Battle of Kursk. Tasks on the maps of the Great Patriotic War USE

Kursk battle lasted 50 days and nights - from July 5 to August 23, 1943. Before the Battle of Kursk, Germany celebrated little success, having managed to recapture the cities of Belgorod and Kharkov. Hitler, seeing a short-term success, decided to develop it. The offensive was planned for the Kursk Bulge. The salient, cut into the depths of German territory, could be surrounded and captured. The operation, approved on May 10-11, was called "Citadel".

Side forces

The advantage was on the side of the Red Army. The number of Soviet troops was 1,200,000 people (versus 900,000 for the enemy), the number of tanks - 3,500 (2,700 for the Germans) units, guns - 20,000 (10,000), aircraft 2,800 (2,500).

The German army was replenished with heavy (medium) tanks "Tiger" ("Panther"), self-propelled guns (ACS) "Ferdinand", aircraft "Focke-Wulf 190". An innovation from the Soviet side was the "St.

Side Plans

The Germans decided to deliver a lightning strike, quickly capture the Kursk salient, and then continue a large-scale offensive. The Soviet side decided at first to defend itself, inflicting counterattacks, and when the enemy was exhausted and exhausted, to go on the offensive.

Defense

It was possible to find out that Battle of Kursk will begin on 07/05/1943. Therefore, at 2:30 and 4:30, the Central Front carried out two half-hour artillery counterattacks. At 5:00, the enemy's guns responded, and then the enemy went on the offensive, exerting strong pressure (2.5 hours) on the right flank in the direction of the village of Olkhovatka.

When the attack was repulsed, the Germans intensified the onslaught on the left flank. They even managed to partially encircle two (15, 81) Soviet divisions, but failed to break through the front (advance 6-8 km). Then the Germans made an attempt to capture the Ponyri station in order to control the Oryol-Kursk railway.

170 tanks and self-propelled guns "Ferdinand" broke through the first line of defense on July 6, but the second survived. On July 7, the enemy came close to the station. The 200 mm frontal armor became impenetrable for Soviet guns. Ponyri station was held by anti-tank mines and powerful Soviet air raids.

The tank battle near the village of Prokhorovka (Voronezh Front) lasted 6 days (10-16). Almost 1200 tanks on both sides. The overall victory was for the Red Army, but more than 300 tanks were lost against 80 of the opponent. Medium tanks The T-34s could hardly withstand the heavy Tigers, and the light T-70 was generally unsuitable in open areas. This is where the losses come from.

Offensive.

While the troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts were repulsing enemy attacks, units of the Western and Bryansk Fronts (July 12) went over to the attack. Within three days (12-14), waging heavy fighting, the Soviet army was able to advance up to 25 kilometers.

And on July 15, the Central Front also launched an offensive. After 10 days, the Red Army captured the Orlovsky bridgehead, and on August 5, the city of Orel and Belgorod.

August 23, when Kharkov was taken, is considered the day of the end Battle of Kursk, although the fighting in the city ceased on 30 August.

The Battle of Kursk, in terms of its scale, military and political significance, is rightfully considered one of the key battles not only of the Great Patriotic War, but also of the Second World War. The battle on the Kursk Bulge finally established the power of the Red Army and completely broke the morale of the Wehrmacht forces. After it, the German army completely lost its offensive potential.

The Battle of Kursk, or as it is also called in Russian historiography - the Battle of the Kursk Bulge - is one of the decisive battles during the Great Patriotic War, which took place in the summer of 1943 (July 5-August 23).

Historians call the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk the two most significant victories of the Red Army against the forces of the Wehrmacht, which completely turned the tide of hostilities.

In this article, we will learn the date of the Battle of Kursk and its role and significance during the war, as well as its causes, course and results.

The historical significance of the Battle of Kursk can hardly be overestimated. If it were not for the exploits of the Soviet soldiers during the battle, the Germans were able to seize the initiative on the Eastern Front and resume the offensive, moving again to Moscow and Leningrad. During the battle, the Red Army defeated most of the combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, and he lost the opportunity to use fresh reserves, as they were already depleted.

In honor of the victory, August 23 forever became the Day of Russian Military Glory. In addition, the largest and bloodiest tank battle in history took place during the battles, as well as a huge amount of aircraft and other types of equipment.

The Battle of Kursk is also called the Battle of the Fiery Arc - all because of the crucial importance of this operation and the bloody battles that took hundreds of thousands of lives.

The Battle of Stalingrad, which took place earlier than the Battle of Kursk, completely destroyed the plans of the Germans regarding the rapid capture of the USSR. According to the Barbarossa plan and the blitzkrieg tactics, the Germans tried to take the USSR in one fell swoop even before winter. Now Soviet Union gathered strength and was able to throw a serious challenge to the Wehrmacht.

During the Battle of Kursk on July 5-August 23, 1943, according to historians, at least 200 thousand soldiers died, more than half a million were wounded. At the same time, it is important to note that many historians consider these figures to be underestimated and the losses of the parties in the Battle of Kursk may be much more significant. Mostly foreign historians speak about the bias of these data.

Intelligence service

A huge role in the victory over Germany was played by Soviet intelligence, which was able to learn about the so-called Operation Citadel. Soviet intelligence officers began to receive messages about this operation as early as the beginning of 1943. On April 12, 1943, a document was placed on the table of the Soviet leader, which contained complete information about the operation - the date of its implementation, the tactics and strategy of the German army. It was hard to imagine what would happen if intelligence did not do its job. Probably, the Germans would still have managed to break through the Russian defenses, since the preparations for Operation Citadel were serious - they were preparing for it no worse than for Operation Barbarossa.

At the moment, historians are unsure exactly who exactly delivered these essential knowledge. It is believed that this information was obtained by one of the British intelligence officers, John Cancross, as well as a member of the so-called "Cambridge Five" (a group of British intelligence officers that was recruited by the USSR in the early 1930s and worked for two governments at once).

There is also an opinion that the intelligence officers of the Dora group, namely the Hungarian intelligence officer Sandor Rado, transmitted information about the plans of the German command.

Some historians believe that one of the most famous intelligence officers of the Second World War period, Rudolf Ressler, who at that time was in Switzerland, transferred all the information about Operation Citadel to Moscow.

Significant support for the USSR was provided by British agents who were not recruited by the Union. During the Ultra program, British intelligence managed to hack the German Lorenz cipher machine, which transmitted messages between members of the top leadership of the Third Reich. The first step was to intercept plans for a summer offensive in the Kursk and Belgorod region, after which this information was immediately sent to Moscow.

Before the start of the Battle of Kursk, Zhukov claimed that as soon as he saw the future battlefield, he already knew how the strategic offensive of the German army would go. However, there is no confirmation of his words - it is believed that in his memoirs he simply exaggerates his strategic talent.

Thus, the Soviet Union knew about all the details of the offensive operation "Citadel" and was able to adequately prepare for it, so as not to leave the Germans a chance to win.

Preparing for battle

At the beginning of 1943, offensive actions were carried out by the German and Soviet armies, which led to the formation of a ledge in the center of the Soviet-German front, reaching a depth of 150 kilometers. This ledge was called the "Kursk Bulge". In April, it became clear to both sides that one of the key battles that could decide the outcome of the war on the Eastern Front would soon begin over this ledge.

