence of this largest populated area is of no interest...

4. It is planned to surround the city with a tight ring and, through shelling from artillery of all calibers and continuous bombing from the air, raze it to the ground. If, as a result of the situation created in the city, requests for surrender are made, they will be rejected, since the problems associated with the stay of the population in the city and its food supply cannot and should not be solved by us. In this war being waged for the right to exist, we are not interested in preserving even part of the population.”

According to Jodl's testimony during the Nuremberg trials,

“During the siege of Leningrad, Field Marshal von Leeb, commander of Army Group North, reported to the OKW that streams of civilian refugees from Leningrad were seeking refuge in the German trenches and that he had no means of feeding or caring for them. The Fuhrer immediately gave the order (dated October 7, 1941 No. S.123) not to accept refugees and push them back into enemy territory.”

It should be noted that in the same order No. S.123 there was the following clarification:

“... not a single German soldier should enter these cities and Leningrad. Whoever leaves the city against our lines must be driven back by fire.

Small unguarded passages that make it possible for the population to leave individually for evacuation to the interior of Russia should only be welcomed. The population must be forced to flee the city through artillery fire and aerial bombardment. The larger the population of cities fleeing deep into Russia, the greater the chaos the enemy will experience and the easier it will be for us to manage and use the occupied areas. All senior officers must be aware of this desire of the Fuhrer."

German military leaders protested against the order to shoot at civilians and said that the troops would not carry out such an order, but Hitler was adamant.

Changing war tactics

The fighting near Leningrad did not stop, but its character changed. German troops began to destroy the city with massive artillery shelling and bombing. Bombing and artillery attacks were especially severe in October - November 1941. The Germans dropped several thousand incendiary bombs on Leningrad in order to cause massive fires. They paid special attention to the destruction of food warehouses, and they succeeded in this task. So, in particular, on September 10 they managed to bomb the famous Badayevsky warehouses, where there were significant food supplies. The fire was enormous, thousands of tons of food were burned, melted sugar flowed through the city and was absorbed into the ground. However, contrary to popular belief, this bombing could not be the main cause of the ensuing food crisis, since Leningrad, like any other metropolis, is supplied “on wheels”, and the food reserves destroyed along with the warehouses would only last the city for a few days .

Taught by this bitter lesson, city authorities began to pay special attention to the disguise of food supplies, which were now stored only in small quantities. So, famine became the most important factor determining the fate of the population of Leningrad. The blockade imposed by the German army was deliberately aimed at the extinction of the urban population.

The fate of citizens: demographic factors

According to data on January 1, 1941, just under three million people lived in Leningrad. The city was characterized by a higher than usual percentage of the disabled population, including children and the elderly. It was also distinguished by an unfavorable military-strategic position due to its proximity to the border and isolation from raw materials and fuel bases. At the same time, the city medical and sanitary service of Leningrad was one of the best in the country.

Theoretically, the Soviet side could have had the option of withdrawing troops and surrendering Leningrad to the enemy without a fight (using the terminology of that time, declaring Leningrad an “open city,” as happened, for example, with Paris). However, if we take into account Hitler’s plans for the future of Leningrad (or, more precisely, the lack of any future for it at all), there is no reason to argue that the fate of the city’s population in the event of capitulation would be better than the fate in the actual conditions of the siege.

The actual start of the blockade

The beginning of the blockade is considered to be September 8, 1941, when the land connection between Leningrad and the entire country was interrupted. However, city residents had lost the opportunity to leave Leningrad two weeks earlier: railway communication was interrupted on August 27, and tens of thousands of people gathered at train stations and in the suburbs, waiting for the opportunity to break through to the east. The situation was further complicated by the fact that since the beginning of the war, Leningrad was flooded with at least 300,000 refugees from the Baltic republics and neighboring Russian regions.

The catastrophic food situation of the city became clear on September 12, when the inspection and accounting of all food supplies were completed. Food cards were introduced in Leningrad on July 17, that is, even before the blockade, but this was done only to restore order in supplies. The city entered the war with the usual supply of food. Food rationing standards were high, and there was no food shortage before the blockade began. The reduction in food distribution standards occurred for the first time on September 15. In addition, on September 1, the free sale of food was prohibited (this measure was in effect until mid-1944). While the “black market” persisted, the official sale of products in so-called commercial stores at market prices ceased.

