The Caucasian front of the First World War briefly. Caucasian Front of Russia in the First World War. Opening of hostilities

Fighting in 1914-1915
The Russian-Turkish (Caucasian) front was 720 kilometers long, stretching from the Black Sea to Lake Urmia. But one must keep in mind the most important feature of the Caucasian theater of operations - unlike the European fronts, there was no continuous line of trenches, ditches, barriers, fighting concentrated along narrow tracts, passes, often goat trails. Most of the armed forces of the parties were concentrated here.
From the first days of the war, Russia and Turkey sought to seize a strategic initiative that could later determine the course of the war in the Caucasus. The Turkish plan of operations on the Caucasian front, developed under the leadership of Turkish Minister of War Enver Pasha and approved by German military experts, provided for the invasion of Turkish troops in Transcaucasia from the flanks through the Batum region and Iranian Azerbaijan, followed by the encirclement and destruction of Russian troops. By the beginning of 1915, the Turks were counting on capturing the entire Transcaucasus and pushing the Russian troops back behind the Caucasian mountain range.

Russian troops had the task of holding the Baku-Vladikavkaz and Baku-Tiflis roads, defending the most important industrial center - Baku and preventing the appearance of Turkish forces in the Caucasus. Since the main front for the Russian army was the Russian-German, the Caucasian army had to actively defend itself on the occupied border mountain lines. In the future, the Russian command planned to capture Erzerum, the most important fortress, the capture of which would have made it possible to threaten Anatolia, but this required significant reserves. It was necessary to break the 3rd Turkish army, and then take a powerful fortress and hold it when the Turkish reserve units approached. But they just didn't exist. Caucasian Front, in the Supreme Headquarters, was considered secondary and the main forces were concentrated against Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Although, on sound reflection, it would be possible to defeat the German Empire by inflicting crushing blows on the “weak links” of the Quadruple Alliance (German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman Empires, Bulgaria) - Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Germany itself, although it was the most powerful combat mechanism, but with practically no resources, for waging a long war. As A. A. Brusilov proved, in May-June 1916 he practically crushed the Austro-Hungarian Empire. If Russia had limited itself to active defense on the border with Germany, and would have delivered the main blows to Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, which would not have been able to withstand the numerous, brave, fairly well-prepared (at the beginning of the war when the army was staffed and with a whole guard) Russian armies. These actions victoriously ended the war back in 1915, Germany could not have stood alone against the three great powers. And Russia, having received from the war territories important for its development (the Bosphorus and Dardanelles), a patriotic public, could industrialize without a Revolution, becoming the leader of the planet.

1914

The fighting on the Caucasian front began in early November with oncoming battles in the Kepri-Key area. Russian troops under the command of General Berkhman quite easily crossed the border, and began to advance in the direction of Erzerum. But the Turks soon counterattacked with the forces of the 9th and 10th corps, while simultaneously pulling up the 11th corps. The Keprikey operation ended with the withdrawal of Russian units to the border, the 3rd Turkish army was inspired and the Turkish command began to harbor hopes that they could defeat the Russian army.

At the same time, Turkish troops invaded Russian territory. On November 18, 1914, Russian troops left Artvin and retreated towards Batum. With the assistance of the Adjarians (a part of the Georgian people, largely professing Islam), who rebelled against the Russian authorities, the entire Batumi region came under the control of Turkish troops, with the exception of the Mikhailovskaya fortress and the Upper Adzhar section of the Batumi district, as well as the city of Ardagan of the Kars region and a significant part of Ardagan region. In the occupied territories, the Turks, with the assistance of the Adjarians, carried out massacres of the Armenian and Greek population.

Having abandoned the battle, to help the troops of Bergman, all the reserves of the Turkestan Corps, the offensive of the Turks was stopped. The situation was stabilized, the Turks lost up to 15 thousand people (total losses), Russian troops - 6 thousand.

In connection with the planned offensive, changes took place in the Turkish command, doubting the success of Gasan-Izzet Pasha, he was replaced by the Minister of War Enver Pasha, his chief of staff was Lieutenant General von Schellendorf, the head of the operations department, Major Feldman. The plan of Enver Pasha's headquarters was that by December the Caucasian army occupied the front from the Black Sea to Lake Van with a length of over 350 km in a straight line, mainly on Turkish territory. At the same time, almost two-thirds of the Russian forces were pushed forward, being between Sarykamysh and Kepri-Key. The Turkish army had the opportunity to try to bypass the main Russian forces from their right flank and strike at the rear, cutting the Sarykamysh-Kars railway. In general, Enver Pasha wanted to repeat the experience of the German army in defeating the 2nd Russian army in East Prussia.

From the front of the Sarykamysh detachment, the 11th Turkish corps, the 2nd cavalry division and the Kurdish cavalry corps were supposed to tie down, while the 9th and 10th Turkish corps on December 9 (22) began a roundabout maneuver through Olty (Olta) and Bardus (Bardiz), intending to go to the rear of the Sarykamysh detachment.
But the plan had many weaknesses: Enver Pasha overestimated the combat readiness of his forces, underestimated the complexity of the mountainous terrain in winter conditions, the time factor (any delay nullified the plan), there were almost no people familiar with the area, the impossibility of creating a well-organized rear. Therefore, terrible mistakes occurred: on December 10, two Turkish divisions (31 and 32) of the 9th corps advancing along the Olta direction staged a battle between themselves (!). As stated in the memoirs of the commander of the 9th Turkish Corps, “When the mistake was realized, people began to cry. It was a heartbreaking picture. We fought the 32nd Division for four hours.” 24 companies fought on both sides, the losses in killed and wounded amounted to about 2 thousand people.

With a swift blow, the Turks knocked out the Olta detachment, which was significantly inferior in number to them (headed by General N. M. Istomin), but it was not destroyed. On December 10 (23), the Sarykamysh detachment relatively easily repulsed the frontal attack of the 11th Turkish Corps. On December 11 (24), the de facto commander of the Caucasian Army, General A.Z. Myshlaevsky, and his chief of staff, General N.N. Yudenich, arrived at the headquarters of the Sarykamysh detachment from Tiflis. General Myshlaevsky organized the defense of Sarykamysh, but at the most crucial moment, having incorrectly assessed the situation, gave the order to retreat, left the army and left for Tiflis. In Tiflis, Myshlaevsky presented a report on the threat of a Turkish invasion of the Caucasus, which caused disorganization of the rear of the army (in January 1915 he was removed from command, in March of the same year he was dismissed, he was replaced by General N. N. Yudenich). General Yudenich took command of the 2nd Turkestan Corps, and the actions of the entire Sarykamysh detachment were still led by General G. E. Berkhman, commander of the 1st Caucasian Corps.