There was no consensus in the German headquarters. For a long time, Hitler could not work out an exact strategy for the summer of 1943. Many generals, including Manstein, were opposed to the offensive at the moment. He believed that the offensive would make sense if it began right now, and not in the summer, when the Red Army could prepare for it. The rest either believed that it was time to go on the defensive, or to launch an offensive in the summer.

Despite the fact that the most experienced commander of the Reich (Manshetein) was against it, Hitler nevertheless agreed to launch an offensive in early July 1943.

The Battle of Kursk in 1943 is the Union's chance to consolidate the initiative after the victory at Stalingrad, and therefore the preparation of the operation was treated with a previously unprecedented seriousness.

The state of affairs at the headquarters of the USSR was much better. Stalin was aware of the plans of the Germans, he had a numerical advantage in infantry, tanks, guns and aircraft. Knowing how and when the Germans would advance, the Soviet soldiers prepared defensive fortifications to meet them and set up minefields to repel the attack, and then go on the counteroffensive. A huge role in the successful defense was played by the experience of Soviet military leaders, who, in two years of hostilities, were still able to work out the tactics and strategy of warfare of the best military leaders of the Reich. The fate of Operation Citadel was sealed before it even began.

Plans and forces of the parties

The German command planned to conduct a major offensive operation on the Kursk Bulge under the name (code name) "Citadel". In order to destroy the Soviet defense, the Germans decided to inflict descending strikes from the north (the region of the city of Orel) and from the south (the region of the city of Belgorod). Having broken the enemy defenses, the Germans were to unite in the area of ​​the city of Kursk, thus taking the troops of the Voronezh and Central fronts into a complete encirclement. In addition, the German tank units were supposed to turn east - to the village of Prokhorovka, and destroy the armored reserves of the Red Army so that they could not come to the aid of the main forces and help them get out of the encirclement. Such tactics were not at all new for German generals. Their tank flanking attacks worked for four. Using such tactics, they were able to conquer almost all of Europe and inflict many crushing defeats on the Red Army in 1941-1942.

To carry out Operation Citadel, the Germans concentrated in Eastern Ukraine, on the territory of Belarus and Russia, 50 divisions with a total number of 900 thousand people. Of these, 18 divisions were armored and motorized. Such a large number of Panzer divisions were commonplace for the Germans. The forces of the Wehrmacht have always used lightning-fast attacks of tank units in order not to give the enemy even a chance to group up and fight back. In 1939, it was the tank divisions that played a key role in the capture of France, which surrendered before it could fight.

The commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht were Field Marshal von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal Manstein (Army Group South). The strike forces were commanded by Field Marshal Model, the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force were commanded by General Herman Goth.

The German army before the start of the battle received the long-awaited tank reserves. Hitler sent more than 100 heavy Tiger tanks, almost 200 Panther tanks (first used at the Battle of Kursk) and less than a hundred Ferdinand or Elefant (Elephant) tank destroyers to the Eastern Front.

"Tigers", "Panthers" and "Ferdinands" - were one of the most powerful tanks during the Second World War. Neither the Allies nor the USSR at that time had tanks that could boast such firepower and armor. If the "Tigers" Soviet soldiers have already seen and learned to fight against them, then the "Panthers" and "Ferdinands" caused a lot of problems on the battlefield.

The Panthers are medium tanks that are slightly less armored than the Tigers and were armed with a 7.5 cm KwK 42 cannon. These guns had an excellent rate of fire and fired over long distances with great accuracy.

"Ferdinand" is a heavy self-propelled anti-tank installation (PT-ACS), which was one of the most famous during the Second World War. Despite the fact that its numbers were small, it offered serious resistance to the tanks of the USSR, as it possessed at that time almost the best armor and firepower. During the Battle of Kursk, the Ferdinands showed their power, perfectly withstanding hits from anti-tank guns, and even coped with artillery hits. However, its main problem was the small number of anti-personnel machine guns, and therefore the tank destroyer was very vulnerable to infantry, which could get close to it and blow them up. It was simply impossible to destroy these tanks with head-on shots. The weak points were on the sides, where they later learned to shoot with sub-caliber shells. The weakest point in the defense of the tank is the weak chassis, which was disabled, and then the stationary tank was captured.

In total, Manstein and Kluge received less than 350 new tanks at their disposal, which was catastrophically insufficient, given the number of Soviet armored forces. It is also worth highlighting that approximately 500 tanks used during the Battle of Kursk were obsolete models. These are the Pz.II and Pz.III tanks, which were already irrelevant at that time.

During the Battle of Kursk, the 2nd Panzer Army included elite Panzerwaffe tank units, including the 1st SS Panzer Division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "DasReich" and the famous 3rd Panzer Division "Totenkopf" (she or "Death's Head").

The Germans had a modest number of aircraft to support infantry and tanks - about 2,500 thousand units. In terms of guns and mortars, the German army was more than twice as inferior to the Soviet one, and some sources point to a threefold advantage of the USSR in guns and mortars.

The Soviet command realized its mistakes in conducting defensive operations in 1941-1942. This time they built a powerful defensive line that could hold off the massive offensive of the German armored forces. According to the plans of the command, the Red Army was to wear down the enemy with defensive battles, and then launch a counteroffensive at the most disadvantageous moment for the enemy.

During the Battle of Kursk, the commander of the Central Front was one of the most talented and productive army generals, Konstantin Rokossovsky. His troops took on the task of defending the northern front of the Kursk salient. The commander of the Voronezh Front on the Kursk Bulge was General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin, a native of the Voronezh Region, on whose shoulders the task of defending the southern front of the ledge fell. Marshals of the USSR Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky were in charge of coordinating the actions of the Red Army.

The ratio of the number of troops was far from on the side of Germany. According to estimates, the Central and Voronezh fronts had 1.9 million soldiers, including units of the troops of the Steppe Front (Steppe Military District). The number of Wehrmacht fighters did not exceed 900 thousand people. In terms of the number of tanks, Germany was less than two times inferior to 2.5 thousand versus less than 5 thousand. As a result, the balance of power before the Battle of Kursk looked like this: 2:1 in favor of the USSR. The historian of the Great Patriotic War Alexei Isaev says that the size of the Red Army during the battle is overestimated. His point of view is subject to great criticism, since he does not take into account the troops of the Steppe Front (the number of soldiers of the Steppe Front who participated in the operations totaled more than 500 thousand people).

Kursk defensive operation

Before giving Full description events on the Kursk Bulge, it is important to show a map of actions to make it easier to navigate the information. Battle of Kursk on the map:

This picture shows the scheme of the Battle of Kursk. The map of the Battle of Kursk can clearly show how combat formations acted during the battle. On the map of the Battle of Kursk you will also see conventions to help you digest the information.

The Soviet generals received all the necessary orders - the defense was strong and the Germans were soon waiting for resistance, which the Wehrmacht had not received in the entire history of its existence. On the day that the Battle of Kursk began, the Soviet army brought a huge amount of artillery to the front to give a response artillery barrage that the Germans would not expect.

