National war under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky briefly. II. Bohdan Khmelnytsky. War of Liberation led by Khmelnytsky

MAIN EVENTS

1648 p., January 25- the beginning of the national liberation war. The uprising of the Cossacks in the Zaporizhzhya Sich and the election of Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky

1653 p., October 1- Zemsky Sobor in Moscow decided to accept the Zaporizhzhya Army under the patronage of the Moscow Tsar

1654 January 8- the Cossack Council, convened by Bogdan Khmelnitsky in Pereyaslav, took the oath of allegiance to the Moscow Tsar

1654 March 27- the March Articles were signed in Moscow - an agreement between Russia and the Hetmanate

The beginning of the war. B. Khmelnitsky

After the suppression of the peasant-Cossack uprisings of the 20-30s of the XVII century. Ukraine has entered a ten-year period of calm.

The Polish gentry intensified the colonization of Ukrainian lands, the national and religious oppression of the Orthodox Ukrainians. Therefore, the explosion of 1648 was natural.

By its nature, this popular movement was national liberation and anti-feudal.

Calmness, which reigned in the Ukrainian lands after the suppression of the Cossack uprisings of the 20-30s by the Polish authorities, pp. XVII century. Was not long, because the existing social contradictions were not resolved. In modern scientific literature, views prevail that the popular uprising, which began in 1648, covering most of the territory and population of Ukraine, grew into a liberation war, and it, having caused fundamental changes in social development acquired the features of a national revolution. On the completion of the national revolution, the prevailing assertion is that it ended in defeat after the fall of Hetman P. Doroshenko in 1676

Periodization of the Ukrainian national revolution of the 17th century.

I period (February 1648 - August 1657 pp.). National Liberation War. Formation of the Ukrainian Cossack state.

II period (September 1657 - June in 1663 pp.). Civil war and the division of Cossack Ukraine into two hetmanships.

III period (June 1663 - September 1676 pp.). The struggle for the reunification of the Cossack Ukraine. Fight defeat. Distribution of Ukrainian lands between neighboring states.

The beginning of the national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people in 1648. Against the Polish domination was due to objective prerequisites and reasons. Prerequisites for the national liberation struggle:

The formation of the Ukrainian early new nation within the Commonwealth actually had no chance of full development.

The transformation of the Ukrainian Cossacks into a leading political force, which, as a result of the aggravation of contradictions between the interests of Ukraine and the great-power ambitions of Poland, played the role of a public detonator.

Spread in Ukraine of ideas of struggle for national independence and personal freedom of a person, were at that time spread in Europe.

Causes of the national liberation struggle:

Strengthening the socio-economic oppression of the peasants, burghers, Cossacks, which was increasingly identified with Polish domination.

Transformation of the repressive policy of the Polish authorities on the "model" in the Ukrainian struggle for their class interests: focus on the use of force to protect their rights.

The strengthening of the national-religious oppression as a result of the open discriminatory policy of the Commonwealth: the oppression of the Orthodox Church, the removal of the Ukrainian from participation in city self-government, restrictions on the Ukrainian language and education, etc.

The driving forces of the liberation war were the Cossacks, the peasantry, the bourgeoisie, part of the Ukrainian clergy, the small and medium Orthodox Ukrainian gentry. The leading role belonged to the non-Polonization Cossack officers. The main goal of the struggle was liberation from Polish domination, magnate land ownership and national-religious oppression. Based on the analysis of the causes, driving forces and goals, the nature of the struggle of the Ukrainian people against the Commonwealth at that time can be defined as religious, social and national liberation.

In the context of exacerbation of social contradictions and the growth of discontent, the presence of a talented and energetic leader was decisive for the start of the uprising. Bogdan-Zinoviy Khmelnitsky (1596-1657) adequately performed this role. He raised the Ukrainian people to fight against the oppression of the Polish gentry and became the builder of the Ukrainian Cossack state. Khmelnytsky belongs to the most prominent personalities of Ukrainian history and occupies a worthy place in world history.

Two stages are clearly defined in his life: before and after 1648. The 53 years lived before the start of the liberation war can be considered a kind of preparatory stage for the future of high rise. Bohdan was born into the family of a prosperous registered Cossack centurion Mikhail Khmelnytsky, who received for his service the Sabitov farm near Chyhyryn (in the Cherkasy region), grew up in a Ukrainian-speaking Cossack-peasant environment and had a Ukrainian soul, which in his youth could not be captivated by any Jesuit Catholics (during education in the Lviv Jesuit Collegium), nor Muslims (during the two-year stay in Turkish captivity after the unsuccessful Battle of Tsetsor in 1620).

Early realizing his duty to the Motherland, Bogdan served all his adult life as part of the Cossack register, advancing from an ordinary Cossack to a clerk of the Zaporozhian Army and Chigirinsky centurion. He participated in many military and diplomatic actions. Belonging to the patriotic Cossacks, Khmelnytsky was a participant in the uprising of 1630-1631 and 1637-1638 pp.

At the invitation of the French government, together with Ivan Sirko and the Zaporozhye Cossacks in 1646. Participated on the side of France in military operations against the Spanish Habsburgs during the Thirty Years' War. In the same year, an event occurred that radically changed his life. In the absence of Khmelnytsky, Sabitov was attacked by the Chigirinsky elder D. Chaplinsky, who robbed the farm, killed his youngest son and kidnapped the woman with whom only the widowed Bogdan was going to marry (such actions were a common practice of the gentry in the Commonwealth). Khmelnytsky tried to find justice for Chaplinsky from the Polish king, but in vain. In 1647, at a secret meeting of the Cossacks, Khmelnitsky proposed a plan for an uprising. But he was soon arrested. Having escaped from custody, he, with a detachment of Cossacks and his son Timothy, went to Zaporozhye, took possession of the Sich, and in February 1648 was elected hetman. With the help of like-minded people, Khmelnitsky began the practical implementation of the uprising plan. He managed to enlist the support of the Crimean Khan Islam Giray III.

Hostilities began on April 21 with the offensive of the Polish troops from Cherkassy. The Cossack army and the Tatars came forward. In April-May 1648, in the battle of Zhovti Vody, the Cossacks received their first victory. Part of the registered Cossacks, headed by Filon Jelal, went over to the side of Khmelnitsky.

In May 1648, the Cossacks and Tatars inflicted a miserable defeat on the Poles near Korsun. As a result of these two victories, the Polish occupation army in Ukraine was actually destroyed, which contributed to the intensification of the liberation struggle.

The war of liberation began the second stage in the life of Khmelnytsky, which became his finest hour. Since that time, the name of Bogdan Khmelnitsky has become known throughout the world.