On December 12 (25), Turkish troops, making a roundabout maneuver, occupied Bardus and turned to Sarykamysh. Frosty weather, however, slowed down the pace of the offensive and led to significant (many thousands of) non-combat losses of the Turkish forces (non-combat losses reached 80% of the personnel). The 11th Turkish Corps continued to put pressure on the main Russian forces, but did not do it energetically enough, which allowed the Russians to withdraw the strongest units from the front one by one and transfer them back to Sarykamysh.

On December 16 (29), with the approach of the reserves, the Russian troops pushed the enemy back and launched a counteroffensive. On December 31, the Turks received an order to withdraw. On December 20 (January 2), Bardus was recaptured, and on December 22 (January 4), the entire 9th Turkish Corps was surrounded and captured. The remnants of the 10th Corps were forced to retreat, and by January 4-6 (17-19) the situation at the front was restored. The general pursuit, despite the severe fatigue of the troops, continued until January 5 inclusive. Russian troops, due to losses and fatigue, stopped the pursuit.

As a result, the Turks lost 90,000 people killed, wounded and captured (including 30,000 people frozen), 60 guns. The Russian army also suffered significant losses - 20,000 killed and wounded and more than 6,000 frostbitten. According to the conclusion of General Yudenich, the operation ended with the complete defeat of the Turkish 3rd Army, it practically ceased to exist, the Russian troops took up an advantageous starting position for new operations; the territory of Transcaucasia was cleared of the Turks, except for a small part of the Batum region. As a result of this battle, the Russian Caucasian army transferred military operations to the territory of Turkey and opened its way deep into Anatolia.

This victory also had an impact on Russia's allies in the Entente, the Turkish command was forced to withdraw forces from the Mesopotamian front, which eased the position of the British. In addition, England, alarmed by the successes of the Russian army, English strategists already dreamed of Russian Cossacks on the streets of Constantinople, decided to start the Dardanelles operation (an operation to capture the Dardanelles and the Bosporus with the help of an Anglo-French attack fleet and landing) on ​​February 19, 1915.

The Sarykamysh operation is an example of a rather rare example of a struggle against encirclement - a struggle that began in a Russian defense situation and ended in a head-on collision, with the encirclement ring opening from the inside and the pursuit of the remnants of the Turkish bypass wing.

This battle once again emphasizes the huge role in the war of the brave, enterprising, not afraid to take independent solutions commander. In this regard, the high command of the Turks and ours in the person of Enver Pasha and Myshlaevsky, who abandoned the main forces of their armies, which they considered already lost, to the mercy of fate, provide a sharply negative example. The Caucasian army was saved by the perseverance in carrying out decisions by private commanders, while the senior commanders were confused and were ready to retreat behind the fortress of Kars. They glorified their names in this battle: the commander of the Oltinsky detachment Istomin N.M., the chief of staff of the Caucasian army Yudenich N.N., the commander of the 1st Caucasian corps Berkhman G.E., the commander of the 1st Kuban plastun brigade Przhevalsky M.A. (cousin of the famous traveler), commander of the 3rd Caucasian Rifle Brigade Gabaev V.D.

1915

The beginning of 1915 is characterized by active operations in the Erivan direction, as well as in Persia-Iran, where the Russian command tried to cooperate with the British, who were based in southern Persia. The 4th Caucasian Corps operated in this direction under the command of Oganovsky P.I.
By the beginning of the 1915 campaign, the Russian Caucasian army had 111 battalions, 212 hundreds, 2 aviation detachments, St. 50 militia and volunteer squads, 364 guns. The 3rd Turkish Army, having restored its combat capability after the defeat near Sarykamysh, included 167 battalions, as well as other formations. The Turkish 3rd Army was restored at the expense of parts of the 1st and 2nd Constantinople armies and the 4th Syrian. It was headed by Mahmud-Kamil Pasha, the German Major Guze managed the headquarters.

Having learned the experience of the Sarykamysh operation, fortified areas were created in the Russian rear - Sarykamysh, Ardagan, Akhalkhatsikhe, Akhalkalakh, Alexandropol, Baku and Tiflis. They were armed with old guns from the stocks of the army. This measure ensured freedom of maneuver for parts of the Caucasian army. In addition, an army reserve was created in the area of ​​​​Sarykamysh and Kars (maximum 20-30 battalions). He made it possible to fend off the blow of the Turks in the Alashkert direction in a timely manner and to allocate the Baratov expeditionary force for operations in Persia.

The focus of the warring parties was the struggle for the flanks. The Russian army had the task of driving the Turks out of the Batum region. The Turkish army, fulfilling the plan of the German-Turkish command to deploy a “jihad” (holy war of Muslims against the infidels), sought to involve Persia and Afghanistan in an open action against Russia and England and, by advancing in the Erivan direction, to seize the Baku oil-bearing region from Russia.

In February-April 1915, the fighting had a local character. By the end of March, the Russian army cleared southern Adzharia and the entire Batumi region of the Turks. The Russian Caucasian army was severely limited (“shell hunger”, stocks prepared for war were used up, and while the industry was switching to “military rails”, there were not enough shells) in shells. The troops of the army were weakened by the transfer of part of its forces to the European theater. On the European front, the German-Austrian armies waged a broad offensive, the Russian armies fiercely fought back, the situation was very difficult.

At the end of April, cavalry detachments of the Turkish army invaded Iran.

Already in the first period of hostilities, the Turkish authorities began to evict the Armenian population in the front line. Anti-Armenian propaganda unfolded in Turkey. Western Armenians were accused of mass desertion from the Turkish army, of organizing sabotage and uprisings in the rear of the Turkish troops. About 60,000 Armenians, drafted into the Turkish army at the beginning of the war, were subsequently disarmed, sent to work in the rear, and then destroyed. Since April 1915, under the guise of deportation of Armenians from the front line, the Turkish authorities began the actual destruction of the Armenian population. In a number of places, the Armenian population offered organized armed resistance to the Turks. In particular, a Turkish division was sent to suppress the uprising in the city of Van, blockading the city.

To help the rebels, the 4th Caucasian Army Corps of the Russian army went on the offensive. The Turks retreated, the Russian army captured important settlements. Russian troops cleared a vast territory from the Turks, advancing 100 km. The fighting in this area entered under the name of the Battle of Van. The arrival of the Russian troops saved thousands of Armenians from inevitable death, who, after the temporary withdrawal of the Russian troops, moved to Eastern Armenia.