In October, city residents felt a clear shortage of food, and in November real famine began in Leningrad. First, the first cases of loss of consciousness from hunger on the streets and at work, the first cases of death from exhaustion, and then the first cases of cannibalism were noted. In February 1942, more than 600 people were convicted of cannibalism, in March - more than a thousand. It was extremely difficult to replenish food supplies: it was impossible to supply such a large city by air, and shipping on Lake Ladoga temporarily stopped due to the onset of cold weather. At the same time, the ice on the lake was still too weak for cars to drive on. All these transport communications were under constant enemy fire.

Despite the lowest standards for the distribution of bread, death from hunger has not yet become a mass phenomenon, and the bulk of the dead so far have been victims of bombing and artillery shelling.

Winter 1941-1942

Leningrader's ration

On the collective and state farms of the blockade ring, everything that could be useful for food was collected from fields and gardens. However, all these measures could not save from hunger. On November 20 - for the fifth time, the population and the third time the troops - had to reduce the norms for the distribution of bread. Warriors on the front line began to receive 500 grams per day; workers - 250 grams; employees, dependents and soldiers not on the front line - 125 grams. And besides bread, almost nothing. Famine began in blockaded Leningrad.

Based on the actual consumption, the availability of basic food products as of September 12 was (the figures are given according to accounting data carried out by the trade department of the Leningrad City Executive Committee, the front commissariat and the KBF):

Bread grain and flour for 35 days

Cereals and pasta for 30 days

Meat and meat products for 33 days

Fats for 45 days

Sugar and confectionery for 60 days

The norms for the supply of goods on food cards, introduced in the city back in July, decreased due to the blockade of the city, and turned out to be minimal from November 20 to December 25, 1941. The food ration size was:

Workers - 250 grams of bread per day,

Employees, dependents and children under 12 years old - 125 grams each,

Personnel of the paramilitary guards, fire brigades, fighter squads, vocational schools and schools of the FZO, who were on boiler allowance - 300 grams,

First line troops - 500 grams.

Moreover, up to 50% of the bread consisted of practically inedible impurities added instead of flour. All other products almost ceased to be issued: already on September 23, beer production ceased, and all stocks of malt, barley, soybeans and bran were transferred to bakeries in order to reduce flour consumption. As of September 24, 40% of bread consisted of malt, oats and husks, and later cellulose (at various times from 20 to 50%). On December 25, 1941, the standards for the distribution of bread were increased - the population of Leningrad began to receive 350 g of bread on a work card and 200 g on an employee, child and dependent card. On February 11, new supply standards were introduced: 500 grams of bread for workers, 400 for employees, 300 for children and non-workers. The impurities have almost disappeared from the bread. But the main thing is that supplies have become regular, food rationing has begun to be issued on time and almost completely. On February 16, quality meat was even issued for the first time - frozen beef and lamb. There has been a turning point in the food situation in the city.

Resident notification system

Metronome

In the first months of the blockade, 1,500 loudspeakers were installed on the streets of Leningrad. The radio network carried information to the population about raids and air raid warnings. The famous metronome, which went down in the history of the siege of Leningrad as a cultural monument of the population’s resistance, was broadcast during the raids through this network. A fast rhythm meant air raid warning, a slow rhythm meant lights out. Announcer Mikhail Melaned also announced the alarm.

Worsening situation in the city

In November 1941, the situation for the townspeople worsened sharply. Deaths from hunger became widespread. Special funeral services daily picked up about a hundred corpses from the streets alone.

There are countless stories of people collapsing and dying - at home or at work, in shops or on the streets. A resident of the besieged city, Elena Skryabina, wrote in her diary:

“Now they die so simply: first they stop being interested in anything, then they go to bed and never get up again.

“Death rules the city. People die and die. Today, when I walked down the street, a man walked in front of me. He could barely move his legs. Overtaking him, I involuntarily drew attention to the eerie blue face. I thought to myself: he will probably die soon. Here one could really say that the stamp of death lay on the man’s face. After a few steps, I turned around, stopped, and watched him. He sank onto the cabinet, his eyes rolled back, then he slowly began to slide to the ground. When I approached him, he was already dead. People are so weak from hunger that they cannot resist death. They die as if they were falling asleep. And the half-dead people around them do not pay any attention to them. Death has become a phenomenon observed at every step. They got used to it, complete indifference appeared: after all, not today - tomorrow such a fate awaits everyone. When you leave the house in the morning, you come across corpses lying in the gateway on the street. The corpses lie there for a long time because there is no one to clean them up.