Khmelnytsky was the first Ukrainian politician who managed not only to lead the struggle for national independence, but also to unite all the states of Ukrainian society to achieve this goal. Under the conditions of the simultaneous development of the peasant war, he managed to mitigate the sharpness of social contradictions and prevent their escalation into a civil war. Taking care of the interests of the Cossacks, the hetman at the same time agreed to recognize the main socio-economic gains of the peasantry. Only a man of truly reforming mind was capable of such a step.

According to Khmelnytsky, the formation process was basically completed Ukrainian state- Troops Zaporozhye. Developing the elements of national statehood formed in Zaporozhye, he actually created the Ukrainian Cossack Republic with pronounced democratic features. political structure, favorably distinguished it from the then monarchies of Europe. B. Khmelnytsky clearly defined the prospects for the development of Ukraine as an independent state within ethnic Ukrainian lands. The national idea formulated by the Hetman became his testament to future Ukrainian generations.

Khmelnytsky's state efforts were hampered by the extremely unfavorable international situation for Ukraine (the strongest monarchs opposed the hetman's intentions: the Polish king, the Turkish sultan, the Crimean Khan, the Muscovite tsar). Surrounded by hostile forces, the hetman had to maneuver, make compromises, abandon his plans and designs, and experience disappointment.

Thanks to exceptional diplomatic skills, Khmelnytsky managed to paralyze the actions of the Polish government aimed at creating an anti-Ukrainian coalition, to establish the prestige of Ukraine in the international arena - ten countries recognized the Cossack state.

The events of the War of Liberation showed the brilliant military talent of B. Khmelnitsky. He became the creator of one of the most powerful armies in Europe at that time and did not lose any of the 12 major battles in which he was directly involved, inflicting the most severe defeats on the Commonwealth in its entire history.

The hetman's high level of education, his subtle mind, erudition, ability to foresee the development of events, steel will command respect. Contemporaries noted an amazing combination in the person of Khmelnitsky of various, often opposite qualities. It was a free and, at the same time, contradictory nature. IN Everyday life and everyday life the hetman was an unpretentious and modest person. Being the de facto owner of the whole country, he did not appropriate any estates for himself, he lived in the hetman's residence in Chigirin and his family farm Subotov. B. Khmelnitsky died on August 6, 1657 in Chigirin and was buried on Saturday in the Ilyinsky Church built at his expense (the grave has not been preserved).

In honor of Khmelnitsky, songs and thoughts were created, works of literature, painting, music were written, monuments were erected, cities and streets were named, orders were established.

Khmelnytsky Cossack uprising

The popular uprising was led by the Chigirinsky centurion Bogdan (Zinovy) Khmelnitsky, who personally felt the arbitrariness of the Polish gentry and the difficulties of a disenfranchised position. Finding no justice, he, with a small detachment of like-minded people, went to the Sich, where in 1648 he was elected hetman of the Zaporozhye Host. Having become a hetman, B. Khmelnytsky in his universals called on the people to revolt.

The beginning of the war. Fighting in 1648-1649 The rebels received their first victories in the battles at Zhovti Vody on May 5-6, 1648 and near Korsun on May 16, 1648. During the summer of 1648, the uprising engulfed the territories of the Kiev region, Podolia, Volhynia and Left-bank Ukraine.

At the beginning of the war, Bohdan Khmelnitsky and the Cossack foreman sought only to restore lost rights and liberties, to provide equal rights to the Orthodox and Catholic churches, and therefore, after the first victories, they began peace negotiations with the Poles. But the latter did not make concessions, but only played for time to gather an army for further struggle against the rebels.

  • On September 13, 1648, the Cossack army defeated the Poles in the battle of Pilyavtsy. In October - November 1648, a long siege of Lviv. The Cossacks, having received a ransom, left the city and went further to the Polish fortress of Zamostye and reached the city of Vistula, but, having learned about the election of a new Polish king, B. Khmelnitsky agreed to a truce with him and returned the Cossack army to Ukraine.
  • On December 23, 1648, the Cossacks solemnly entered Kyiv. Here, according to historians, B. Khmelnitsky had a turning point in his views on the main goal of the struggle. Until now, he did not rise above the interests of his state - the Cossacks. Now he realized his duties towards the whole people. During negotiations with the Poles, he announced his intention to liberate the whole of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people from Polish rule. Hetman rethought the lessons of last year's struggle, for the first time in the history of Ukrainian social and political thought he formulated the basic principles of the national state idea. During this time, serious changes took place in the self-consciousness of Ukrainians: the development of the idea of ​​the Motherland, its unity and independence, a sense of common purpose and national identity.

The Polish authorities were unable to compromise, and the continuation of the war was inevitable. On August 5-6, 1649, B. Khmelnitsky, with the help of the Crimean Khan, won a convincing victory over the Poles in the battle of Zborov. During July and August of this year, the siege of the Zbarazh fortress continued, but Khan Islam-Girey III did not allow the defeat of the Polish army to be completed. He decided to pursue a "balance of power" policy that would lead to the mutual exhaustion of Ukraine and Poland and would enable Crimea to play a leading role in Southeastern Europe.

Zboriv peace treaty. On August 8, 1649, B. Khmelnitsky and the Polish king Jan Casimir signed the Zboriv peace treaty. Its content actually meant that the Polish government for the first time recognized the autonomy (self-government) of the Ukrainian Cossack state within the Commonwealth on the territory of three provinces - Kyiv, Bratslav and Chernigov.

On the liberated lands, a new military-administrative and politic system, formed the Ukrainian national state - the Hetmanate. The traditional military and social way of the Cossacks was transferred to the liberated territory. A Cossack foreman, national in composition, came to power. A fairly influential part of it was the Orthodox Ukrainian gentry.

According to the terms of the agreement, the number of Cossacks of the Zaporozhye Host was limited by the register to 40,000 people. All those who did not get into the Cossack register had to return. An amnesty was proclaimed to all participants in the national liberation war led by B. Khmelnitsky, Orthodox and Catholic gentry who joined the Cossacks and fought against the Polish government forces. The Orthodox Metropolis of Kiev was restored in its rights, and the Kiev Metropolitan was to enter the Senate of the Commonwealth. The issue of the union was submitted to the Sejm for consideration.

The signed peace treaty did not satisfy either the Cossacks or the government of the Commonwealth. Both sides began preparations for a new phase of the war.

Political and socio-economic changes in Ukrainian lands. Under the onslaught of popular uprisings and hostilities, the Polish magnates and gentlemen, the Catholic clergy were forced to leave their estates and flee. As a result, feudal landownership was significantly limited, and serfdom was abolished. Bohdan Khmelnytsky held back the growth of large landownership for some time. The land left by the masters was seized by the Cossacks and peasants: part of the land became the property of the military treasury. Cossacks and peasants became free small landowners. The townspeople got the opportunity to freely and freely engage in crafts, crafts and trade. The Cossacks finally took shape in a separate class of society. The reduction in the size of requisitions and duties contributed to the growth of economic opportunities for peasant farms. New opportunities have opened up in the cities for the manifestation of the entrepreneurial initiative of artisans and merchants. The positions of the Orthodox clergy were strengthened. Orthodoxy became a universal ideological doctrine that united the national forces of Ukraine in the struggle against foreign domination.