Battle of Van (April-June 1915)

With the outbreak of World War I, a massacre of the Armenian population was organized in the Van province (an administrative-territorial unit in the Ottoman Empire). Defeated on the Caucasian front and retreating Turkish troops, joined by armed Kurdish gangs and deserters, marauders, under the pretext of "infidelity" of the Armenians and their sympathy for the Russians, mercilessly slaughtered Armenians, robbed their property, and ravaged Armenian settlements. In a number of districts of the Van vilayet, the Armenians resorted to self-defense, fought stubborn battles against the rioters. The most significant was the Van self-defense, which lasted about a month.
The Armenian population took measures to repulse the threatening attack. To manage the self-defense, a single military body was formed - the "Military body of the Armenian self-defense of Van". Services were created for the provision and distribution of products, medical care, a weapons workshop (the production of gunpowder was established in it, two cannons were cast), as well as the "Union of Women", which was mainly engaged in the manufacture of clothing for fighters. In the face of imminent danger, representatives of the Armenian political parties rallied together. Against superior enemy forces (12 thousand soldiers of the regular army, a large number of gang formations), the defenders of Van had no more than 1,500 fighters.

Self-defense began on April 7, when Turkish soldiers fired on Armenian women moving along the road from the village. Shushants to Aygestan; the Armenians returned fire, after which the general attack of the Turks on Aygestan (Armenian-speaking region of the city of Van) began. The first ten days of the Van self-defense passed under the sign of success for the defenders. Despite the fact that Aygestan was subjected to fierce shelling, the enemy did not manage to break through the line of defense of the Armenians. Even the night assault, organized by a German officer who arrived from Erzurum, did not produce results: the Turks, having suffered losses, were driven back. The defenders acted courageously, inspired by the just goals of their struggle. Not a few women and girls fought in the ranks of the defenders. In the second half of April heavy fighting continued. The enemy, continuously replenishing his troops, made attempts to break through the line of defense of the Vans. The shelling of the city continued. During the self-defense of Van, the Turks raged in the region of Van, slaughtering the peaceful Armenian population and setting the Armenian villages on fire; about 24 thousand Armenians died at the hands of the pogromists, over 100 villages were looted and burned. On April 28, the Turks launched a new assault, but the defenders of Van repulsed it. After that, the Turks abandoned active operations, continuing the shelling of the Armenian quarters of Van. In early May, the advanced units of the Russian army and detachments of Armenian volunteers approached Van.

The Turks were forced to lift the siege and retreat. On May 6, Russian troops and Armenian volunteers entered Van, enthusiastically received by the defenders and the population. The military body of self-defense issued an appeal “To the Armenian people”, in which it welcomed the victory of a just cause over violence and tyranny. Van self-defense - a heroic page in the history of the Armenian national liberation movement
In July, Russian troops repulsed the offensive of Turkish troops in the area of ​​Lake Van.

After the completion of the Sarykamysh operation of 1914-1915, units of the 4th Caucasian Army Corps (Infantry General P.I. Oganovsky) went to the Kop-Bitlis area in order to prepare for a general offensive against Erzurum. The Turkish command, seeking to frustrate the plan of the command of the Caucasian army, secretly concentrated a strong strike force led by Abdul-Kerim Pasha (89 battalions, 48 ​​squadrons and hundreds) to the west of Lake Van. She had the task of pressing the 4th Caucasian Army Corps (31 battalion, 70 squadrons and hundreds) in an impenetrable and desert area north of Lake Van, destroying it, and then going on the offensive to Kars in order to cut the communications of the Russian troops and force them to withdraw. Parts of the corps, under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, were forced to retreat from line to line. By July 8 (21), Turkish troops reached the line of Gelian, Jura, Diyadin, creating a threat of a breakthrough to Kars. To disrupt the enemy’s plan, the Russian command created a shock detachment of Lieutenant General N. N. Baratov (24 battalions, 31 hundreds) in the Dayar area, which on July 9 (22) delivered a counterattack to the flank and rear of the 3rd Turkish army. A day later, the main forces of the 4th Caucasian Army Corps went on the offensive. The Turkish troops, fearing a detour, began to retreat and, taking advantage of the insufficiently energetic actions of the corps, managed on July 21 (August 3) to go on the defensive at the line of Buluk-Bashi, Erdzhish. As a result of the operation, the enemy's plan to destroy the 4th Caucasian Army Corps and break through to Kars failed. Russian troops retained most of the territory they occupied and provided the conditions for the Erzurum operation of 1915-1916, facilitated the actions of the British troops in Mesopotamia.

In the second half of the year, hostilities spread to the territory of Persia.

In October-December 1915, the commander of the Caucasian Army, General Yudenich, carried out a successful Hamadan operation, which prevented Persia from entering the war on the side of Germany. On October 30, Russian troops landed in the port of Anzali (Persia), by the end of December they defeated the pro-Turkish armed groups and took control of the territory of Northern Persia, securing the left flank of the Caucasian army.
After the Alashkert operation, Russian troops tried to launch a number of offensives, but due to lack of ammunition, all attacks ended in vain. By the end of 1915, the Russian troops, with a few exceptions, retained those areas that they conquered in the spring and summer of this year, however, due to the difficult situation on the Eastern Front and the lack of ammunition, the Russian command had to abandon active operations in the Caucasus in 1915. The front of the Caucasian army was reduced by 300 km. The Turkish command did not achieve its goals in the Caucasus in 1915.

Western Armenian Genocide

Talking about the military actions of Turkey in this period, one cannot but pay attention to such a monstrous event as the genocide of Western Armenians. Today, the Armenian genocide is also widely discussed in the press and the world community, and the Armenian people keep the memory of the innocent victims of the genocide.

During the First World War, the Armenian people experienced a terrible tragedy, the Young Turk government carried out the mass extermination of Armenians on an unprecedented scale and with unheard-of cruelty. The extermination took place not only in western Armenia, but throughout Turkey. The Young Turks, pursuing, as already mentioned, predatory goals, sought to create a "great empire". But the Armenians under Ottoman rule, like a number of other peoples who were subjected to heavy oppression and persecution, sought to get rid of the cruel Turkish domination. In order to prevent such attempts by the Armenians and put an end to the Armenian question forever, the Young Turks planned to physically exterminate the Armenian people. The rulers of Turkey decided to take advantage of the outbreak of the world war and implement their monstrous program - the program of the Armenian genocide.

The first exterminations of Armenians took place at the end of 1914 and at the beginning of 1915. At first, they were organized covertly, secretly. Under the pretext of mobilization into the army and the gathering of workers for road construction, the authorities conscripted adult male Armenians into the army, who were then disarmed and secretly, in separate groups, destroyed. During this period, hundreds of Armenian villages located in the regions bordering Russia were devastated.