D. V. Pavlov, the State Defense Committee’s authorized representative for food supply for Leningrad and the Leningrad Front, writes:

“The period from mid-November 1941 to the end of January 1942 was the most difficult during the blockade. By this time, internal resources were completely exhausted, and imports through Lake Ladoga were carried out in insignificant quantities. People pinned all their hopes and aspirations on the winter road.”

Despite the low temperatures in the city, part of the water supply network worked, so dozens of water pumps were opened, from which residents of surrounding houses could take water. Most of the Vodokanal workers were transferred to a barracks position, but residents also had to take water from damaged pipes and ice holes.

The number of famine victims grew rapidly - more than 4,000 people died every day in Leningrad, which was a hundred times higher than the mortality rate in peacetime. There were days when 6-7 thousand people died. In December alone, 52,881 people died, while losses in January-February were 199,187 people. Male mortality significantly exceeded female mortality - for every 100 deaths there were an average of 63 men and 37 women. By the end of the war, women made up the bulk of the urban population.

Exposure to cold

Another important factor in the increase in mortality was the cold. With the onset of winter, the city almost ran out of fuel reserves: electricity generation was only 15% of the pre-war level. Centralized heating of houses stopped, water supply and sewage systems froze or were turned off. Work has stopped at almost all factories and plants (except for defense ones). Often, citizens who came to the workplace could not do their work due to the lack of water, heat and energy.

The winter of 1941-1942 turned out to be much colder and longer than usual. By an evil irony of fate, the winter of 1941-1942, according to cumulative indicators, is the coldest for the entire period of systematic instrumental observations of the weather in St. Petersburg - Leningrad. The average daily temperature steadily dropped below 0 °C already on October 11, and became steadily positive after April 7, 1942 - the climatic winter lasted 178 days, that is, half of the year. During this period, there were 14 days with an average daily t > 0 °C, mostly in October, that is, there were practically no thaws usual for Leningrad winter weather. Even in May 1942, there were 4 days with a negative average daily temperature; on May 7, the maximum daytime temperature rose only to +0.9 °C. There was also a lot of snow in winter: the depth of the snow cover by the end of winter was more than half a meter. In terms of maximum snow cover height (53 cm), April 1942 is the record holder for the entire observation period, up to 2010 inclusive.

The average monthly temperature in October was +1.4 °C (the average value for the period 1743–2010 is +4.9 °C), which is 3.5 °C below normal. In the middle of the month, frosts reached −6 °C. By the end of the month, snow cover had established itself.

The average temperature in November 1941 was −4.2 °C (the long-term average was −0.8 °C), the temperature ranged from +1.6 to −13.8 °C.

In December, the average monthly temperature dropped to −12.5 °C (with a long-term average of −5.6 °C). The temperature ranged from +1.6 to −25.3 °C.

The first month of 1942 was the coldest this winter. The average temperature of the month was −18.7 °C (the average temperature for the period 1743–2010 was −8.3 °C). The frost reached −32.1 °C, the maximum temperature was +0.7 °C. The average snow depth reached 41 cm (the average depth for 1890-1941 was 23 cm).

The February average monthly temperature was −12.4 °C (the long-term average was −7.9 °C), the temperature ranged from −0.6 to −25.2 °C.

March was slightly warmer than February - average t = −11.6 °C (with long-term average t = −4 °C). The temperature varied from +3.6 to −29.1 °C in the middle of the month. March 1942 was the coldest in the history of weather observations until 2010.

The average monthly temperature in April was close to average values ​​(+2.8 °C) and amounted to +1.8 °C, while the minimum temperature was −14.4 °C.

In the book “Memoirs” by Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachev, it is said about the years of the blockade:

“The cold was somehow internal. It permeated everything through and through. The body produced too little heat.