Events 1651-1653 The defeat in the Battle of Berestechko (June 1651) negatively affected the morale of the army. Although the battles near Belaya Tserkov in September 1651 showed that the Polish army was not able to overcome the Cossacks, B. Khmelnitsky also had few forces for the offensive, and was also not sure of the reliability of the Crimean Khan, who could take the side of Poland. All this forced both parties to move on to negotiations, which ended with the conclusion on September 18, 1651 of the Bila Tserkva agreement, which was unfavorable for Ukraine.

May 22-23, 1652 B. Khmelnitsky in the battle of Knut utterly defeated the 30 thousandth Polish army. In fact, the Zborovsky treaty was renewed. The struggle continued in the Moldavian campaigns and the battle of Zhvanets (Zhvanets siege in October-December 1653).

However, the longer the war lasted, the more B. Khmelnytsky and the foreman became convinced that Ukraine would not be able to overcome Poland on its own, without outside help. One of the possible allies of Ukraine was the Turkish sultan. But the real help of the Sultan was limited only by orders to the Crimean Khan to join the operations of the Zaporizhian Army. The Tatars, on the other hand, were unreliable allies, and with their robberies they irritated the Ukrainian population. B. Khmelnitsky was more and more inclined to believe that only the Russian "universal" tsar could become a reliable ally.

Rapprochement with Russia. Pereyaslav Council. A new attempt to achieve the liberation and unification of all Ukrainian lands within the national state was made with an attempt to rely on the help of Russia. On October 1, 1653, the Zemsky Sobor in Moscow decided to accept the Zaporizhzhya Army "under the high sovereign's hand." For the legal registration of this act, the embassy of V. Buturlin left for Ukraine. On January 8, 1654 in Pereyaslav, first a senior council was held, and later the General Military Council. It was decided that the Hetmanate would pass under the protectorate of Russia, while maintaining the basic rights and liberties of the Zaporizhian Host. Oral agreements in Pereyaslav were approved in March of the same year in Moscow, the documents formed a system of norms for relations between the Hetmanate and Russia, known in literature as the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654.

Growing contradictions between the Hetmanate and Russia. In the spring of 1654, the Russian army began hostilities against the Polish army in Belarus. she was assisted by the 20,000th Cossack corps of I. Zolotarenko. The allies received Smolensk, Minsk, Vilna, I. Zolotarenko captured southern Belarus. But his measures to introduce the Cossack system in Belarus caused the first conflict with the Moscow governors, who considered all the lands received by the Cossacks to be “royal”.

In the autumn of 1654, the Poles, with the support of the Crimean Khan, went on a campaign against Ukraine. In January 1655, B. Khmelnitsky came out against them with the Cossack and Moscow army. The decisive battle that took place near Okhmatov (in the Kyiv region) in last days January, cost heavy losses to both sides, but did not bring success to either. This significantly weakened the Ukrainian hopes for the help of the tsar, who, moreover, tried in every possible way to subjugate Ukraine to his will through his governors, and use the Cossacks to conquer Lithuania and Belarus.

The desire of B. Khmelnitsky to complete the liberation and unification of Ukrainian lands. Since 1655, B. Khmelnytsky developed an active diplomatic activity, trying to ensure the independence of the Ukrainian state through other foreign policy efforts. In particular, allied relations with Sweden were established. In the spring of 1655, the Swedish king Charles X Gustav began a war against Poland. Taking advantage of this, B. Khmelnitsky with the Ukrainian army and the corps of F. Buturlin went to Galicia in the fall, defeated the Polish army near Gorodok and began the siege of Lvov. Since F. Buturlin, on behalf of the tsar, demanded that all the cities received belong to the tsar, B. Khmelnitsky did not storm Lvov, but limited himself to ransom.

The Ukrainian-Muscovite army captured Lublin, and the prospects for uniting all Ukrainian lands under his mace opened up before the hetman. But here the khan came to the aid of Poland again. This forced B. Khmelnitsky to retreat from Lvov. On November 20, 1655, the Tatars attacked the Ukrainian-Moscow camp in Ozernaya, and everything ended in negotiations and the loss of the achievements of the 1655 campaign.

From the end of 1655, Russia, frightened by the successes of Sweden in the Baltic states, went to rapprochement with the Commonwealth in order to fight Sweden. started Russo-Swedish war. And in Vilna, an armistice agreement was signed between Russia and Poland (1656). The Ukrainian delegation was not allowed to the Polish-Russian negotiations. In Ukraine, this was perceived as a betrayal.

The main concern of Bogdan Khmelnytsky in Last year his life was the completion of the liberation of Ukrainian lands. In order to create an anti-Polish coalition, he concluded agreements with the Swedish king Carl X Gustav and Prince Yuri Rakoczy II of Semigrad. At the beginning of 1657, Ukraine and Semigradye (Transylvania) began hostilities against Poland. Cossack troops captured Volhynia, Turov-Pinshchina and Beresteyshchina.

The Swedes took over most of Poland. But soon setbacks began, and the anti-Polish coalition fell apart. These events were the last blow for the sick hetman, and on July 27, 1657 he died in Chyhyryn. His death significantly complicated the matter of the liberation of Ukraine: the internal contradictions of Ukrainian society broke out; contradictions escalated between the foreman, who sought to obtain feudal privileges, and ordinary Cossacks; the struggle of senior groups for power unfolded, which led to the collapse.

After the death of Bohdan Khmelnitsky, Ivan Vyhovsky, who was elected hetman, met strong opposition in the person of the left-bank Cossacks, as a result of which the Civil War- Ruin. In 1658, the hetman concluded with the Commonwealth the so-called. Gadyach articles. According to them, the territories subject to the Zaporozhian Host were to become part of the Commonwealth as the Grand Duchy of Russia as an equal part with the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. However, strong opposition forced Vyhovsky to resign as hetman, and Bohdan Khmelnytsky's son, Yuriy, was elected in his place. After the defeat near Slobodische, Khmelnitsky was forced to capitulate and went over to the side of the Commonwealth, but was not supported by all the Cossacks. On the Left Bank, they did not recognize the Slobodischensky treaty signed by Khmelnytsky, and elected Pereyaslav colonel Yakim Samko as hetman. The split between supporters and opponents of the Pereyaslav Rada eventually led in 1660 to the division of the Zaporizhian Army into the left bank (subordinate to Russia) and the right bank (as part of the Commonwealth).