After the destruction in an insidious way of the majority of the Armenian population capable of resistance, the Young Turks from the spring of 1915 began an open and general massacre of peaceful, defenseless inhabitants, carrying out this criminal act under the guise of deportation. In the spring of 1915, an order was given to deport the Western Armenian population to the deserts of Syria and Mesopotamia. This order of the ruling Turkish clique marked the beginning of a general massacre. The mass extermination of women, children and the elderly began. Part was cut out on the spot, in native villages and cities, the other, which was forcibly deported, was on the way.

The massacre of the Western Armenian population was carried out with monstrous ruthlessness. The Turkish government has instructed its local authorities to be resolute and spare no one. Thus, in September 1915, the Minister of the Interior of Turkey, Talaat Bey, telegraphed the governor of Aleppo that the entire Armenian population should be liquidated, not sparing even infants. The pogromists acted in the most barbaric way. Having lost their human appearance, the executioners threw children into rivers, burned women and the elderly in churches and residential premises, and sold girls. Eyewitnesses describe the atrocities of the killers with horror and disgust. Many representatives of the Western Armenian intelligentsia also died tragically. On April 24, 1915, outstanding writers, poets, publicists and many other figures of culture and science were arrested and then brutally murdered in Constantinople. The great Armenian composer Komitas, only accidentally escaped death, could not stand the horrors that he witnessed, and lost his mind.

The news about the extermination of the Armenians leaked into the press of European states, the terrible details of the genocide became known. The world community expressed an angry protest against the misanthropic actions of the Turkish rulers, who set themselves the goal of destroying one of the most ancient civilized peoples of the world. Maxim Gorky, Valery Bryusov and Yuri Veselovsky in Russia, Anatole France and R. Rolland in France, Fridtjof Nansen in Norway, Karl Liebknecht and Joseph Markwart in Germany, James Bryce in England and many others protested against the genocide of the Armenian people. But nothing influenced the Turkish rioters, they continued their atrocities. The massacre of Armenians continued in 1916 as well. It took place in all parts of Western Armenia and in all areas of Turkey inhabited by Armenians. Western Armenia lost its indigenous population.
The main organizers of the genocide of Western Armenians were the Minister of War of the Turkish government Enver Pasha, the Minister of Internal Affairs Talaat Pasha, one of the major military figures of Turkey, General Jemal Pasha and other Young Turk leaders. Some of them were subsequently killed by Armenian patriots. So, for example, in 1922 Talaat was killed in Berlin, and Dzhemal - in Tiflis.

During the years of the extermination of the Armenians, Kaiser's Germany, an ally of Turkey, patronized the Turkish government in every possible way. It sought to seize the entire Middle East, and the liberation aspirations of Western Armenians hindered the implementation of these plans. In addition, the German imperialists hoped through the deportation of Armenians to get cheap labor for the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad railway. They in every possible way incited the Turkish government to organize the forcible deportation of Western Armenians. Moreover, the German officers and other officials who were in Turkey took part in organizing the massacre and deportation of the Armenian population. The powers of the Entente, who considered the Armenian people as their ally, actually did not take any practical steps to save the victims of the Turkish vandals. They limited themselves only to the fact that on May 24, 1915, they published a statement in which they blamed the government of the Young Turks for the massacre of Armenians. And the United States of America, which had not yet taken part in the war, did not even make such a statement. While Turkish executioners exterminated Armenians, the US ruling circles strengthened their trade and economic ties with the Turkish government. When the massacre began, part of the Western Armenian population resorted to self-defense and tried - where possible - to protect their lives and honor. The population of Van, Shapin-Garahisar, Sasun, Urfa, Svetia and a number of other regions took up arms.

In 1915-1916. The Turkish government forcibly evicted several hundred thousand Armenians to Mesopotamia and Syria. Many fell victim to famine and epidemics. The survivors settled in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, moved to the countries of Europe and America. The Armenians living in a foreign land were in very difficult conditions. During the First World War, many Western Armenians managed to escape the massacre with the help of Russian troops and move to the Caucasus. This happened mainly in December 1914 and in the summer of 1915. During 1914-1916. about 350 thousand people moved to the Caucasus. They settled mainly in Eastern Armenia, Georgia and the North Caucasus. Refugees, not receiving tangible material assistance, experienced great hardships. In total, according to various estimates, from 1 to 1.5 million people were destroyed.

Results of the 1914-1915 campaign

Campaign 1914-1915 was controversial for Russia. In 1914, Turkish troops were unable to dislodge the Russian Caucasian Army from the Transcaucasus and transfer the fighting to the North Caucasus. Raise Muslim peoples against Russia North Caucasus, Persia and Afghanistan. They suffered a heavy defeat in the Sarykamysh battle. But the Russian army was also unable to consolidate its success and go on a major offensive. The reasons for this were mainly the lack of reserves (secondary front) and the mistakes of the high command.

In 1915, the Turkish troops were unable to take advantage of the weakening of the Russian troops (due to the difficult situation of the Russian army on the Eastern Front) and did not achieve their goals - the capture of the Baku oil-bearing region. In Persia, the Turkish units were also defeated and could not complete the task of dragging Persia into the war on their side. The Russian army inflicted several strong blows on the Turks: defeating them near Van, the Alashkert battle, in Persia (Hamadan operation). But they also failed to fulfill the plan to capture Erzurum and completely defeat the Turkish army. In general, the Russian Caucasian army acted quite successfully. She strengthened her position along the entire front, gained the ability to widely maneuver in mountainous winter conditions, improved the network of front-line communications, prepared supplies for the offensive, and entrenched herself 70 km away. from Erzurum. All this made it possible to carry out the victorious Erzurum offensive operation in 1916.

21.12.2015

Annotation:

The article presents an analysis of the course of hostilities on the Caucasian front during the First World War. All the most significant military operations conducted by the Caucasian army under the leadership of General N.N. Yudenich, the conditions and factors that predetermined their success. The reasons that caused the collapse of the Caucasian front and the exit of Russia from the First World War, including in the Caucasian direction, are determined.

The European theater of operations, although it was the main one during the First World War due to the fact that it was here that the armed confrontation acquired the most violent character, nevertheless, was far from the only one. The fighting went far beyond the European continent, thus defining other theaters of war. One of these theaters of war was the Middle East, within which Russia had the Caucasian front, where it was opposed by the Ottoman Empire.

Her involvement in the war for Germany was of fundamental importance. Turkey, according to the plan of the German strategists, having a million-strong army, was supposed to pull over the reserves and resources of Russia to the Caucasus, and Great Britain to the Sinai Peninsula and Mesopotamia (the territory of modern Iraq).

For Turkey itself, which experienced a number of military defeats at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries, participation in a new war, especially against Russia, was far from a bright prospect. Therefore, despite the allied obligations, the leadership of the Ottoman Empire hesitated for a long time before starting a war with Russia. This was opposed by both the head of state himself - Sultan Mehmed V, and most of the members of his government. The only supporter of the war was the Minister of War of Turkey, Enver Pasha, who was under the influence of the head of the German mission in Turkey, General L. von Sanders.