The human mind was the last thing to die. If your arms and legs have already refused to serve you, if your fingers can no longer button the buttons of your coat, if a person no longer has any strength to cover your mouth with a scarf, if the skin around the mouth has become dark, if the face has become like a dead man’s skull with bared front teeth - the brain continued working. People wrote diaries and believed that they would be able to live another day. »

Heating and transport system

The main heating means for most inhabited apartments were special mini-stoves, potbelly stoves. They burned everything that could burn, including furniture and books. Wooden houses were dismantled for firewood. Fuel production has become an important part of the life of Leningraders. Due to a lack of electricity and massive destruction of the contact network, the movement of urban electric transport, primarily trams, ceased. This event was an important factor contributing to the increase in mortality.

According to D. S. Likhachev,

“... when the tram stop added another two to three hours of walking from the place of residence to the place of work and back to the usual daily workload, this led to additional expenditure of calories. Very often people died from sudden cardiac arrest, loss of consciousness and freezing on the way.”

“The candle burned at both ends” - these words expressively characterized the situation of a city resident who lived under conditions of starvation rations and enormous physical and mental stress. In most cases, families did not die out immediately, but one by one, gradually. As long as someone could walk, he brought food using ration cards. The streets were covered with snow, which had not been cleared all winter, so movement along them was very difficult.

Organization of hospitals and canteens for enhanced nutrition.

By decision of the bureau of the city committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Leningrad City Executive Committee, additional medical nutrition was organized at increased standards in special hospitals created at plants and factories, as well as in 105 city canteens. The hospitals operated from January 1 to May 1, 1942 and served 60 thousand people. From the end of April 1942, by decision of the Leningrad City Executive Committee, the network of canteens for enhanced nutrition was expanded. Instead of hospitals, 89 of them were created on the territory of factories, factories and institutions. 64 canteens were organized outside the enterprises. Food in these canteens was provided according to specially approved standards. From April 25 to July 1, 1942, 234 thousand people used them, of which 69% were workers, 18.5% were employees and 12.5% ​​were dependents.

In January 1942, a hospital for scientists and creative workers began operating at the Astoria Hotel. In the dining room of the House of Scientists, from 200 to 300 people ate during the winter months. On December 26, 1941, the Leningrad City Executive Committee ordered the Gastronom office to organize a one-time sale with home delivery at state prices without food cards to academicians and corresponding members of the USSR Academy of Sciences: animal butter - 0.5 kg, wheat flour - 3 kg, canned meat or fish - 2 boxes, sugar 0.5 kg, eggs - 3 dozen, chocolate - 0.3 kg, cookies - 0.5 kg, and grape wine - 2 bottles.

By decision of the city executive committee, new orphanages were opened in the city in January 1942. Over the course of 5 months, 85 orphanages were organized in Leningrad, accepting 30 thousand children left without parents. The command of the Leningrad Front and the city leadership sought to provide orphanages with the necessary food. The resolution of the Front Military Council dated February 7, 1942 approved the following monthly supply standards for orphanages per child: meat - 1.5 kg, fats - 1 kg, eggs - 15 pieces, sugar - 1.5 kg, tea - 10 g, coffee - 30 g , cereals and pasta - 2.2 kg, wheat bread - 9 kg, wheat flour - 0.5 kg, dried fruits - 0.2 kg, potato flour -0.15 kg.

Universities open their own hospitals, where scientists and other university employees could rest for 7-14 days and receive enhanced nutrition, which consisted of 20 g of coffee, 60 g of fat, 40 g of sugar or confectionery, 100 g of meat, 200 g of cereal , 0.5 eggs, 350 g of bread, 50 g of wine per day, and the products were issued by cutting coupons from food cards.

In the first half of 1942, hospitals and then canteens with enhanced nutrition played a huge role in the fight against hunger, restoring the strength and health of a significant number of patients, which saved thousands of Leningraders from death. This is evidenced by numerous reviews from the blockade survivors themselves and data from clinics.

In the second half of 1942, to overcome the consequences of the famine, 12,699 patients were hospitalized in October and 14,738 in November, patients in need of enhanced nutrition. As of January 1, 1943, 270 thousand Leningraders received increased food supply compared to all-Union standards, another 153 thousand people visited canteens with three meals a day, which became possible thanks to the navigation of 1942, which was more successful than in 1941.