In January 1663, after Yury Khmelnytsky resigned as hetman, Ivan Bryukhovetsky became the Kosh Hetman for the first and only time in the Zaporizhzhya Sich.

After several unsuccessful attempts at unification by both sides, in 1667 the Andrusovo truce was concluded, which secured the division of Ukraine along the Dnieper.

Since that time, Right-Bank Ukraine has become the arena of the struggle between the Commonwealth, the Ottoman Empire and individual Cossack detachments. In this struggle, the title of hetman is widely used, which is alternately worn by proteges of the warring parties. Under these conditions, there is a significant weakening of the hetman's power in Right-Bank Ukraine.

Ivan Mazepa became a hetman at an extremely difficult time for Ukraine. Ukrainian lands were divided. "Kolomatsky articles" in 1687

Kolomatsky articles of 1687 - an agreement concluded on July 25, 1687 on the river. Kolomak (now Kharkiv region), between the newly elected hetman of Ukraine I. Mazepa and the Cossack foreman, on the one hand, and the Moscow tsars Ivan, Peter and Tsarina Sophia, on the other. The agreement consisted of 22 clauses (articles). The Kolomatsky Articles were based on the previous Ukrainian-Moscow treaties approved by the Cossack councils during the election of hetmans D. Mnogohrishny and I. Samoylovich. Kolomatsky articles repeated with some changes the text of the Glukhovsky articles of 1669 and contained several new paragraphs. The articles confirmed the Cossack rights and privileges, preserved the 30,000 registered Cossack army and company regiments.

However, the hetman had no right, without a royal decree, to deprive the foreman of leadership positions, and the foreman - to remove the hetman. The Cossack foreman was obliged to follow and report on the hetman to the tsarist government. The hetman's right to dispose of military lands was significantly limited. The Hetman's government was forbidden to maintain diplomatic relations with foreign states. The hetman undertook to send the Cossack army to the war with the Crimean Khanate and Turkey; in the hetman's capital - Baturin - a regiment of Moscow archers was stationed. In Art. 19 of the treaty, the hetman and the foreman were asked about the need for a close state unification of Ukraine with the Moscow state and the elimination of the national identity of the Ukrainian people. Thus, the Kolomatsky Articles became another step towards further limiting the autonomous rights of Ukraine.

By his policy, I. Mazepa strengthened the power of the hetman, contributed to the economic and cultural development of Ukraine. The hetman brought his authority with active patronage - 12 churches were built and 20 churches were restored at his expense, the Kyiv-Mohyla Collegium received the status of an academy.

However, the hetman's social policy was not flexible enough. He made the main bet on the Cossack foremen and the gentry, striving to turn them into a strong privileged class. There was an increase in all forms of exploitation of the peasants, Cossacks and petty bourgeois, sharpening of social contradictions in Ukrainian society.

In 1704, the left-bank hetman Ivan Mazepa, taking advantage of the uprising against the Commonwealth and the invasion of Poland by Swedish troops, occupied the Right Bank.

In Left-bank Ukraine, the gradual restriction of the powers of the hetman began almost immediately after the division. Here the hetmans were under pressure from two sides at once: on the one hand, their power was steadily reduced by the Russian government; on the other hand, the Cossack elder also did not want their strengthening. As a result, the hetmans, forced to maneuver, often made concessions, gradually losing power.

After the division of Ukraine, Chyhyryn remained the residence of the right-bank hetman; on the Left Bank, the cities of Gadyach, Glukhov, and Baturyn became successively such residences.

Mazepa's transfer to the side of the Swedes in the Northern War significantly accelerated the process of weakening the power of the hetmans. Since 1709, under the hetman (Ivan Skoropadsky), there was a special Russian official who controlled it. In 1720, the General Military Chancellery was founded, and in 1722, the Little Russian Collegium, to which, after the death of Hetman Ivan Skoropadsky, the hetman's powers were actually transferred. The elders were expressly forbidden to elect a new hetman, and some elders who dared to disagree with the king on this issue were imprisoned.

On April 5, 1710, supporters of the recently deceased Mazepa elected Philip Orlik as hetman. He held this title until his death in exile in 1742.

The main reason: the conflict between the right-wing population of Ukr. and cathol. RP.

Character: national liberation.

Main events: uprising led by Gaetman BH, the capture of Kiev (1648), the victory of the rebels near Zborov, the peace of Zborov (1649), the defeat of the rebels near Berestechko, the Peace of Belotserkovsky (1651), the threat of a complete defeat of the rebels (1653) and the decision of the Zemsky Sobor of Russia to accept Ukraine, Pereyaslav Rada joining Russia (January 8, 1654). After that, Russia will fight for a long time with Poland and Sweden with varying success, and Ukraine will change hetmans and rush from Russia to Poland, then to Turkey.

CAUSES National Liberation War

After suppression TO Cossack uprisings in the first quarter of the 17th century. the colonial policy of Poland towards Ukraine intensified, and led to the National Liberation War.

1. Deterioration of the situation of the peasantry in the conditions of the dominance of magnates and the corvée-filvar system of management: 2. The growth of discontent of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie, which suffered both from private owners of cities and from the arbitrariness of royal officials: 4. Restriction of rights TO, the introduction of measures aimed at eliminating it as a state: 5. Colonization of Ukrainian culture, the forced imposition of Catholicism, which caused mass protests:

OV Ukrainian people under the leadership BH divided by 3 main stages: 1) 1648-1649 - The initial period of the war - from the first battles near Zhovti Vody and Korsun to the signing of the Zborov agreement; 2) 1649-1651 - The period of the deployment of a mass anti-feudal movement - before the defeat near Berestechko and the signing of the Belotserkovsky agreement;

3) 1651-1654 The period of the defeat of the noble forces and the search for BH external allies - until the signing of an agreement with Russia in Pereyaslav.

The war began with the performance of the Zaporizhzhya Cossacks. On May 5, 1648, near Zhovti Vody, the rebels won the first victory over the six thousandth vanguard of the Polish army. The son of the Crown Hetman N. Potocki Stefan, who commanded the Polish avant-garde, died of wounds. Registered Cossacks who served in the Polish army went over to the side of the rebels; their foremen who supported the Commonwealth (I. Barabash, I. Karaimovich) were executed.

On May 26, 1648, a new victory was won near Korsun - over the main forces (12 thousand) of the Polish army under the leadership of hetmans N. Potocki and M. Kalinovsky. This victory was achieved thanks to the applied BH military cunning: he decided to force Pototsky to withdraw and deliver a decisive blow to the enemy on the march. The Cossack S. Zarudny was exiled to the Polish camp, who, under torture, repeated the message about the many thousands of Cossack-Tatar troops. The Poles began to retreat and were brought to the Orekhovaya Dibrova tract, which had been dug up and dammed in advance. As a result, the Polish camp was mired and was unable to withstand a long shelling and subsequent assault. After a 4-hour battle, the Polish army was defeated. Both Polish hetmans fell into Tatar captivity.