The beginning of the Battle of Kursk (defensive stage) was planned for the morning of July 5 - the offensive was to take place immediately from the northern and southern fronts. Before the tank attack, the Germans carried out large-scale bombardments, to which the Soviet army responded in kind. At this point, the German command (namely Field Marshal Manstein) began to realize that the Russians had learned about Operation Citadel and were able to prepare the defense. Manstein repeatedly told Hitler that this offensive at the moment no longer made sense. He believed that it was necessary to carefully prepare the defense and try first to repulse the Red Army and only then think about counterattacks.

Start - Arc of Fire

On the northern front, the offensive began at six o'clock in the morning. The Germans attacked a little west of the Cherkasy direction. The first tank attacks ended in failure for the Germans. A solid defense led to heavy losses in the German armored units. And yet the enemy managed to break through 10 kilometers deep. On the southern front, the offensive began at three o'clock in the morning. The main blows fell on the settlements of Oboyan and Korochi.

The Germans could not break through the defenses of the Soviet troops, as they were carefully prepared for battle. Even the elite panzer divisions of the Wehrmacht were hardly moving forward. As soon as it became clear that the German forces could not break through on the northern and southern fronts, the command decided that it was necessary to strike in the direction of Prokhorov.

On July 11, fierce fighting began near the village of Prokhorovka, which escalated into the largest tank battle in history. Soviet tanks in the Battle of Kursk outnumbered the German ones, but despite this, the enemy resisted to the end. July 13-23 - The Germans are still trying to carry out offensive attacks, which end in failure. On July 23, the enemy completely exhausted his offensive potential and decided to go on the defensive.

tank battle

It is difficult to say how many tanks were involved on both sides, since the data from various sources differ. If we take the average data, then the number of tanks of the USSR reached about 1 thousand vehicles. Whereas the Germans had about 700 tanks.

The tank battle (battle) during the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge took place on July 12, 1943. Enemy attacks on Prokhorovka began immediately from the western and southern directions. Four panzer divisions were advancing in the west and about 300 more tanks were heading in from the south.

The battle began early in the morning and the Soviet troops gained an advantage, as rising Sun the Germans shone directly into the viewing devices of the tanks. The battle formations of the parties mixed up quite quickly, and already a few hours after the start of the battle it was difficult to make out where whose tanks were.

The Germans found themselves in a very difficult position, since the main strength of their tanks was in long-range guns, which were useless in close combat, and the tanks themselves were very slow, while in this situation much was decided by maneuverability. The 2nd and 3rd tank (anti-tank) armies of the Germans were defeated near Kursk. The Russian tanks, on the contrary, gained an advantage, as they had a chance to target the weak spots of heavily armored German tanks, and they themselves were very maneuverable (especially the famous T-34s).

However, the Germans nevertheless gave a serious rebuff from their anti-tank guns, which undermined the morale of the Russian tankers - the fire was so dense that the soldiers and tanks did not have time and could not form orders.

While the bulk of the tank troops were tied up in battle, the Germans decided to use the Kempf tank group, which was advancing on the left flank of the Soviet troops. To repel this attack, the tank reserves of the Red Army had to be used. In the southern direction, by 14.00, Soviet troops began to push the German tank units, which did not have fresh reserves. In the evening, the battlefield was already far behind the Soviet tank units and the battle was won.

Tank losses on both sides during the battle near Prokhorovka during the Kursk defensive operation looked like this:

• about 250 Soviet tanks;
• 70 German tanks.

The above figures are irretrievable losses. The number of damaged tanks was much larger. For example, the Germans after the battle of Prokhorovka had only 1/10 fully combat-ready vehicles.

The battle of Prokhorovka is called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not entirely true. In fact, this is the largest tank battle that took place in just one day. But the largest battle took place two years earlier also between the forces of the Germans and the USSR on the Eastern Front near Dubno. During this battle, which began on June 23, 1941, 4,500 tanks collided with each other. The Soviet Union had 3700 pieces of equipment, while the Germans had only 800 units.

Despite such a numerical advantage of the tank units of the Union, there was not a single chance of victory. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the quality of the German tanks was much higher - they were armed with new models with good anti-tank armor and weapons. Secondly, in Soviet military thought at that time there was a principle that "tanks do not fight tanks." Most of the tanks in the USSR at that time had only bulletproof armor and could not penetrate the thick German armor themselves. That is why the first largest tank battle was a catastrophic failure for the USSR.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk ended on July 23, 1943 with the complete victory of the Soviet troops and the crushing defeat of the Wehrmacht forces. As a result of bloody battles, the German army was exhausted and drained of blood, a significant number of tanks were either destroyed or partially lost their combat effectiveness. The German tanks participating in the battle near Prokhorovka were almost completely disabled, destroyed or fell into the hands of the enemy.

The ratio of losses during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk was as follows: 4.95:1. The Soviet army lost five times as many soldiers, while the German losses were much smaller. However, a huge number of German soldiers were wounded, as well as tank troops were destroyed, which significantly undermined the combat power of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.

As a result of the defensive operation, the Soviet troops reached the line, which they occupied before the German offensive, which began on July 5. The Germans went on the defensive.

During the Battle of Kursk there was a radical change. After the Germans exhausted their offensive capabilities, the Red Army counteroffensive began on the Kursk Bulge. From July 17 to July 23, the Izyum-Barvenkovskaya offensive operation was carried out by Soviet troops.

The operation was carried out by the Southwestern Front of the Red Army. Its key goal was to pin down the Donbas grouping of the enemy so that the enemy could not transfer fresh reserves to the Kursk salient. Despite the fact that the enemy threw his almost best tank divisions into battle, the forces of the Southwestern Front still managed to seize bridgeheads and with powerful blows pin down and surround the Donbass group of Germans. Thus, the Southwestern Front significantly helped in the defense of the Kursk Bulge.

Miusskaya offensive operation

From July 17 to August 2, 1943, the Mius offensive operation was also carried out. The main task of the Soviet troops during the operation was to pull the fresh reserves of the Germans from the Kursk Bulge to the Donbass and defeat the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht. To repel the attack in the Donbass, the Germans had to transfer significant aviation and tank units to defend the city. Despite the fact that the Soviet troops failed to break through the German defenses near the Donbass, they still managed to significantly weaken the offensive on the Kursk Bulge.

The offensive phase of the Battle of Kursk continued successfully for the Red Army. The next important battles on the Kursk Bulge took place near Orel and Kharkov - the offensive operations were called "Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev".

The offensive operation "Kutuzov" began on July 12, 1943 in the area of ​​​​the city of Orel, where two German armies opposed the Soviet troops. As a result of bloody battles, the Germans were unable to hold bridgeheads on July 26, they retreated. Already on August 5, the city of Orel was liberated by the Red Army. It was on August 5, 1943, for the first time in the entire period of hostilities with Germany, that a small parade with fireworks took place in the capital of the USSR. Thus, it can be judged that the liberation of Orel was an extremely important task for the Red Army, which it successfully coped with.

Offensive operation "Rumyantsev"

The next main event of the Battle of Kursk during its offensive phase began on August 3, 1943 on the southern face of the arc. As already mentioned, this strategic offensive was called "Rumyantsev". The operation was carried out by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts.