Use of food substitutes

A major role in overcoming the food supply problem was played by the use of food substitutes, the repurposing of old enterprises for their production and the creation of new ones. A certificate from the secretary of the city committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Ya.F. Kapustin, addressed to A.A. Zhdanov reports on the use of substitutes in the bread, meat, confectionery, dairy, canning industries, and in public catering. For the first time in the USSR, food cellulose, produced at 6 enterprises, was used in the baking industry, which made it possible to increase bread baking by 2,230 tons. Soy flour, intestines, technical albumin obtained from egg white, animal blood plasma, and whey were used as additives in the manufacture of meat products. As a result, an additional 1,360 tons of meat products were produced, including table sausage - 380 tons, jelly 730 tons, albumin sausage - 170 tons and vegetable-blood bread - 80 tons. The dairy industry processed 320 tons of soybeans and 25 tons of cotton cake, which produced an additional 2,617 tons of products, including: soy milk 1,360 tons, soy milk products (yogurt, cottage cheese, cheesecakes, etc.) - 942 tons. A group of scientists from the Forestry Academy under the leadership of V.I. Kalyuzhny developed a technology for producing nutritional yeast from wood The technology of preparing vitamin C in the form of an infusion of pine needles was widely used. Until December alone, more than 2 million doses of this vitamin were produced. In public catering, jelly was widely used, which was prepared from plant milk, juices, glycerin and gelatin. Oatmeal waste and cranberry pulp were also used to produce jelly. The city's food industry produced glucose, oxalic acid, carotene, and tannin.

Attempts to break the blockade. "The road of life"

Breakthrough attempt. Bridgehead "Nevsky Piglet"

In the fall of 1941, immediately after the blockade was established, Soviet troops launched two operations to restore Leningrad's land communications with the rest of the country. The offensive was carried out in the area of ​​the so-called “Sinyavinsk-Shlisselburg salient”, the width of which along the southern coast of Lake Ladoga was only 12 km. However, German troops were able to create powerful fortifications. The Soviet army suffered heavy losses, but was never able to move forward. The soldiers who broke through the blockade ring from Leningrad were severely exhausted.

The main battles were fought on the so-called “Neva patch” - a narrow strip of land 500-800 meters wide and about 2.5-3.0 km long (this is according to the memoirs of I. G. Svyatov) on the left bank of the Neva, held by the troops of the Leningrad Front . The entire area was under fire from the enemy, and Soviet troops, constantly trying to expand this bridgehead, suffered heavy losses. However, under no circumstances was it possible to surrender the patch - otherwise the full-flowing Neva would have to be crossed again, and the task of breaking the blockade would become much more complicated. In total, about 50,000 Soviet soldiers died on the Nevsky Piglet between 1941 and 1943.

At the beginning of 1942, the high Soviet command, inspired by the success of the Tikhvin offensive operation and clearly underestimating the enemy, decided to attempt the complete liberation of Leningrad from the enemy blockade with the help of the Volkhov Front, with the support of the Leningrad Front. However, the Lyuban operation, which initially had strategic objectives, developed with great difficulty, and ultimately ended in a severe defeat for the Red Army. In August - September 1942, Soviet troops made another attempt to break the blockade. Although the Sinyavinsk operation did not achieve its goals, the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts managed to thwart the German command’s plan to capture Leningrad under the code name “Northern Lights” (German: Nordlicht).

Thus, during 1941-1942, several attempts were made to break the blockade, but all of them were unsuccessful. The area between Lake Ladoga and the village of Mga, in which the distance between the lines of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts was only 12-16 kilometers (the so-called “Sinyavin-Shlisselburg ledge”), continued to be firmly held by units of the 18th Army of the Wehrmacht.

“The Road of Life” is the name of the ice road through Ladoga in the winters of 1941–42 and 1942–43, after the ice reached a thickness that allowed the transportation of cargo of any weight. The Road of Life was in fact the only means of communication between Leningrad and the mainland.

“In the spring of 1942, I was 16 years old at the time, I had just graduated from driver’s school, and went to Leningrad to work on a lorry. My first flight was via Ladoga. The cars broke down one after another and food for the city was loaded into the cars not just “to capacity,” but much more. It seemed like the car was about to fall apart! I drove exactly halfway and only had time to hear the cracking of ice before my “one and a half” ended up under water. I was saved. I don’t remember how, but I woke up already on the ice about fifty meters from the hole where the car fell through. I quickly began to freeze. They took me back in a passing car. Someone threw either an overcoat or something similar over me, but it didn’t help. My clothes began to freeze and I could no longer feel my fingertips. As I drove by, I saw two more drowned cars and people trying to save the cargo.