So, during the War of Liberation 1648-1654. Ukr. TO power. It had a number of features compared to Western Europe. Chief among them were: The greater role played by the stratum of small landowning warriors who lived off their labor; openness TO with its privileges for the entry of representatives of other classes; Fear of contradiction in the struggle for power in the ruling elite - foremen - due to the fact that the process of its formation has not yet been completed; The special role of the military factor in the development of the state: the military occupied all leadership positions, since in order to maintain independence, it was necessary to continue fighting; this had a negative impact on the future general-watered. development of Ukraine.

20. The evolution of the Cossack movement (late 16th - first half of the 17th century)

at the end of the 16th century. the struggle of the Ukrainian peasantry intensified significantly and TO Cossacks against serfdom and national oppression.

And by the way, the first anti-feudal uprising in Ukraine was in the XV century. So, during the years 1490-1492. there was a large anti-feudal uprising of peasants in Eastern Galicia and Northern Bukovina under the leadership of Mucha. An army of ten thousand managed to capture the fortresses of Snyatyn, Kolomyia, and Galich. The peasants attacked the feudal lords, burned and devastated their estates, but they acted mostly spontaneously, locally, scattered, and therefore were defeated.

In the XVI century. a new form of anti-feudal struggle appeared - the oprishki movement. For the first time they are mentioned in documents of 1529. This movement covered the mountainous regions of Eastern Galicia, Northern Bukovina and Transcarpathia. To combat them, the feudal lords of Poland and Moldavia concluded an agreement in 1547. However, the movement grew and embraced the Carpathians and Podolia. Particularly successful were the detachments led by Peter Chumak, Mark Gattaloy, Vasily Chepts and others.

In the spring of 1594, an uprising against the Polish gentry began again. It was headed by a native of the family of an artisan from the city of Gusyatyn, in Podolia, - Severin Nalivaiko. In the Zaporozhian Sich, he was a centurion. In 1594 he led a successful campaign in Moldavia against the Tur.-Tatars. invaders. After returning, he appealed to the Cossacks to start a struggle against the Polish-gentry authorities. Despite the disagreement of part of the foreman, the Cossacks decided to send a detachment of Cossacks led by Hetman Loboda to help Nalivaik in the fall of 1595. The Moldavian campaign ended, and the three thousandth Polish-gentry army went to Ukraine. Lithuanian magnates united to fight against the rebels under the leadership of the Lithuanian hetman H. Radziwill. The Belarusian gentry gathered in Minsk under the leadership of the voivode Nikolai Buivid. In December 1595, the 5,000-strong detachment of Buyvid approached Mogilev, where there were 1,500 soldiers. TO and peasants led by Nalivaiko. There was a battle, and although Buivid retreated, Nalivaiko hurried to join the second part of the army. During the transition to the river Blue Waters near the village of Priluki, a battle took place with the troops of Zholkievsky, in which they won TO.

In 1629 Grigory Cherny was elected hetman, with a pro-Polish orientation. However, his attempts to please the gentry caused hatred among the Cossacks. In 1630, they abducted him, took him to the Sich, prosecuted him and executed him. Taras Fedorovich (Shaker) was elected the new hetman, who organized and led a large army against the gentry. The Polish army was again led by Konetspolsky. After several battles in Pereyaslav, an agreement was signed, according to which the register increased to 8 thousand, an amnesty was declared to all Cossacks who took part in the uprising.

In 1635, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth built a Kodak fortress on the Dnieper, north of the Sich, to control the Cossacks. And a few months before the completion of construction, a detachment of Cossacks led by Hetman Ivan Sulima destroyed the fortress and destroyed its garrison. I. Sulima was a hetman for a long time, participated in many campaigns, but was never wounded. He even received a gold medal from the Pope for capturing a Turkish galley, capturing 300 Turks, whom he presented to the Pope. But despite this, the Polish gentry achieved his execution.

In 1637, a new uprising began, led by the Zaporozhian hetman Pavel But (Pavlyuk). He was joined large groups peasants. However, in December 1637, near Kumeyki near Chigirin, the 15,000-strong Polish army dealt them a decisive blow.

over a 45-year period in Ukraine there were 5 large peasant TO uprisings, but they all ended in defeat. Among the reasons for the defeats can be called spontaneity, disorganization of uprisings, contradictions between registered and non-registered TO, lack of a unified command, poor weapons, locality of speeches, parochial interests. And despite this, in the process of people-liberate. struggle against social and national oppression in Ukraine, the military skills of the population improved, the tactics of struggle increased, military experience increased, the ties between the Cossacks and the peasants strengthened. The ten-year "golden peace" pushed the conflict back only up to a certain time, it has long since matured. Strengthening in Ukraine in the first half of the XVII century. Polish-gentry oppression caused discontent among the peasants, townspeople and other segments of the population.

The liberation war of the Ukrainian people in the middle of the 17th century. was caused by socio-economic, national-religious and political reasons.

Socio-economic reasons:

    the heavy feudal-serf oppression experienced by the Ukrainian population, especially the peasants by the Polish and Polonized (polonized) Ukrainian magnates and gentry;

    panshchina in some places in Ukraine reached 6 days a week;

    in addition to the panshchina, the peasants also paid the feudal lord taxes in kind and in cash, the amounts of which continuously increased;

    cities at that time were the property of the feudal lords, the inhabitants performed duties in favor of their owners and paid taxes.

National-religious reasons:

    the Commonwealth carried out cruel oppression of the Orthodox Church and faith;

    Catholicism and Uniatism were planted in various ways;

    the Commonwealth impeded the development of Ukrainian schools, education, and culture.

In other words, the policy of the Polish government was aimed at depriving Ukrainians of their national identity, their assimilation.

The political causes of the War of Independence were due to the aggressive policy of Poland, aimed at absorbing Ukraine.

The Ukrainian people did not want and could not accept such a fate. The liberation of Ukraine from the power of gentry Poland became a historical necessity.

By the middle of the seventeenth century there were all the necessary prerequisites for a victorious war of liberation. Which?

First, socio-political: a powerful social base of the liberation movement has been formed in Ukraine. It included the peasantry, the Cossacks, the bourgeoisie, the small Ukrainian gentry, the lower Orthodox clergy, i.e. the majority of the Ukrainian people.

Secondly, military prerequisites: a strong military organization was created by the Cossacks, vast experience in conducting combat operations was accumulated.

The third most important prerequisite was the rapid national identity Ukrainian people. It is, above all, feelings of hatred for the Polish domination and everything that was connected with it.