Because of this, the Turkish leadership in September 1914, through the Russian ambassador in Istanbul N. Girs, brought its position on the readiness not only to be neutral in the war that had already begun, but also to act as an ally of Russia against Germany.

Paradoxically, this was precisely what the tsarist leadership did not like. Nicholas II was haunted by the laurels of his great ancestors: Peter I and Catherine II, and he really wanted to realize the idea of ​​gaining Constantinople and the Black Sea straits for Russia and thereby go down in history. The best way to achieve this was only a victorious war with Turkey. Proceeding from this, Russia's foreign policy strategy in the Middle East was built. Therefore, the question of allied relations with Turkey was not even raised.

Thus, arrogance in foreign policy, isolation from political realities, overestimation of one's strengths and capabilities led the Russian leadership to put the country in a war on two fronts. The Russian soldier once again had to pay for the voluntarism of the country's political leadership.

Combat operations in the Caucasian direction began literally immediately after the bombardment by Turkish ships on October 29-30, 1914 of the Russian Black Sea ports of Sevastopol, Odessa, Feodosia and Novorossiysk. In Russia, this event received the unofficial name "Sevastopol wake-up call". On November 2, 1914, Russia declared war on Turkey, followed by England and France on November 5 and 6.

At the same time, Turkish troops crossed the Russian border and occupied part of Adjara. Subsequently, it was supposed to go to the Kars-Batum-Tiflis-Baku line, raise the Muslim peoples of the North Caucasus, Adjara, Azerbaijan and Persia to jihad against Russia and thus cut off the Caucasian army from the center of the country and defeat it.

These plans were, of course, grandiose, but their main vulnerability was the underestimation of the potential of the Caucasian army and its command.

Despite the fact that most of the troops of the Caucasian Military District were sent to the Austro-German front, the grouping of Russian troops was still combat-ready, and the quality of officers and privates was higher than in the center of the country.

It is noteworthy that the planning of operations and direct management of them during the combat was carried out by one of the best Russian military leaders of that time - the commander of the Suvorov school - General N.N. Yudenich, who became widely known after Lenin's appeal "Everything to fight Yudenich", and then, by the efforts of ideological censorship, was forgotten.

But it was the military talent of General N.N. Yudenich largely determined the success of the actions of the Caucasian army. And almost all the operations carried out by her until April 1917 were successful, among which the following were of particular importance: Sarykamysh (December 1914 - January 1915), Alashkert (July - August 1915), Hamadan (October - December 1915), Erzurum (December 1915 - February 1916), Trebizond (January-April 1916) and others.

The course of hostilities on the Caucasian front at the initial stage of the war was determined by the Sarykamysh operation, the conduct of which by Russian troops should rightfully be included in the textbooks of the history of military art. Since, in its uniqueness, it is actually comparable to the Swiss campaign of A.V. Suvorov. Not only did the offensive of the Russian troops take place in conditions of 20-30 degree frosts, it was also carried out in mountainous areas and against an enemy superior in strength.

The number of Russian troops near Sarykamysh was about 63 thousand people under the general command of the assistant to the commander-in-chief of the Caucasian army, General A.Z. Myshlaevsky. The 90,000-strong 3rd Turkish field army opposed the Russian troops.

Having advanced more than 100 kilometers deep into the territory of Turkey, the formations of the Caucasian army have largely lost contact with the bases for supplying weapons and food. In addition, communications between the center and the flanks were disrupted. In general, the position of the Russian troops was so unfavorable that General A.Z. Myshlaevsky, not believing in the success of the upcoming operation, gave the order to retreat, left the troops and left for Tiflis, which further complicated the situation.

The Turks, on the contrary, were so sure of their victory that the offensive operation against the Russian troops was personally led by Minister of War Enver Pasha. The chief of staff of the army was the representative of the German command, Lieutenant-General F. Bronsart von Schellendorf. It was he who planned the course of the upcoming operation, which, according to the plan of the Turkish-German command, was to become for the Russian troops a kind of Schliefen "Cannes", by analogy with the defeat of France in the same period by the German troops.

The Turks did not succeed in "Cannov", and even more so in grinding, because the cards were confused by the chief of staff of the Caucasian army, General N.N. Yudenich, who was convinced that “the decision to retreat implies an inevitable collapse. And under the condition of fierce resistance, it is quite possible to snatch victory. Based on this, he insisted on canceling the order to retreat and took measures to strengthen the Sarykamysh garrison, which at that time consisted of only two militia squads and two reserve battalions. In fact, these "paramilitary" formations had to withstand the first onslaught of the 10th Turkish army corps. And they withstood it and repelled it. The offensive of the Turks on Sarikamysh began on December 13. Despite multiple superiority, the Turks never managed to capture the city. And by December 15, the Sarykamysh garrison was reinforced and already consisted of more than 22 battalions, 8 hundreds, 78 machine guns and 34 guns.

The situation for the Turkish troops was complicated by the weather conditions. Unable to take Sarykamysh and provide their troops with winter quarters, the Turkish corps in the snowy mountains lost only about 10 thousand people frostbitten.

On December 17, the Russian troops launched a counteroffensive and threw back the Turkish troops from Sarykamysh. On December 22, the 9th Turkish Corps was completely surrounded, and on December 25, the new commander of the Caucasian Army, General N.N. Yudenich gave the order to launch a counteroffensive. Having thrown back the remnants of the 3rd Army by 30-40 km by January 5, 1915, the Russian troops stopped the pursuit, which was carried out in 20-30-degree frost. Enver Pasha's troops lost about 78 thousand people killed, frozen, wounded and captured. (over 80% of the composition). The losses of Russian troops amounted to 26 thousand people. (killed, wounded, frostbitten).

The significance of this operation was that it actually stopped the Turkish aggression in Transcaucasia and strengthened the position of the Caucasian army in Turkey's Eastern Anatolia.

Another significant event in 1915 was the Alashkert defensive operation (July-August) of the Caucasian army.

In an effort to take revenge for the defeat near Sarykamysh, the Turkish command concentrated a strong strike force in this direction as part of the newly formed 3rd field army under the command of General Kiamil Pasha. Its task was to encircle units of the 4th Caucasian Army Corps (Infantry General P.I. Oganovsky) in an impenetrable and deserted area north of Lake Van, destroy it, and then go on the offensive on Kars in order to cut the communications of the Russian troops and force them to retreat. The superiority of the Turkish troops in manpower was almost twofold. It was also important that the offensive operation of the Turks took place simultaneously with the offensive of the Austro-German troops on the Eastern (Russian) front, which excluded the possibility of providing any assistance to the Caucasian army.