I stayed in the blockade area for another six months. The worst thing I saw was when the corpses of people and horses surfaced during the ice drift. The water seemed black and red..."

Spring-summer 1942

The first breakthrough of the siege of Leningrad

On March 29, 1942, a partisan convoy with food for the city residents arrived in Leningrad from the Pskov and Novgorod regions. The event had enormous propaganda significance and demonstrated the enemy’s inability to control the rear of his troops, and the possibility of releasing the city by the regular Red Army, since the partisans managed to do this.

Organization of subsidiary farms

On March 19, 1942, the executive committee of the Leningrad City Council adopted a regulation “On personal consumer gardens of workers and their associations,” providing for the development of personal consumer gardening both in the city itself and in the suburbs. In addition to individual gardening itself, subsidiary farms were created at enterprises. For this purpose, vacant plots of land adjacent to enterprises were cleared, and employees of enterprises, according to lists approved by the heads of enterprises, were provided with plots of 2-3 acres for personal gardens. Subsidiary farms were guarded around the clock by enterprise personnel. Vegetable garden owners were provided with assistance in purchasing seedlings and using them economically. Thus, when planting potatoes, only small parts of the fruit with a sprouted “eye” were used.

In addition, the Leningrad City Executive Committee obliged some enterprises to provide residents with the necessary equipment, as well as to issue manuals on agriculture (“Agricultural rules for individual vegetable growing”, articles in Leningradskaya Pravda, etc.).

In total, in the spring of 1942, 633 subsidiary farms and 1,468 associations of gardeners were created, the total gross harvest from state farms, individual gardening and subsidiary plots amounted to 77 thousand tons.

Reducing street deaths

In the spring of 1942, due to warming temperatures and improved nutrition, the number of sudden deaths on the city streets decreased significantly. So, if in February about 7,000 corpses were picked up on the streets of the city, then in April - approximately 600, and in May - 50 corpses. In March 1942, the entire working population came out to clear the city of garbage. In April-May 1942, there was a further improvement in the living conditions of the population: the restoration of public utilities began. Many businesses have resumed operations.

Restoring urban public transport

On December 8, 1941, Lenenergo stopped supplying electricity and partial redemption of traction substations occurred. The next day, by decision of the city executive committee, eight tram routes were abolished. Subsequently, individual carriages still moved along the Leningrad streets, finally stopping on January 3, 1942 after the power supply completely stopped. 52 trains stood still on the snow-covered streets. Snow-covered trolleybuses stood on the streets all winter. More than 60 cars were crashed, burned or seriously damaged. In the spring of 1942, city authorities ordered the removal of cars from highways. The trolleybuses could not move under their own power; they had to organize towing. On March 8, power was supplied to the network for the first time. The restoration of the city's tram service began, and a freight tram was launched. On April 15, 1942, power was given to the central substations and a regular passenger tram was launched. To reopen freight and passenger traffic, it was necessary to restore approximately 150 km of the contact network - about half of the entire network in operation at that time. The launch of the trolleybus in the spring of 1942 was considered inappropriate by the city authorities.

Official statistics

Incomplete figures from official statistics: with a pre-war mortality rate of 3,000 people, in January-February 1942, approximately 130,000 people died monthly in the city, in March 100,000 people died, in May - 50,000 people, in July - 25,000 people, in September - 7000 people. The radical decrease in mortality occurred because the weakest had already died: the elderly, children, and the sick. Now the main civilian casualties of the war were mostly those who died not from starvation, but from bombings and artillery shelling. In total, according to the latest research, approximately 780,000 Leningraders died during the first, most difficult year of the siege.

1942-1943

1942 Intensification of shelling. Counter-battery combat

In April - May, the German command, during Operation Aisshtoss, unsuccessfully tried to destroy the ships of the Baltic Fleet stationed on the Neva.

By the summer, the leadership of Nazi Germany decided to intensify military operations on the Leningrad Front, and first of all, to intensify artillery shelling and bombing of the city.