Fourthly, foreign policy prerequisites were essential. A favorable situation for the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people was also created by the interest neighboring countries- Russia, Turkey, Sweden - in the weakening of the Commonwealth, and therefore in supporting the rebels, and the emerging trend of political weakening of Poland itself, and the employment of Western European countries with wars on the continent, which made it impossible for them to intervene in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict.

Finally, it was of no small importance that Hetman Bogdan Khmelnytsky (1595-1657), an experienced politician and military leader, who was perceived by the broad masses of the Ukrainian population as "given by God", became the leader of the War of Liberation.

The specifics of the national liberation struggle in the middle of the XVII century. was that it developed in close connection with the social struggle, and on a scale never seen before. It was its exceptionally mass nature that gave historians reason to assert that the social struggle of the peasantry grew into the Peasant War of 1648-1652.

Thus, the War of Liberation by its nature was an anti-feudal and national liberation war. It met the interests of the broadest masses of the Ukrainian people.

The organizer and leader of the entire struggle was the Cossacks, and then the peasantry and the bourgeoisie joined it. It was their struggle against the feudal-serf oppression that gave the war a pronounced anti-serf orientation.

Particular attention should be paid to the chronological framework of the War of Independence.

    Soviet historiography claimed that the Liberation the war began in 1648 and ended in 1654 with the reunification of Ukraine with Russia.

    A new approach to characterizing the content of the war made it possible to take a different approach to its upper limit. At the beginning, historians (O. Subtelny and others) postponed the end of the war until 1657, the year of B. Khmelnitsky's death. IN AND. Borisenko connects the end of the war with the signing by Yuri Khmelnytsky of the Slobodischensky Treaty on October 17, 1660. According to the historian, his signing "ended the many years of struggle of the entire Ukrainian people against gentry Poland." Researchers V.A. Smoliy and V.S. Stepankov pushed back the border until 1676. The war ended, they argue, only with the liquidation of state institutions in Right-Bank Ukraine, which coincided with the fall of P. Doroshenko's hetmanate. However, new dates for the end of the war have been put forward in the discussion plan. They are not generally recognized. The scientific search continues.

The liberation war of the Ukrainian people went through three main stages.

First stage covers 1648. At this time, a popular uprising broke out throughout Ukraine and grew into the War of Liberation. Created from numerous insurgent detachments, the people's army, headed by B. Khmelnitsky, won a number of remarkable victories. She defeated the Polish troops on May 5-6, 1648 near Zhovti Vody (Zhovti Vody is now a city and a small river in the Dnepropetrovsk region), on May 16, 1648 near Korsun, on September 11-13, 1648 near Pilyavtsy (now with. Pilyava in the Khmelnytsky region).

The result of the first stage of the War of Liberation was the liberation of most of the Ukrainian lands from foreign enslavement. On the liberated territory, the Ukrainian Cossack state began to form. The old Polish-gentry administration was liquidated. A new military-administrative and political system was being created.

The administrative structure in Ukraine evolved along the lines of the Zaporozhian Sich. The territory began to be divided into regiments and hundreds, led by colonels and centurions. The management of the Ukrainian lands was taken over by the Cossack foremen. The state apparatus was headed by a hetman. He collected glades, was in charge of finances, led the army, held relations with other countries in his hands. On the territory of the regiments, power was in the hands of colonels, centurions, chieftains. There was a process of creating a new judiciary: in place of the estate-gentry system of courts, hundreds, regimental and general judicial institutions, rural courts grew up. The practice of sending hetman court commissions to investigate cases of special importance was introduced.

A fundamentally new tax system was created with a variety of tax rates. A diplomatic service began to form in Ukraine, and a foreign policy was actively pursued. In barely 1648, B. Khmelnitsky entered into a military alliance with the Crimean Khan. In accordance with the agreement, the khan was supposed to provide Khmelnitsky with cavalry assistance, and the hetman was to give military booty to the Tatars. After the victory at Korsun, on June 8, 1648, B. Khmelnitsky sent a letter to the Russian Tsar, in which he reported on the successes of the Cossack army and asked to support Ukraine in its struggle with Poland. The Hetman's government also sought to establish ties and establish peaceful relations with Turkey, Moldavia, Wallachia, Venice, Sweden and other countries.

Second phase The War of Liberation covers 1649-1651. During this period hostilities resumed. there were battles of such magnitude, the likes of which Europe had not known before. One of them took place in August 1649 near Zborov (now Ternopil region). B. Khmelnitsky, using the tactics of a sudden quick maneuver, surrounded the Polish army. The Crimean Khan was still his ally. The gentry army found itself in a catastrophic situation. However, this time the Tatars saved the Polish army. The Crimean Khan, not wanting the final defeat of Poland and the strengthening of Ukraine, withdrew his troops and demanded that Khmelnitsky make peace with the king. Not being able to simultaneously fight against the royal army and the Tatar troops, B. Khmelnitsky was forced to start negotiations and conclude the Zborovsky Treaty with the Polish king on August 8, 1649.

Under the terms of this agreement, Kiev, Chernihiv and Bratslav provinces went to the hetman. The rest of the territory of Ukraine remained under the rule of the king. The number of registered Cossacks increased to 40 thousand people.

The Zboriv Treaty legally fixed the fact of the emergence of a new power, which stood out from the Commonwealth. For the first time, the Poles are forced to recognize the existence of Ukraine. On the whole, the terms of the Zboriv Treaty did not satisfy either the Ukrainian people or gentry Poland.

An even more grandiose battle took place in June 1651 near Berestechko (now the Volyn region). More than 300 thousand people participated in it from both sides. The rebels were defeated, which was largely due to the second betrayal of the Tatars.

On September 18, 1651, B. Khmelnitsky had to sign the Bila Tserkva Treaty, which was much worse than the Zborovsky Treaty. The Cossack register was reduced to 20 thousand people. Only the Kiev region remained under the hetman's rule.

Third stage War of Liberation covers 1652-1654

The beginning of 1652 was difficult and alarming for Ukraine. Among the Cossacks, peasants and townspeople, dissatisfaction with the terms of the Bila Tserkva Treaty grew. The situation was critical. In extremely difficult conditions B, Khmelnitsky still managed to complete the preparations for a new stage of the liberation struggle.

May 20, 1652 Cossacks destroyed the 20 thousandth Polish army near Batog It was one of the most outstanding victories of B. Khmelnitsky.

The victorious conclusion of the Battle of Batozh caused a new upsurge in the national liberation struggle in Ukraine. During May-June 1652, the territories of Kyiv, Chernigov, Bratslav and the eastern part of the Podolsk provinces were liberated from the Polish-gentry domination.