However, the calculations of Turkish strategists did not materialize. In an effort to destroy parts of the 4th Caucasian Corps as quickly as possible, the Turkish command exposed the flanks, which N.N. took advantage of. Yudenich, planning a counteroffensive in these areas.

It started with a counterattack on July 9, 1915 by a detachment of Lieutenant General N.N. Baratov to the flank and rear of the 3rd Turkish Army. A day later, the main forces of the 4th Caucasian Army Corps went on the offensive. Turkish troops, fearing a bypass, began to retreat, gaining a foothold at the line of Buluk-Bashi, Erdzhish, 70 kilometers east of the strategically important city of Erzerum.

Thus, as a result of the operation, the enemy’s plan to destroy the 4th Caucasian Army Corps and break through to Kars failed. Russian troops retained most of the territory they occupied. At the same time, the most important significance of the results of the Alashkert operation was that after it the Turks finally lost their strategic initiative in the Caucasian direction and went on the defensive.

In the same period (the second half of 1915), hostilities spread to the territory of Persia, which, although it declared its neutrality, at the same time was unable to ensure it. Therefore, the neutrality of Persia, despite the fact that it was recognized by all the warring parties, was widely ignored by them. The most active in terms of involving Persia in the war was the leadership of Turkey, which sought to use the commonality of ethno-confessional factors to deploy a “jihad” against Russia in Persian territory in order to create a direct threat to the strategically important Baku oil region for Russia.

In order to prevent the entry of Persia on the side of Turkey in October-December 1915, the command of the Caucasian army planned and successfully carried out the Hamadan operation, during which the pro-Turkish Persian armed formations were defeated and the territory of Northern Persia was taken under control. Thus, the security of both the left flank of the Caucasian army and the Baku region was ensured.

At the end of 1915, the situation on the Caucasian front became much more complicated, and, paradoxically, it was the fault of Russia's allies - Great Britain and France. Worried about her success in Eastern Anatolia, which threatened all the vital important regions Turkey up to Istanbul, Russia's allies decided to conduct a landing operation to take control of both the capital of Turkey and its Black Sea straits. The operation was called the Dardanelles (Gallipoli). It is noteworthy that the initiator of its holding was none other than W. Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty of Britain).

For its implementation, the Allies concentrated 60 ships and more than 100 thousand personnel. At the same time, British, Australian, New Zealand, Indian and French troops took part in the land operation to land troops on the Gallipoli peninsula. The operation began on February 19 and ended in August 1915 with the defeat of the Entente forces. The loss of the British amounted to about 119.7 thousand people, France - 26.5 thousand people. The losses of the Turkish troops, although they were more significant - 186 thousand people, but they compensated for their victory. The result of the Dardanelles operation was the strengthening of the positions of Germany and Turkey in the Balkans, the entry into the war on their side of Bulgaria, as well as a government crisis in Britain, as a result of which W. Churchill, as its initiator, was forced to resign.

After the victory in the Dardanelles operation, the Turkish command planned to transfer the most combat-ready units from Gallipoli to the Caucasian front. But N.N. Yudenich was ahead of this maneuver by carrying out the Erzurum and Trebizond operations. In them, the Russian troops achieved the greatest success on the Caucasian front.

The purpose of these operations was to capture the fortress of Erzerum and the port of Trebizond - the main bases of Turkish troops in the Caucasus direction. Here, the 3rd Turkish army of Kiamil Pasha (about 100 thousand people) acted against the Caucasian army (103 thousand people).

On December 28, 1915, the 2nd Turkestan (General M.A. Przhevalsky) and the 1st Caucasian (General P.P. Kalitin) army corps went on the offensive against Erzerum. The offensive took place in the snowy mountains with strong wind and frost. Nevertheless, despite the difficult natural and climatic conditions, Russian troops broke through the Turkish front and on January 8 reached the approaches to Erzerum. The assault on this heavily fortified Turkish fortress in conditions of severe cold and snow drifts, in the absence of siege artillery, was fraught with great risk. Even the viceroy of the tsar in the Caucasus, Nikolai Nikolaevich Jr., was opposed to its implementation. However, the commander of the Caucasian Army, General N.N. Yudenich nevertheless decided to continue the operation, taking full responsibility for its implementation. On the evening of January 29, the assault on the Erzurum positions began. After five days of fierce fighting, Russian troops broke into Erzurum, and then began the pursuit of Turkish troops, which continued until February 18. At a distance of about 70-100 km west of Erzurum, the Russian troops stopped, advancing in general into the territory of Turkey more than 150 km from the state border.

The large-scale disinformation of the enemy also greatly contributed to the success of this operation. At the direction of N.N. Yudenich, a rumor spread among the troops about preparations for an attack on Erzerum only in the spring of 1916. At the same time, officers began to give out vacations, and officer wives were allowed to arrive at the places of deployment of the army. The 4th division was removed from the front and sent to Persia in order to convince the enemy that the next offensive was being prepared in the Baghdad direction. All this was so convincing that the commander of the 3rd Turkish Army left the troops and left for Istanbul. Measures were also taken for the covert concentration of troops.

The very offensive of the Russian troops began on the eve of the New Year and Christmas holidays (December 28), which the Turks did not expect at all, and therefore could not offer proper resistance.

In other words, the success of the operation was largely due to the highest level of military-strategic art of General N.N. Yudenich, as well as the courage, steadfastness and desire for victory of the soldiers of his Caucasian army. All this, combined, predetermined the successful outcome of the Erzerum operation, in which even the viceroy of the king in the Caucasus did not believe.

The capture of Erzerum and, in general, the entire offensive operation of the Caucasian army in the winter campaign of 1916 were of extremely important military and strategic importance. The Russian troops were actually opened the road deep into Asia Minor, since Erzerum was the last Turkish fortress on the way to Istanbul. This, in turn, forced the Turkish command to hastily transfer reinforcements from other directions to the Caucasian front. And it was precisely thanks to the successes of the Russian troops that, for example, the Turkish operation in the Suez Canal area was abandoned, and the British expeditionary army in Mesopotamia received greater freedom of action.

In addition, the victory near Erzerum was of exceptionally important military and political significance for Russia. Extremely interested in active hostilities on the Russian front, Russia's allies, on all issues related to the post-war structure of the world, went literally "to meet" her wishes. This is evidenced, at least, by the provisions of the Anglo-French-Russian Agreement concluded on March 4, 1916 on the “goals of the war of Russia in Asia Minor”, ​​which provided for the transfer under the jurisdiction of Russia of the area of ​​\u200b\u200bConstantinople and the straits, as well as the northern part of Turkish Armenia. In turn, Russia recognized the right of England to occupy the neutral zone of Persia. In addition, the Entente powers took away the "Holy Places" (Palestine) from Turkey.