New artillery batteries were deployed around Leningrad. In particular, super-heavy guns were deployed on railway platforms. They fired shells at distances of 13, 22 and even 28 km. The weight of the shells reached 800-900 kg. The Germans drew up a map of the city and identified several thousand of the most important targets, which were fired upon daily.

At this time, Leningrad turned into a powerful fortified area. 110 large defense centers were created, many thousands of kilometers of trenches, communication passages and other engineering structures were equipped. This created the opportunity to secretly regroup troops, withdraw soldiers from the front line, and bring up reserves. As a result, the number of losses of our troops from shell fragments and enemy snipers has sharply decreased. Reconnaissance and camouflage of positions were established. A counter-battery fight against enemy siege artillery is organized. As a result, the intensity of shelling of Leningrad by enemy artillery decreased significantly. For these purposes, the naval artillery of the Baltic Fleet was skillfully used. The positions of the heavy artillery of the Leningrad Front were moved forward, part of it was transferred across the Gulf of Finland to the Oranienbaum bridgehead, which made it possible to increase the firing range, both to the flank and rear of enemy artillery groups. Thanks to these measures, in 1943 the number of artillery shells that fell on the city decreased by approximately 7 times.

1943 Breaking the blockade

On January 12, after artillery preparation, which began at 9:30 a.m. and lasted 2:10 a.m., at 11 a.m. the 67th Army of the Leningrad Front and the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front went on the offensive and by the end of the day had advanced three kilometers towards each other. friend from the east and west. Despite the stubborn resistance of the enemy, by the end of January 13, the distance between the armies was reduced to 5-6 kilometers, and on January 14 - to two kilometers. The enemy command, trying to hold Workers' Villages No. 1 and 5 and strongholds on the flanks of the breakthrough at any cost, hastily transferred its reserves, as well as units and subunits from other sectors of the front. The enemy group, located to the north of the villages, unsuccessfully tried several times to break through the narrow neck to the south to its main forces.

On January 18, troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts united in the area of ​​Workers' settlements No. 1 and 5. On the same day, Shlisselburg was liberated and the entire southern coast of Lake Ladoga was cleared of the enemy. A corridor 8-11 kilometers wide, cut along the coast, restored the land connection between Leningrad and the country. In seventeen days, a road and a railway (the so-called “Victory Road”) were built along the coast. Subsequently, the troops of the 67th and 2nd Shock armies tried to continue the offensive in a southern direction, but to no avail. The enemy continuously transferred fresh forces to the Sinyavino area: from January 19 to 30, five divisions and a large amount of artillery were brought up. To exclude the possibility of the enemy reaching Lake Ladoga again, the troops of the 67th and 2nd Shock Armies went on the defensive. By the time the blockade was broken, about 800 thousand civilians remained in the city. Many of these people were evacuated to the rear during 1943.

Food factories began to gradually switch to peacetime products. It is known, for example, that already in 1943, the Confectionery Factory named after N.K. Krupskaya produced three tons of sweets of the well-known Leningrad brand “Mishka in the North”.

After breaking through the blockade ring in the Shlisselburg area, the enemy, nevertheless, seriously strengthened the lines on the southern approaches to the city. The depth of the German defense lines in the area of ​​the Oranienbaum bridgehead reached 20 km.

1944 Complete liberation of Leningrad from the enemy blockade

On January 14, troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov and 2nd Baltic fronts began the Leningrad-Novgorod strategic offensive operation. Already by January 20, Soviet troops achieved significant successes: formations of the Leningrad Front defeated the enemy’s Krasnoselsko-Ropshin group, and units of the Volkhov Front liberated Novgorod. This allowed L. A. Govorov and A. A. Zhdanov to appeal to J. V. Stalin on January 21:

In connection with the complete liberation of Leningrad from the enemy blockade and from enemy artillery shelling, we ask for permission:

2. In honor of the victory, fire a salute with twenty-four artillery salvoes from three hundred and twenty-four guns in Leningrad on January 27 this year at 20.00.

J.V. Stalin granted the request of the command of the Leningrad Front and on January 27, a fireworks display was fired in Leningrad to commemorate the final liberation of the city from the siege, which lasted 872 days. The order to the victorious troops of the Leningrad Front, contrary to the established order, was signed by L. A. Govorov, and not Stalin. Not a single front commander was awarded such a privilege during the Great Patriotic War.