At the same time, ties between B. Khmelnitsky and the Russian government became especially lively. Convinced that the Ukrainian people could not free themselves from the power of gentry Poland on their own, the hetman began to seek the acceptance of Ukraine under high hand Moscow Tsar.

On October 1, 1653, the Zemsky Sobor in Moscow decided "to take Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky and the entire Zaporizhzhya army with their cities and lands under their sovereign hand." To implement this decision, an embassy headed by the boyar Buturlin arrived in Ukraine from Moscow. Khmelnytsky, realizing the importance of the event, decided to hold a wide popular assembly to resolve this issue. The Rada took place in Pereyaslav in January 1654. Of the four possible sovereigns - the Turkish Sultan, the Crimean Khan, the Polish King and the Russian Tsar - she chose the latter. On the basis of the decision of the Pereyaslav Rada and negotiations in Pereyaslav, an agreement was concluded on the transfer of Ukraine under the "high hand" of the Moscow Tsar.

However, the specific terms of the union between Ukraine and Russia were not defined in Pereyaslav. An embassy of the Zaporizhian Army was sent to Moscow to develop them and legalize the treaty. As a result of the negotiations, documents were prepared, which later became known as the March Articles of 1654.

An analysis of these documents shows that Ukraine became part of Russia on the basis of the widest possible autonomy. The March Articles provided for the full power of the hetman, in particular, his right to have relations with foreign powers and distribute free lands at his discretion; the presence of a huge Ukrainian army - a 60,000-strong Cossack register, non-interference of the tsarist governors and other officials in the internal affairs of Ukraine; preservation of the territorial-administrative structure, court and legal proceedings, rights, privileges and possessions of the Cossacks, the Ukrainian gentry and the Orthodox clergy. As you can see, Ukraine passed under the high hand of the Muscovite Tsar as an independent power, retaining the main gains of the Cossack Republic.

Historians have assessed and are assessing the Pereyaslav Treaty in different ways. Some saw in it a union of two powers, others - an agreement that had the character of vassalage, others - a military alliance. In Soviet historiography, the characterization of the treaty as a great act of reunification of Ukraine with Russia was dominant. Modern Ukrainian historians have moved away from such an assessment. So, the scientist V.A. Smoliy emphasizes that the Treaty of Pereyaslav was a confederal alliance directed against an external enemy.

Concluding the consideration of the issue, it is necessary to conclude: the exceptional complexity of the situation in Ukraine was that in those historical conditions it had no other reasonable alternative, except for an alliance with Russia. At the same time, Ukraine was uniting with a power in which it had no prospects for independent development.

National liberation revolution of the Ukrainian people under the leadership of B. Khmelnytsky

The liberation war of the Ukrainian people in the middle of the 17th century. was caused by socio-economic, national-religious and political reasons.

Socio-economic reasons:

the heavy feudal-serf oppression experienced by the Ukrainian population, especially the peasants by the Polish and Polonized (polonized) Ukrainian magnates and gentry;

panshchina in some places in Ukraine reached 6 days a week;

in addition to the panshchina, the peasants also paid the feudal lord taxes in kind and in cash, the amounts of which continuously increased;

cities at that time were the property of the feudal lords, the inhabitants performed duties in favor of their owners and paid taxes.

National-religious reasons:

the Commonwealth carried out cruel oppression of the Orthodox Church and faith;

Catholicism and Uniatism were planted in various ways;

the Commonwealth impeded the development of Ukrainian schools, education, and culture.

In other words, the policy of the Polish government was aimed at depriving Ukrainians of their national identity, their assimilation.

The political causes of the War of Independence were due to the aggressive policy of Poland, aimed at absorbing Ukraine.

The Ukrainian people did not want and could not accept such a fate. The liberation of Ukraine from the power of gentry Poland became a historical necessity.

By the middle of the seventeenth century there were all the necessary prerequisites for a victorious war of liberation. Which?

First, socio-political: a powerful social base of the liberation movement has been formed in Ukraine. It included the peasantry, the Cossacks, the bourgeoisie, the small Ukrainian gentry, the lower Orthodox clergy, i.e. the majority of the Ukrainian people.

Secondly, military prerequisites: a strong military organization was created by the Cossacks, vast experience in conducting combat operations was accumulated.

The third most important prerequisite was the rapid recovery of the national self-consciousness of the Ukrainian people. It is, above all, feelings of hatred for the Polish domination and everything that was connected with it.

Fourthly, foreign policy prerequisites were essential. A favorable situation for the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people was also created by the interest of neighboring countries - Russia, Turkey, Sweden - in weakening the Commonwealth, and therefore in supporting the rebels, and the emerging trend of the political weakening of Poland itself, and the employment of Western European countries with wars on the continent, which made them impossible intervention in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict.


Finally, it was of no small importance that Hetman Bogdan Khmelnytsky (1595-1657), an experienced politician and military leader, who was perceived by the broad masses of the Ukrainian population as "given by God", became the leader of the War of Liberation.

The specifics of the national liberation struggle in the middle of the XVII century. was that it developed in close connection with the social struggle, and on a scale never seen before. It was its exceptionally mass nature that gave historians reason to assert that the social struggle of the peasantry grew into the Peasant War of 1648-1652.

Thus, the War of Liberation by its nature was an anti-feudal and national liberation war. It met the interests of the broadest masses of the Ukrainian people.

The organizer and leader of the entire struggle was the Cossacks, and then the peasantry and the bourgeoisie joined it. It was their struggle against the feudal-serf oppression that gave the war a pronounced anti-serf orientation.

Particular attention should be paid to the chronological framework of the War of Independence.

Soviet historiography claimed that the War of Liberation began in 1648 and ended in 1654 with the reunification of Ukraine with Russia.

A new approach to characterizing the content of the war made it possible to take a different approach to its upper limit. At the beginning, historians (O. Subtelny and others) postponed the end of the war until 1657, the year of B. Khmelnitsky's death. IN AND. Borisenko connects the end of the war with the signing by Yuri Khmelnytsky of the Slobodischensky Treaty on October 17, 1660. According to the historian, his signing "ended the many years of struggle of the entire Ukrainian people against gentry Poland." Researchers V.A. Smoliy and V.S. Stepankov pushed back the border until 1676. The war ended, they argue, only with the liquidation of state institutions in Right-Bank Ukraine, which coincided with the fall of P. Doroshenko's hetmanate. However, new dates for the end of the war have been put forward in the discussion plan. They are not generally recognized. The scientific search continues.

The liberation war of the Ukrainian people went through three main stages.

The first stage covers 1648. At this time, a popular uprising broke out throughout Ukraine and grew into the War of Liberation. Created from numerous insurgent detachments, the people's army, headed by B. Khmelnitsky, won a number of remarkable victories. She defeated the Polish troops on May 5-6, 1648 near Zhovti Vody (Zhovti Vody is now a city and a small river in the Dnepropetrovsk region), on May 16, 1648 near Korsun, on September 11-13, 1648 near Pilyavtsy (now with. Pilyava in the Khmelnytsky region).