The Trebizond (January 23 - April 5, 1916) operation became a logical continuation of the Erzerum one. The significance of Trebizond was determined by the fact that it was through it that the supply of the 3rd Turkish field army was carried out, so taking it under control greatly complicated the actions of Turkish troops throughout the region. Awareness of the significance of the forthcoming operation took place even at the level of the highest military-political leadership of Russia: both the Supreme Commander of the Russian army, Nicholas II, and his Headquarters. This, obviously, explains the unprecedented case of the First World War, when troops were not taken from the Caucasus to the Austro-German front, but, on the contrary, they were sent here. In particular, we are talking about two Kuban plastun brigades sent from Novorossiysk to the area of ​​the upcoming operation in early April 1916. And although the operation itself began at the end of January with the bombardment of Turkish positions by the Black Sea Fleet, it was with their arrival that its active phase actually began, ending with the capture of Trebizond on April 5.

As a result of the success of the Trebizond operation, the shortest connection between the 3rd Turkish army and Istanbul was interrupted. The base of light forces of the Black Sea Fleet and the supply base organized by the Russian command in Trebizond significantly strengthened the position of the Caucasian army. At the same time, Russian military art was enriched by the experience of organizing joint actions of the army and navy in the coastal direction.

At the same time, it should be noted that not all military operations of the Caucasian army were as successful as those described above. In particular, we are talking about the Kerind-Kasreshira operation, in which the 1st Caucasian separate corps of General N.N. Baratov (about 20 thousand people) carried out a campaign from Iran to Mesopotamia in order to rescue the English detachment of General Townsend (more than 10 thousand people), besieged by the Turks in Kut-el-Amar (southeast of Baghdad).

The campaign took place from April 5 to May 9, 1916. Corps N.N. Baratov occupied a number of Persian cities and entered Mesopotamia. However, this difficult and dangerous campaign through the desert lost its meaning, since already on April 13 the English garrison in Kut-el-Amar capitulated, after which the command of the 6th Turkish Army sent its main forces against the 1st Caucasian Separate Corps itself to time already strong thinned (mainly from diseases). Near the city of Khaneken (150 km northeast of Baghdad), an unsuccessful battle for the Russian troops took place, after which the corps of N.N. Baratov left the occupied cities and retreated to Hamadan. East of this Iranian city, the Turkish offensive was stopped.

Directly on the Turkish direction of the Caucasian Front, the actions of the Russian troops were more successful. So, in June-August 1916, the Erzrinjan operation was carried out. It is noteworthy that, as well as near Sarykamysh and Alashkert, active hostilities were launched by the Turkish side, which sought to take revenge for the defeat near Erzurum and Trebizond. By this time, the Turkish command had transferred up to 10 divisions from Gallipoli to the Caucasian front, bringing the number of its troops on the Caucasian front again to more than 250 thousand people in two armies: the 3rd and 2nd. It is noteworthy that the troops of the 2nd Army are the winners of the Anglo-French in the Dardanelles.

The operation itself began on May 18 with the transition to the offensive of the 3rd Turkish field army, reinforced by the Dardanelles units, in the Erzurum direction.

In oncoming battles, the Caucasian riflemen managed to wear down the enemy, preventing the enemy from reaching Erzurum. The scale of the fighting expanded, and both sides brought more and more new forces into the unfolding battle. After a corresponding regrouping on June 13, the entire Turkish 3rd Army went on the offensive against Trebizond and Erzurum.

During the battles, the Turkish troops managed to wedge themselves into the junction between the 5th Caucasian (Lieutenant General V.A. Yablochkin) and the 2nd Turkestan (Lieutenant General M.A. Przhevalsky) Corps, but they could not develop this breakthrough, because the 19th Turkestan Regiment under the command of Colonel B.N. stood in their way as an "iron wall". Litvinov. For two days the regiment held the blow of two enemy divisions.

With their steadfastness, the soldiers and officers of this regiment provided N.N. Yudenich the opportunity to regroup his forces and go on the counteroffensive.

On June 23, the troops of the 1st Caucasian Corps, General P.P. Kalitin, with the support of cavalry Cossack regiments, launched a counterattack in the Mamakhatun direction. In the oncoming battles that began along the entire Erzurum front, the Turkish reserves were crushed, and the spirit of the troops was broken.

On July 1, the troops of the Caucasian Army launched a general offensive along the entire front from the Black Sea coast to the Erzurum direction. By July 3, the 2nd Turkestan Corps occupied Bayburt, and the 1st Caucasian Corps overturned the enemy over the river. Northern Euphrates. In the period from July 6 to 20, a large-scale counter-offensive of the Caucasian army took place, during which the 3rd Turkish army was again defeated, losing more than seventeen thousand people only as prisoners. On July 12, Russian troops broke into Erzincan, the last major Turkish city up to Ankara.

Having suffered a defeat near Erzincan, the Turkish command assigned the task of returning Erzerum to the newly formed 2nd Army under the command of Ahmet Izet Pasha (120 thousand people).

On July 23, the 2nd Turkish Army went on the offensive in the Ognot direction, where the 4th Caucasian Corps of General V.V. de Witt, thus starting the Ognot operation.

The advancing Turkish troops managed to tie down the actions of the 1st Caucasian Corps, attacking the 4th Caucasian Corps with the main forces. On July 23, the Russians left Bitlis, and two days later the Turks reached the state border. At the same time, fighting began in Persia. An extremely difficult situation has developed for the Caucasian army. According to, for example, the historian of the Russian army A.A. Kersnovsky A.A., “since the time of Sarykamysh, this was the most serious crisis of the Caucasian front”3.

The outcome of the battle was decided by a counterattack planned by N.N. Yudenich in the flank of the 2nd Turkish army. In the battles of August 4-11, the counterattack was crowned with complete success: the enemy was overturned on his right flank and thrown back to the Euphrates. On August 19, the 2nd Turkish Army once again broke through the Russian front with the last effort, but there were no longer enough forces to develop success. Until August 29, oncoming battles were going on in the Erzurum and Ognot directions, interspersed with constant counterattacks of the parties.

Thus, N.N. Yudenich once again snatched the initiative from the enemy, forcing him to switch to defensive actions and abandon the continuation of the offensive and, thereby, achieve success in the entire ongoing operation.

The military campaign of 1916 was completed with success in the Ognot operation. Its results exceeded all expectations of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the Caucasian army seriously advanced deep into the Ottoman Empire, defeated the enemy in a number of battles, captured the most important and largest cities in the region - Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Erzinjan. The Turkish summer offensive was thwarted during the Erzincan and Ognot operations. The main task of the army, which was set at the beginning of the First World War, was solved - Transcaucasia was reliably protected. In the occupied territories, a temporary governor-general of Turkish Armenia was established, directly subordinate to the command of the Caucasian army.