Already two days after the start of the operation - on August 5, the city of Belgorod was liberated from the Nazis. And two days later, the forces of the Red Army liberated the city of Bogodukhov. During the offensive on August 11, Soviet soldiers managed to cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway communication line of the Germans. Despite all the counterattacks of the German army, the forces of the Red Army continued to advance. As a result of fierce fighting on August 23, the city of Kharkov was recaptured.

The battle for the Kursk Bulge was already won by the Soviet troops at that moment. This was understood by the German command, but Hitler gave a clear order to "stand to the last."

The Mginskaya offensive operation began on July 22 and continued until August 22, 1943. The main goals of the USSR were as follows: to finally thwart the plan of the German offensive against Leningrad, prevent the enemy from transferring forces to the west, and completely destroy the 18th Wehrmacht Army.

The operation began with a powerful artillery strike in the enemy direction. The forces of the parties at the time of the start of the operation on the Kursk Bulge looked like this: 260 thousand soldiers and about 600 tanks on the side of the USSR, and 100 thousand people and 150 tanks on the side of the Wehrmacht.

Despite strong artillery preparation, the German army put up fierce resistance. Although the forces of the Red Army managed to immediately capture the first echelon of the enemy's defense, they could not advance further.

In early August 1943, having received fresh reserves, the Red Army again began to attack German positions. Thanks to the numerical superiority and powerful mortar fire, the soldiers of the USSR managed to capture the enemy's defensive fortifications in the village of Porechie. However, the spacecraft again could not advance further - the German defense was too dense.

A fierce battle between the opposing sides during the operation unfolded for Sinyaevo and Sinyaevo Heights, which were captured by Soviet troops several times, and then they passed back to the Germans. The fighting was fierce and both sides suffered heavy losses. The German defense was so strong that the command of the spacecraft decided to stop the offensive operation on August 22, 1943 and go on the defensive. Thus, the Mginskaya offensive operation did not bring final success, although it played an important strategic role. To repel this attack, the Germans had to use the reserves, which were supposed to go to Kursk.

Smolensk offensive operation

Until the Soviet counter-offensive in the Battle of Kursk 1943 began, it was extremely important for the Headquarters to defeat as many enemy units as possible, which the Wehrmacht could send under the Course to contain the Soviet troops. In order to weaken the enemy's defenses and deprive him of the help of reserves, the Smolensk offensive operation was carried out. The Smolensk direction adjoined the western region of the Kursk salient. The operation was codenamed "Suvorov" and began on August 7, 1943. The offensive was launched by the forces of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, as well as the entire Western Front.

The operation ended in success, as in its course the beginning of the liberation of Belarus was laid. However, most importantly, the commanders of the Battle of Kursk achieved the pinning down of as many as 55 enemy divisions, preventing them from going to Kursk - this significantly increased the chances of the Red Army forces during the counteroffensive near Kursk.

To weaken the positions of the enemy near Kursk, the forces of the Red Army carried out another operation - the Donbas offensive. The plans of the parties regarding the Donbas basin were very serious, because this place served as an important economic center - the Donetsk mines were extremely important for the USSR and Germany. There was a huge German grouping in the Donbass, which numbered more than 500 thousand people.

The operation began on August 13, 1943 and was carried out by the forces of the Southwestern Front. On August 16, the Red Army forces met serious resistance on the Mius River, where there was a heavily fortified defensive line. On August 16, the forces of the Southern Front entered the battle, which managed to break through the enemy defenses. Especially in the battles, the 67th showed up from all the regiments. The successful offensive continued and already on August 30, the spacecraft liberated the city of Taganrog.

On August 23, 1943, the offensive phase of the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Kursk itself ended, however, the Donbass offensive operation continued - the forces of the spacecraft had to push the enemy across the Dnieper River.

Now important strategic positions were lost for the Germans and the threat of dismemberment and death hung over Army Group South. To prevent this, the leader of the Third Reich nevertheless allowed her to move beyond the Dnieper.

On September 1, all German units in the area began to retreat from the Donbass. On September 5, Gorlovka was liberated, and three days later, during the fighting, Stalino was taken or, as the city is now called, Donetsk.

The retreat for the German army was very difficult. The Wehrmacht forces were running out of ammunition for artillery pieces. During the retreat, the German soldiers actively used the tactics of "scorched earth". The Germans killed civilians and burned villages as well as small towns along their path. During the Battle of Kursk in 1943, retreating in cities, the Germans plundered everything that came to hand.

On September 22, the Germans were thrown back across the Dnieper River in the area of ​​​​the cities of Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk. After that, the Donbas offensive operation came to an end, ending with the complete success of the Red Army.

All the operations undertaken above led to the fact that the Wehrmacht forces, as a result of the fighting in the Battle of Kursk, were forced to withdraw beyond the Dnieper in order to build new defensive lines. The victory in the Battle of Kursk was the result of the increased courage and fighting spirit of Soviet soldiers, the skill of commanders and the competent use of military equipment.

The Battle of Kursk in 1943, and then the Battle of the Dnieper, finally secured the initiative on the Eastern Front for the USSR. No one else doubted that the victory in the Great Patriotic War would be for the USSR. This was understood by the allies of Germany, who began to gradually abandon the Germans, leaving the Reich even less chance.

Many historians also believe that the Allied offensive on the island of Sicily, which at that moment was occupied mainly by Italian troops, played an important role in the victory over the Germans during the Battle of Kursk.

On July 10, the Allies launched an offensive in Sicily and the Italian troops surrendered to the British and American forces with little or no resistance. This greatly spoiled Hitler's plans, since in order to hold Western Europe he had to transfer part of the troops from the Eastern Front, which again weakened the position of the Germans near Kursk. Already on July 10, Manstein told Hitler that the offensive near Kursk must be stopped and went into deep defense beyond the Dnieper River, but Hitler still hoped that the enemy would not be able to defeat the Wehrmacht.

Everyone knows that the Battle of Kursk during the Great Patriotic War was bloody and the date of its beginning is associated with the death of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. However, there were also funny (interesting) facts during the Battle of Kursk. One of these cases is associated with the KV-1 tank.

During a tank battle, one of the Soviet KV-1 tanks stalled and the crew ran out of ammunition. He was opposed by two German Pz.IV tanks, which could not penetrate the armor of the KV-1. German tankers tried to get to the Soviet crew by sawing through the armor, but nothing came of it. Then two Pz.IVs decided to drag the KV-1 to their base in order to deal with the tankers there. They hitched up the KV-1 and started towing it. Somewhere in the middle of the way, the KV-1 engine suddenly started up and the Soviet tank dragged two Pz.IVs with it to its base. The German tankers were shocked and simply abandoned their tanks.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

If the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad ended the period of defense of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War, then the end of the Battle of Kursk marked a radical turning point in the course of hostilities.

After a report (message) about the victory in the Battle of Kursk arrived on Stalin's desk, the Secretary General said that this was only the beginning and that the Red Army troops would soon oust the Germans from the occupied territories of the USSR.

The events after the Battle of Kursk, of course, did not unfold simply for the Red Army. The victories were accompanied by huge losses, because the enemy stubbornly held the defense.