The result of the first stage of the War of Liberation was the liberation of most of the Ukrainian lands from foreign enslavement. On the liberated territory, the Ukrainian Cossack state began to form. The old Polish-gentry administration was liquidated. A new military-administrative and political system was being created.

The administrative structure in Ukraine evolved along the lines of the Zaporozhian Sich. The territory began to be divided into regiments and hundreds, led by colonels and centurions. The management of the Ukrainian lands was taken over by the Cossack foremen. The state apparatus was headed by a hetman. He collected glades, was in charge of finances, led the army, held relations with other countries in his hands. On the territory of the regiments, power was in the hands of colonels, centurions, chieftains. There was a process of creating a new judiciary: in place of the estate-gentry system of courts, hundreds, regimental and general judicial institutions, rural courts grew up. The practice of sending hetman court commissions to investigate cases of special importance was introduced.

A fundamentally new tax system was created with a variety of tax rates. A diplomatic service began to take shape in Ukraine, foreign policy. In barely 1648, B. Khmelnitsky entered into a military alliance with the Crimean Khan. In accordance with the agreement, the khan was supposed to provide Khmelnitsky with cavalry assistance, and the hetman was to give military booty to the Tatars. After the victory at Korsun, on June 8, 1648, B. Khmelnitsky sent a letter to the Russian Tsar, in which he reported on the successes of the Cossack army and asked to support Ukraine in its struggle with Poland. The Hetman's government also sought to establish ties and establish peaceful relations with Turkey, Moldavia, Wallachia, Venice, Sweden and other countries.

The second stage of the War of Liberation covers 1649-1651. During this period hostilities resumed. there were battles of such magnitude, the likes of which Europe had not known before. One of them took place in August 1649 near Zborov (now Ternopil region). B. Khmelnitsky, using the tactics of a sudden quick maneuver, surrounded the Polish army. The Crimean Khan was still his ally. The gentry army found itself in a catastrophic situation. However, this time the Tatars saved the Polish army. The Crimean Khan, not wanting the final defeat of Poland and the strengthening of Ukraine, withdrew his troops and demanded that Khmelnitsky make peace with the king. Not being able to simultaneously fight against the royal army and the Tatar troops, B. Khmelnitsky was forced to start negotiations and conclude the Zborovsky Treaty with the Polish king on August 8, 1649.

Under the terms of this agreement, Kiev, Chernihiv and Bratslav provinces went to the hetman. The rest of the territory of Ukraine remained under the rule of the king. The number of registered Cossacks increased to 40 thousand people.

The Zboriv Treaty legally fixed the fact of the emergence of a new power, which stood out from the Commonwealth. For the first time, the Poles are forced to recognize the existence of Ukraine. On the whole, the terms of the Zboriv Treaty did not satisfy either the Ukrainian people or gentry Poland.

An even more grandiose battle took place in June 1651 near Berestechko (now the Volyn region). More than 300 thousand people participated in it from both sides. The rebels were defeated, which was largely due to the second betrayal of the Tatars.

On September 18, 1651, B. Khmelnitsky had to sign the Bila Tserkva Treaty, which was much worse than the Zborovsky Treaty. The Cossack register was reduced to 20 thousand people. Only the Kiev region remained under the hetman's rule.

The third stage of the War of Liberation covers 1652-1654

The beginning of 1652 was difficult and alarming for Ukraine. Among the Cossacks, peasants and townspeople, dissatisfaction with the terms of the Bila Tserkva Treaty grew. The situation was critical. In extremely difficult conditions B, Khmelnitsky still managed to complete the preparations for a new stage of the liberation struggle.

May 20, 1652 the Cossacks destroyed the 20,000th Polish army near Batog. This was one of the most outstanding victories of B. Khmelnitsky.

The victorious conclusion of the Battle of Batozh caused a new upsurge in the national liberation struggle in Ukraine. During May-June 1652, the territories of Kyiv, Chernigov, Bratslav and the eastern part of the Podolsk provinces were liberated from the Polish-gentry domination.

At the same time, ties between B. Khmelnitsky and the Russian government became especially lively. Convinced that the Ukrainian people could not free themselves from the power of gentry Poland on their own, the hetman began to seek the acceptance of Ukraine under the high hand of the Moscow Tsar.

On October 1, 1653, the Zemsky Sobor in Moscow decided "to take Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky and the entire Zaporizhzhya army with their cities and lands under their sovereign hand." To implement this decision, an embassy headed by the boyar Buturlin arrived in Ukraine from Moscow. Khmelnytsky, realizing the importance of the event, decided to hold a wide popular assembly to resolve this issue. The Rada took place in Pereyaslav in January 1654. Of the four possible sovereigns - the Turkish Sultan, the Crimean Khan, the Polish King and the Russian Tsar - she chose the latter. On the basis of the decision of the Pereyaslav Rada and negotiations in Pereyaslav, an agreement was concluded on the transfer of Ukraine under the "high hand" of the Moscow Tsar.

However, the specific terms of the union between Ukraine and Russia were not defined in Pereyaslav. An embassy of the Zaporizhian Army was sent to Moscow to develop them and legalize the treaty. As a result of the negotiations, documents were prepared, which later became known as the March Articles of 1654.

An analysis of these documents shows that Ukraine became part of Russia on the basis of the widest possible autonomy. The March Articles provided for the full power of the hetman, in particular, his right to have relations with foreign powers and distribute free lands at his discretion; the presence of a huge Ukrainian army - a 60,000-strong Cossack register, non-interference of the tsarist governors and other officials in the internal affairs of Ukraine; preservation of the territorial-administrative structure, court and legal proceedings, rights, privileges and possessions of the Cossacks, the Ukrainian gentry and the Orthodox clergy. As you can see, Ukraine passed under the high hand of the Muscovite Tsar as an independent power, retaining the main gains of the Cossack Republic.

Historians have assessed and are assessing the Pereyaslav Treaty in different ways. Some saw in it a union of two powers, others - an agreement that had the character of vassalage, others - a military alliance. In Soviet historiography, the characterization of the treaty as a great act of reunification of Ukraine with Russia was dominant. Modern Ukrainian historians have moved away from such an assessment. So, the scientist V.A. Smoliy emphasizes that the Treaty of Pereyaslav was a confederal alliance directed against an external enemy.

Concluding the consideration of the issue, it is necessary to conclude: the exceptional complexity of the situation in Ukraine was that in those historical conditions it had no other reasonable alternative, except for an alliance with Russia. At the same time, Ukraine was uniting with a power in which it had no prospects for independent development.