By the beginning of September 1916, the Caucasian Front had stabilized at the line of Elleu, Erzinjan, Ognot, Bitlis and Lake Van. Both sides have exhausted their offensive capabilities.

Turkish troops, having been defeated in all the battles on the Caucasian front and having lost more than 300 thousand soldiers and officers in them, were incapable of any active combat operations, especially offensive ones.

The Caucasian army, cut off from supply bases, and stationed in a mountainous treeless area, had problems with sanitary losses exceeding combat ones. The army needed both replenishment of personnel, ammunition, food and fodder, as well as elementary rest.

Therefore, active hostilities were planned only in 1917. By the same time, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command planned to carry out a landing operation against Istanbul. The grounds for this were given not only by the successes on the Caucasian front of the army of General N.N. Yudenich, but also the undivided dominance at sea of ​​the Black Sea Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral A.V. Kolchak.

Corrections to these plans were made first by February, and then by October Revolution 1917. Focusing on the Austro-German front and providing all possible assistance to the allies, the tsarist government missed the development of crisis processes within the country. These processes were caused not so much by the deteriorating economic situation, but by the aggravation of the struggle of various political groups at the highest level of state power, as well as the fall in the authority of the king himself and his family, who surrounded themselves with various kinds of crooks and opportunists.

All this, against the backdrop of unsuccessful operations of the Russian armies on the Austro-German front, led to an acute political crisis that ended with the February Revolution. Demagogues and populists came to power in the country in the person of the Provisional Government headed by A.F. Kerensky and the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (N.S. Chkheidze, L.D. Trotsky, G.E. Zinoviev). On the conscience of the latter, for example, was the adoption of the infamous Order No. 1, which marked the beginning of the decomposition of the Russian army at the front. Along with other populist measures, the order provided for the actual abolition of active army unity of command ("democratization of the army"), which led to an increase in anarchy in the form of soldiers' refusals to go on the offensive and lynching of officers; in addition, there was a colossal increase in desertion.

Not in the best way The Provisional Government also showed itself, taking the position, on the one hand, of flirting with the revolutionary-minded soldiers at the front, and on the other, continuing the war.

All this caused chaos and unrest in the troops, including those of the Caucasian front. During 1917, the Caucasian army gradually decomposed, the soldiers deserted, going home, and by the end of the year the Caucasian front was completely collapsed.

General N.N. Yudenich, who was appointed during this period the commander-in-chief of the Caucasian Front, created on the basis of the Caucasian Army, continued offensive operations against the Turks, however, difficulties in supplying troops, a drop in discipline under the influence of revolutionary agitation and an increase in the incidence of malaria forced him to stop the last operation on the Caucasian front - the Mesopotamian and withdraw troops in the mountains.

Refusing to comply with the order of the Provisional Government to resume the offensive, on May 31, 1917, he was removed from command of the front "for resisting the instructions" of the Provisional Government, handed over command to General of Infantry M.A. Przhevalsky and transferred to the disposal of the Minister of War.

The war with Turkey for Russia was completed with the signing of the Brest Peace, which meant the formal cessation of the existence of the Caucasian Front and the possibility of returning to their homeland for all Russian troops that still remained on the territory of Turkey and Persia.

Further fate and the Caucasian Army and its legendary commander, General N.N. Yudenich were tragic.

N.N. Yudenich, having led the White movement in the North-West of Russia and, accordingly, the North-Western Army in September-October 1919, was on the outskirts of Petrograd. Having failed to take Petrograd and betrayed by the allies, he was arrested by independent Estonian authorities and released only after the intervention of the leadership of the French and British missions. The next years of his life were connected with emigration to France.

The Caucasian army, abandoned to the mercy of fate by the government of the country, which by that time had already become Soviet, was forced to independently reach Russia through the territory of the newly formed "democratic" states (Georgia and Azerbaijan). Along the way, units and formations of the army were subjected to robberies and violence.

Subsequently, the democratic states paid dearly for the fact that they lost the guarantee of their security in the person of the Caucasian army, having been subjected to de facto occupation by Turkey and Germany, and then by Great Britain. She paid dearly for the betrayal of her army, including the Caucasian and Soviet Russia. Having adopted the inherently criminal slogan “turn the imperialist war into a civil war”, the country once again, in the words of K. Clausewitz, began to defeat itself.

In this regard, one cannot but agree with the words of the President Russian Federation V.V. Putin that victory was stolen from Russia in the First World War. In our opinion, it was stolen not only by the allies of Russia, who traditionally treated it fraudulently, but also by the United States, which entered the war when its outcome was actually a foregone conclusion. She was stolen and degraded political elite a country that was unable to take measures to strengthen statehood during its most acute crisis, as well as democratically advanced counter-elites who put the interests of achieving power and personal well-being above those of the state.

Bocharnikov Igor Valentinovich

1 - Oskin M.V. "History of the First World War", M., "Veche", 2014, p. 157-163.

2 - The fierceness of the fighting is evidenced by the fact that out of 60 officers and 3200 soldiers, the losses of the regiment amounted to 43 officers and 2069 soldiers. At the same time, the advancing Turkish units and formations lost about 6 thousand people. In hand-to-hand combat, soldiers of the 19th Turkestan regiment even raised the commander of the 10th Turkish division.

3 - Kersnovsky A.A. "History of the Russian Army", M., 1994, v. 4, p. 158.

Bibliography:

Bocharnikov I.V. Military-political interests of Russia in the Transcaucasus: historical experience and modern practice of implementation. Diss. … Ph.D. Sciences. M: VU, 1996.
Kersnovsky A.A. "History of the Russian Army", M., 1994, v. 4, p. 158.
Korsun N. G. First World War on the Caucasian front, M., 1946.
Novikov N.V. Fleet operations against the shore on the Black Sea in 1914-1917, 2nd ed., M., 1937.
Oskin M.V. History of the First World War. M.: "Veche", 2014. S. 157 - 163.

MILITARY HISTORICAL LIBRARY

N.G. KORSUN

caucasian front

WORLD WAR I

UDC 355/359" 1914/1919" BBK 63.3(0)53 K69

The series was founded in 1998

Serial design by A.A. Kudryavtseva

Signed for publication from ready-made transparencies on April 28, 2004. Format 84x108 "/52. Printing paper. Offset printing. Conv. oven l. 36.12. Circulation 3000 copies. Order 1454.

Korsun N.G.

K69 Caucasian front of the First World War / N.G. Korsun. - M.: AST Publishing House LLC: Tranzitkniga LLC. 2004. - 685.)