The liberation of cities after the Battle of Kursk continued, for example, already in November 1943, the capital of the Ukrainian SSR- the city of Kyiv.

A very important result of the Battle of Kursk - change in the attitude of the allies towards the USSR. A report to the President of the United States, written in August, said that the USSR now occupies a dominant position in World War II. There is proof of this. If Germany allocated only two divisions for the defense of Sicily from the combined troops of Great Britain and the USA, then on the Eastern Front the USSR attracted the attention of two hundred German divisions.

The United States was very worried about the successes of the Russians on the Eastern Front. Roosevelt said that if the USSR continued to pursue such success, the opening of a "second front" would be unnecessary and the United States would then not be able to influence the fate of Europe without benefit to itself. Therefore, the opening of a "second front" should follow as soon as possible while US assistance was needed at all.

The failure of Operation Citadel led to the disruption of further strategic offensive operations of the Wehrmacht, which were already prepared for execution. The victory near Kursk would allow developing an offensive against Leningrad, and after that the Germans went to occupy Sweden.

The result of the Battle of Kursk was the undermining of Germany's authority among its allies. The successes of the USSR on the Eastern Front made it possible for the Americans and the British to turn around in Western Europe. After such a crushing defeat of Germany, the leader of fascist Italy, Benito Mussolini, broke off agreements with Germany and left the war. Thus, Hitler lost his true ally.

Success, of course, had to be paid dearly. The losses of the USSR in the Battle of Kursk were huge, as, indeed, were the German ones. The balance of power has already been shown above - now it's worth looking at the losses in the Battle of Kursk.

In fact, it is rather difficult to establish the exact number of deaths, since data from different sources vary greatly. Many historians take average figures - these are 200 thousand dead and three times as many wounded. The least optimistic data speaks of more than 800 thousand dead on both sides and the same number of wounded. The parties also lost a huge number of tanks and equipment. Aviation in the Battle of Kursk played almost a key role and the loss of aircraft amounted to about 4 thousand units on both sides. At the same time, aviation losses are the only ones where the Red Army lost no more than the German one - each lost about 2 thousand aircraft. For example, the ratio of human losses looks like this 5:1 or 4:1 according to various sources. Based on the characteristics of the Battle of Kursk, we can conclude that the effectiveness of Soviet aircraft at this stage of the war was in no way inferior to the German ones, while at the beginning of hostilities the situation was radically different.

Soviet soldiers near Kursk showed extraordinary heroism. Their exploits were even celebrated abroad, especially by American and British publications. The heroism of the Red Army was also noted by the German generals, including Manshein, who was considered the best commander of the Reich. Several hundred thousand soldiers received awards "For participation in the Battle of Kursk."

Another interesting fact- children also participated in the Battle of Kursk. Of course, they did not fight on the front lines, but they provided serious support in the rear. They helped deliver supplies and shells. And before the start of the battle, with the help of children, hundreds of kilometers of railways were built, which were necessary for the rapid transportation of military and supplies.

Finally, it is important to fix all the data. Date of the end and beginning of the Battle of Kursk: July 5 and August 23, 1943.

Key dates of the Battle of Kursk:

• July 5 - 23, 1943 - Kursk strategic defensive operation;
• July 23 - August 23, 1943 - Kursk strategic offensive operation;
• July 12, 1943 - a bloody tank battle near Prokhorovka;
• July 17 - 27, 1943 - Izyum-Barvenkovskaya offensive operation;
• July 17 - August 2, 1943 - Miusskaya offensive operation;
• July 12 - August 18, 1943 - Oryol strategic offensive operation "Kutuzov";
• August 3 - 23, 1943 - Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation "Rumyantsev";
• July 22 - August 23, 1943 - Mginskaya offensive operation;
• August 7 - October 2, 1943 - Smolensk offensive operation;
• August 13 - September 22, 1943 - Donbass offensive operation.

Results of the Battle of the Fiery Arc:

• a radical turn of events during the Great Patriotic War and World War II;
• complete fiasco of the German campaign to seize the USSR;
• the Nazis lost confidence in the invincibility of the German army, which lowered the morale of the soldiers and led to conflicts in the ranks of the command.

Municipal educational institution

Upper Toiden Secondary School

An essay about:

"Battle of Kursk"

Prepared

Kononova Love

15 years old (childhood disabled)

2009 – 2010 academic year

Russia, beloved Motherland,
We will not forget your military days,
You were proud of your strength in all ages,
their invincible sons.
And how near Prokhorovka in the summer of forty-three,
two forces met in a tank battle.
They stood to death, and left for immortality
My grandfather and great-grandfather, having become in the same ranks ...

E. Likarchuk.

In the history of our state there are events that do not fade in the memory of generations. With a deep spiritual and moral connection, they connect the past and the present, reconcile our responsibility to the future. This is how we evaluate the years of the Great Patriotic War. Today, on the eve of the 65th anniversary of the Victory in this war, not only the greatness of the national feat, but also its human dimension appears with particular clarity. Military merit Soviet people invaluable.

The Great Patriotic War claimed many human lives. People fought for their Fatherland. There were a lot of battles during the war, but I was especially struck by the battle on the Kursk Bulge near the village of Prokhorovka. It was the largest tank battle of World War II. It happened on July 12, 1943. The German command, after the defeat of its troops at Stalingrad, intended to conduct a major offensive operation in the Kursk region (Operation Citadel). Significant enemy forces were involved in its implementation - 50 divisions (including 16 tank and mechanized) and a number of separate units of the Army Group Center (General - Field Marshal G. Kluge) and Army Group South (General - Field Marshal E . Manstein). As part of the enemy strike groups, there were over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2700 tanks and self-propelled guns (most of them were new designs - "tigers", "panthers" and "Ferdinands") and about 2050 aircraft. The German-fascist command attached decisive importance to this offensive. It was to end with a quick and decisive success. The general plan of the operation was as follows: with two simultaneous counter strikes in the general direction to Kursk - from Orel to the south and from the Kharkov region to the north - to encircle and destroy the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts on the Kursk ledge. The subsequent offensive operations of the Wehrmacht were made dependent on the results of the battle on the Kursk Bulge. The success of these operations was to serve as a signal for an attack on Leningrad. The enemy prepared carefully for the operations. Soviet troops were also actively preparing for offensive operations. By the beginning of July, the Central and Voronezh Fronts had 1336 thousand people, over 19 thousand guns and mortars, 3444 tanks and self-propelled guns. In the rear of the Kursk ledge, the Steppe Military District (from July 9 - the front) was deployed, which was the strategic reserve of the Headquarters.

So, intense combat training took place in all ground and air forces, each fighter and commander was preparing to meet the enemy.

And this meeting took place .... The enemy offensive was to begin at 3 o'clock in the morning on July 5 . However, just before it began, the Soviet troops carried out artillery counter-preparation and inflicted heavy damage on the enemy in the places of his concentration. The German offensive began only after 2.5 hours, and its course was different from what was planned. Thanks to the measures taken, it was possible to restrain the advance of the enemy.

On July 12, the Bryansk Front and the reinforced 11th Guards Army of the Western Front went on the offensive and, despite the deeply echeloned, highly engineered defense and the stubborn resistance of the enemy, broke through it and began to move forward in the direction of Orel. So here, in the Orel region, the long-prepared Nazi general offensive finally failed. The German troops had to experience the bitterness of a heavy defeat and feel the power of Soviet weapons that fell with all their might on a hated enemy. However, in the Belgorod region, the enemy still delivered very strong blows; on July 6, a bloody battle broke out in the Oboyan direction. Many hundreds of aircraft, tanks and self-propelled guns simultaneously participated on both sides. But the enemy could not overturn the steel defense of our troops. Tankers and artillerymen courageously fought off repeated attacks of the enemy. Only on July 6, the enemy lost more than 200 tanks, tens of thousands of soldiers and about 100 combat aircraft here. Having pulled up reserves and regrouped his forces, the enemy at dawn on July 7 brought into action a new strong grouping of tanks. At the same time, their bulk was thrown against the 6th Guards Army and the 1st Tank Army in the direction of Oboyan - Prokhorovka. On the morning of July 7, fierce enemy attacks began again. In the air and on the ground there was an incessant rumble of battle, the rattle of tanks and the noise of engines. The troops of the Voronezh Front, fighting with strong aviation support, did not allow the enemy to break through the second line of defense, but he managed to wedge in some places.

Then the front command brought into action in this sector, which has now become dangerous, the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps, as well as several rifle divisions and artillery units transferred from other directions.

In two days, the enemy lost less than 200 tanks and many other equipment. His infantry units already numbered no more than half of their original strength in their ranks. Having regrouped its main forces on a narrower sector during July 10, the enemy again threw them in the direction of Prokhorovka, hoping to crush our weakened troops. During July 11, a heavy battle continued in the Prokhorovka direction. By the end of the day, a dangerous crisis had set in on the sector of the Voronezh Front. According to the previously developed plan, the Headquarters pulled up the 5th Guards Combined Arms and 5th Guards Tank Armies from its reserve here, to the Prokhorovka area, and on the morning of July 12 brought them into battle. On this day, the largest oncoming tank battle in history took place in the Prokhorovka area, in which 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part on both sides. Having entered the business, our troops had more than 800 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations in service. In total, the enemy had at least as many tanks in the Oboyan and Prokhorov directions, but the morale of his troops was already broken. The fierce fight lasted until late in the evening. . Clouds of dust and smoke hung over the battlefield. It was a turning point in the battle in the Belgorod direction. Bloodless and having lost faith in victory, the Nazi troops gradually switched to defensive operations. On July 16, the enemy finally stopped the attacks and began to withdraw their rear lines to Belgorod. The Voronezh Front and the troops of the Steppe Front, brought into battle on July 18, proceeded to pursue the enemy. By the end of July 23, they had basically restored the position that they had occupied before the start of the battle.

As a result of the Battle of Kursk, 30 enemy divisions (including 7 tank divisions) were completely defeated. The enemy lost over 500 thousand people, 1.5 thousand tanks, over 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns.

Thus, the plan of the Wehrmacht called "Citadel" to capture Orel, Kursk, Belgorod, the encirclement of the Red Army was thwarted. As in all other battles in Russian history, it was not the strength of the armor that won, but the strength of the Russian people, their wisdom, will, spirituality, deep faith in the holy just cause .

The battle in the area of ​​Kursk, Orel and Belgorod is one of the greatest battles of the Great Patriotic War and World War II in general. Here, not only were select and powerful groups of Germans defeated, but faith in the Nazi fascist leadership and in Germany's ability to resist the growing might of the Soviet Union was irretrievably undermined in the German army and people.

So, the Nazis lost the greatest battle that they were preparing, straining all their strength and capabilities to take revenge for the defeat of their troops in 1942/43 on the Volga and near Leningrad.

More than half a century separates us from those formidable military springs, but the payment for the Victory will never depreciate. And about them, now living veterans, and those who did not come from the war, we simply must remember. After all, if they had not defeated the enemy, then we would not have been on earth. Let's always remember this. And about these details:

I've seen hand-to-hand combat many times.

Once - in reality and a thousand - in a dream.

Who says that war is not scary,

He knows nothing about the war.

These are poems by Yulia Drunina. They are about what has not yet been said the last word about war.

This is our pain, our memory and great gratitude to the fallen.

Literature: Great Soviet Encyclopedia.

"Memories and Reflections".

Volume 1 - 8th edition - Moscow; Press Agency News Publishing, 1987.

Thousands of books have been written about this battle, but many facts are still little known to a wide audience. Russian historian and writer, author of more than 40 publications on the history of the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Prokhorov Valery Zamulin recalls the heroic and victorious battle in the Black Earth region.

The article is based on the material of the program "The Price of Victory" of the radio station "Echo of Moscow". The broadcast was conducted by Vitaly Dymarsky and Dmitry Zakharov. You can read and listen to the original interview in full here.

After the encirclement of the Paulus group and its dismemberment, the success at Stalingrad was deafening. After February 2, a number of offensive operations were carried out. In particular, the Kharkov offensive operation, as a result of which the Soviet troops captured a significant territory. But then the situation changed dramatically. In the Kramatorsk area, a group of tank divisions, some of which were transferred from France, including two SS divisions - Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and Das Reich - the Germans launched a crushing counterattack. That is, the Kharkov offensive operation turned into a defensive one. I must say that this battle came at a high cost to us.

After the German troops occupied Kharkov, Belgorod and adjacent territories, the well-known Kursk ledge was formed in the south. Around March 25, 1943, the front line finally stabilized in this sector. Stabilization occurred due to the introduction of two tank corps: the 2nd Guards and the 3rd "Stalingrad", as well as the operational transfer at the request of Zhukov from the Stalingrad of the 21st Army of General Chistyakov and the 64th Army of General Shumilov (hereinafter it is 6 -I and 7th Guards armies). In addition, by the end of March, mud had set in, which, of course, helped our troops to hold the line at that moment, because the equipment was very bogged down and it was simply impossible to continue the offensive.

Thus, given that Operation Citadel began on July 5, then from March 25 to July 5, that is, for three and a half months, preparations were underway for summer operations. The front stabilized, and in fact a certain balance was maintained, balance, without sharp, as they say, movements on both sides.

The Stalingrad operation cost the Germans the 6th Army of Paulus and himself

Germany suffered a colossal defeat at Stalingrad, and most importantly, the first such deafening defeat, so the political leadership had an important task to consolidate its bloc, because Germany's allies began to think that Germany was not so invincible; and what will happen if suddenly another Stalingrad? Therefore, Hitler needed after a rather victorious offensive in Ukraine in March 1943, when Kharkov was recaptured, Belgorod was taken, the territory was captured, another, perhaps small, but impressive victory.

No, it's not small though. If Operation Citadel were successful, which the German command naturally expected, then two fronts would be in the ring - Central and Voronezh.

Many German military leaders took part in the development and implementation of Operation Citadel. In particular, General Manstein, who initially proposed a completely different plan: to cede the Donbass to the advancing Soviet troops so that they go there, and then, with a blow from above, from the north, press them, throw them into the sea (there were the Azov and Black Seas in the lower part).

But Hitler did not accept this plan for two reasons. First, he said that Germany could not make territorial concessions now, after Stalingrad. And, secondly, the Donetsk basin, which the Germans needed not so much from a psychological point of view, but from a raw material point of view, as an energy base. Manstein's plan was rejected, and the forces of the German General Staff concentrated on the development of Operation Citadel to eliminate the Kursk salient.

The fact is that from the Kursk ledge it was convenient to deliver flank strikes to our troops, so the area for the start of the main summer offensive was precisely determined. However, the task formation process and the preparation process took a long time because there were disputes. For example, Model spoke and persuaded Hitler not to start this operation because of the understaffing of both manpower and technical. And, by the way, the second date of the Citadel was set for June 10 (the first date was for May 3-5). And already from June 10, it was moved even further - to July 5.

Here, again, we must return to the myth that only "Tigers" and "Panthers" were involved in the Kursk Bulge. In fact, this was not the case, because these machines began to be produced in a relatively large series precisely in 1943, and Hitler insisted that about 200 Tigers and 200 Panthers be sent to the Kursk direction. However, this entire 400-machine grouping was not involved, because, like any new technology, both those and other tanks suffered from “childhood illnesses”. As Manstein and Guderian noted, the Tigers quite often caught fire in their carburetors, the Panthers had problems with the transmission, and therefore no more than 50 vehicles of both types were actually used in the fighting during the Kursk operation. God forbid, the remaining 150 of each type would have been brought into battle - the consequences could have been much more deplorable.

It is important to understand here that the German command initially planned the Belgorod grouping, that is, Army Group South, which was headed by Manstein, as the main one - it was supposed to solve the main task. The blow of the 9th Army of the Model was, as it were, auxiliary. Manstein had to go 147 kilometers before joining the troops of the Model, so the main forces, including tank and motorized divisions, were concentrated near Belgorod.

The first offensive in May - Manstein saw (reconnaissance reports, photography) how quickly the Red Army, the Voronezh Front, in particular, was strengthening its positions, and understood that his troops would not be able to reach Kursk. With these thoughts, he first arrived at Bogodukhov, at the command post of the 4th Panzer Army near Goth. For what? The fact is that Goth wrote a letter - there was still an attempt to develop the operation "Panther" (as a continuation in case of success of the "Citadel"). So, in particular, Goth opposed this operation. He believed that the main thing was not to rush to Kursk, but to destroy, as he assumed, about 10 tank mechanized corps, which the Russians had already prepared. That is, destroy mobile reserves.

If all this colossus moves on the Army Group "South", then, as they say, it will not show enough. That's it for this it was necessary to plan at least the first stage of the "Citadel". On May 9-11 Goth and Manstein discussed this plan. And it was precisely at this meeting that the tasks of the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force were clearly defined, and the plan for the Prokhorov battle was also developed here.

It was near Prokhorovka that Manstein planned a tank battle, that is, the destruction of these mobile reserves. And after they are defeated, when an assessment of the state of the German troops is carried out, it will be possible to talk about an offensive.

In the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, both in the north and in the south, the Germans concentrated up to 70% of the armored vehicles available to them on the Eastern Front for Operation Citadel. It was assumed that it was these forces that would be able to ram the three most fortified lines of the Soviet defense and destroy, given the qualitative superiority of German armored vehicles at that time over our tanks, mobile reserves. After that, with a favorable set of circumstances, they will also be able to advance in the direction of Kursk.

For the battles near Prokhorovka, the SS corps, partly the 48th corps and part of the forces of the 3rd Panzer Corps, were planned. These three corps were supposed to crush the mobile reserves, which were supposed to approach the Prokhorovka area. Why in the Prokhorovka area? Because the area was favorable there. In other places it was simply impossible to deploy a significant number of tanks. This plan was largely implemented by the enemy. The only thing is that our defense forces did not calculate.

A few more words about the Germans. The fact is that they already had a seam situation in Africa. After the loss of Africa, it automatically followed that the British establish complete control over the Mediterranean Sea. Malta is an unsinkable aircraft carrier from which they hammer Sardinia first, Sicily, and thus prepare the possibility of landing in Italy, which was eventually carried out. That is, the Germans in other areas, too, everything was not thank God. Plus the vacillation of Hungary, Romania and other allies...

The planning of the summer military operations of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht began approximately at the same time: for the Germans - in February, for us - at the end of March, after the stabilization of the front line. The fact is that the holding of the enemy, who was advancing from Kharkov in the Belgorod region, and the organization of the defense were controlled by the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Zhukov. And after the stabilization of the front line, he was here, in the Belgorod region; together with Vasilevsky they discussed further plans. After that, he prepared a note in which he stated the point of view, which was developed jointly with the command of the Voronezh Front. (By the way, Vatutin became commander of the Voronezh Front on March 27, before that he commanded the South-Western Front. He replaced Golikov, who, by decision of the Headquarters, was removed from this post).

So, in early April, a note lay on Stalin's desk, which set out the basic principles for conducting hostilities in the south in the summer of 1943. On April 12, a meeting was held with the participation of Stalin, in which a proposal was approved to switch to a deliberate defense, to prepare troops and a defense in depth in case the enemy goes on the offensive. And the configuration of the front line in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge assumed a high probability of such a transition.

Despite local successes, the Nazi operation "Citadel" failed

Here we should return to the system of engineering structures, because until 1943, before the Battle of Kursk, the creation of such powerful defensive lines by the Red Army was not carried out. After all, the depth of these three defense lines was about 300 kilometers. That is, the Germans had to plow, ram, drill 300 kilometers of fortified areas. And these are not just trenches dug to their full height and fortified with boards, these are anti-tank ditches, gouges, this is the most powerful system of minefields made during the war for the first time; and each, in fact, the settlement in this territory also turned into a mini-fortress.

Neither the German nor our side have ever erected such a strong and saturated defensive line with engineering barriers and fortifications on the Eastern Front. The first three lanes were the most fortified: the main army lane, the second army lane and the third rear army lane - approximately to a depth of 50 kilometers. The fortifications were so powerful that two large, strong enemy groupings could not break through them for two weeks, despite the fact that, in general, the Soviet command did not guess the main direction of the German attack.

The fact is that in May fairly accurate data were received about the enemy’s plans for the summer: periodically they came from illegal agents from England and Germany. The headquarters of the supreme command knew about the plans of the German command, but for some reason it was determined that the Germans would inflict the main blow on the Central Front, on Rokossovsky. Therefore, Rokossovsky was additionally transferred significant artillery forces, an entire artillery corps, which Vatutin did not have. And this miscalculation, of course, influenced how the fighting on South. Vatutin was forced to repulse the attacks of the enemy's main tank grouping with tanks, not having sufficient artillery to fight; in the north there were also tank divisions that were directly involved in the attack on the Central Front, but they dealt with Soviet artillery, and numerous ones at that.

But let's move smoothly to July 5, when, in fact, the event began. The canonical version is Ozerov's film "Liberation": the defector says that the Germans are concentrated here and there, a colossal artillery raid is being carried out, almost all Germans are being killed, it is not clear who else is fighting there for a whole month. How was it really?

There really was a defector, and not one - there were several of them both in the north and in the south. In the south, in particular, on July 4, a soldier of the reconnaissance battalion from the 168th Infantry Division went over to our side. According to the plan of the command of the Voronezh and Central Fronts, in order to inflict maximum losses on the enemy prepared for the offensive, it was supposed to carry out two measures: firstly, to conduct a powerful artillery attack, and, secondly, to strike the aircraft of the 2nd, 16th and 17th air armies at the base airfield. Let's say about the air raid - it failed. And moreover, it had unfortunate consequences, since the time was not calculated.

As for the artillery attack, it was partially successful in the zone of the 6th Guards Army: the telephone communication lines were mostly disrupted. There were losses in both manpower and equipment, but insignificant.

Another thing is the 7th Guards Army, which took up defense along the eastern bank of the Donets. The Germans, respectively, on the right. Therefore, in order to launch an offensive, they needed to force the river. They pulled up significant forces and watercraft to certain settlements and sectors of the front, and previously built several crossings, hiding them under water. Soviet intelligence recorded this (engineer intelligence, by the way, worked very well), and artillery strikes were carried out precisely on these areas: on crossings and on settlements where these assault groups of the 3rd tank corps of Routh were concentrated. Therefore, the effectiveness of artillery preparation in the zone of the 7th Guards Army was much higher. Losses from it both in manpower and in technology, not to mention management and so on, were high. Several bridges were destroyed, which slowed down the pace of the offensive, and in some places paralyzed.

Already on July 5, Soviet troops began to split the enemy strike force, that is, they did not allow the 6th Panzer Division, Kempf's army group, to cover the right flank of Hausser's 2nd Panzer Corps. That is, the offensive of the main strike force and the auxiliary along divergent lines began. This forced the enemy to enlist additional forces to cover his flanks from the point of impact. Such a tactic was conceived by the command of the Voronezh Front and perfectly implemented.

Since we are talking about the Soviet command, many will agree that both Vatutin and Rokossovsky - famous people, but the latter gained a reputation, or something, of a greater commander. Why? Some say that he fought better in the Battle of Kursk. But Vatutin, in general, did a lot, because he still fought with smaller forces, fewer numbers. Judging by the documents that are now open, it can be said with confidence that Nikolai Fedorovich very competently, very sensibly and skillfully planned his defensive operation, given that the main group, the most numerous, was advancing against his front (although it was expected from the north). And until the 9th, inclusive, when the situation turned around, when the Germans had already sent strike groups to the flanks to solve tactical problems, the troops of the Voronezh Front fought excellently, and management went, of course, very well. As for the next steps, the decisions of the front commander Vatutin were influenced by a number of subjective factors, including the role of the supreme commander.

Everyone remembers that Rotmistrov's tankers won a great victory on the tank field. However, before that, at the turn of the German attack, at the forefront, was the notorious Katukov, who, in general, took all the bitterness of the first blows upon himself. How did it happen? The fact is that the defense was built as follows: ahead, on the main line, were the troops of the 6th Guards Army, and it was assumed that the Germans, most likely, would strike along the Oboyan highway. And then they were supposed to be stopped by the tankers of the 1st Tank Army of Lieutenant General Mikhail Efimovich Katukov.

On the night of the 6th, they advanced to the second army line and almost in the morning took the main blow. By the middle of the day, Chistyakov's 6th Guards Army was divided into several parts, three divisions were dispersed, we suffered significant losses. And only thanks to the skill, skill and stamina of Mikhail Efimovich Katukov, the defense was held up to the 9th day inclusive.

Commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army N. F. Vatutin accepts the report of one of the unit commanders, 1943

It is known that after Stalingrad our army suffered huge losses, including among officers. I wonder how these losses were replenished in a fairly short period by the summer of 1943? Vatutin received the Voronezh Front in a very deplorable state. A number of divisions numbered two, three, four thousand. Replenishment was due to the call of the local population, which came out of the occupied territory, marching companies, as well as due to the replenishment arrived from the Central Asian republics.

As for the command staff, its shortage in the spring of 1942 was made up by officers from the academies, from the rear units, and so on. And after the battles near Stalingrad, the situation with the command staff of the tactical level, especially the commanders of battalions and regiments, was catastrophic. As a result, on October 9, the well-known order to abolish the commissars, and a significant part of the political staff was sent to the troops. That is, everything that can be done was done.

The Battle of Kursk is considered by many to be the largest defensive operation of the Great Patriotic War. Is it so? At the first stage, no doubt. No matter how we evaluate the battle in the Chernozem region now, it was after August 23, 1943, when it ended, that our enemy, the German army, was no longer able to conduct a single major strategic offensive operation within the army group. He simply had nothing to do with it. In the south, the situation was as follows: the Voronezh Front was given the task of exhausting the enemy forces and driving out his tanks. During the defensive period, until July 23, they could not do this completely. The Germans sent a significant part of the repair fund to repair bases, which were located not far from the front line. And after the troops of the Voronezh Front went on the offensive on August 3, all these bases were captured. In particular, in Borisovka there was a repair base of the 10th tank brigade. There, the Germans blew up part of the Panthers, up to forty units, we captured part. And at the end of August, Germany was no longer able to replenish all the tank divisions on the Eastern Front. And this task of the second stage of the Battle of Kursk during the counteroffensive - to knock out the tanks - was solved.

№1 Fill in the empty cells of the table using the data in the list below

1) M. A. Egorov, M. V. Kantaria 2) September 1941 - April 1942

3) Ya. F. Pavlov 4) Battle of Kursk

№2

Event

date

Member(s)

Operation "Bagration"

__________(A)

I. Kh. Bagramyan, I. D. Chernyakhovsky

Operation Overlord

__________(B)

__________(IN)

__________(G)

August-December 1943

G. K. Zhukov, I. S. KonevK. K. Rokossovsky

Battle for Moscow

__________(D)

__________(E)

1) M. A. Egorov, M. V. Kantaria 2) September 1941 - April 1942

3) D. Eisenhower 4) Battle of Kursk

№ 3. Fill in the empty cells of the table using the data presented in the list below.

1) November-December 1943 2) Vistula-Oder operation

5) I. V. Stalin, F. D. Roosevelt, W. Churchill 6) June-August 1944

7) August 9-September 2, 1945 8) I. S. Konev 9) Iasi-Kishinev operation

№ 4 Fill in the empty cells of the table using the data presented in the list below.

Event

Name of the settlement (territory)

Year

__________(A)

v. Prokhorovka

__________(B)

__________(IN)

Stalingrad

1942

The first air night ram during the Great Patriotic War

__________(G)

__________(D)

The first meeting of Soviet and American troops during the Great Patriotic War

__________(E)

1945

1) Torgau 2) 1943 3) Moscow and Moscow region 4) Budapest

5) the encirclement of the 6th German army under the command of F. Paulus 6) the first meeting of the leaders of the "Big Three" countries 7) 1941. 8) the largest tank battle during the Great Patriotic War 9) 1944

№5. What event of the Great Patriotic War is shown on the map.

№6. What military operation of the Great Patriotic War is marked on the map.

№7. Write the name of the city indicated on the diagram by the number "4".

№8. Indicate the name of the city, indicated on the diagram by the number "2", in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bwhich the troops of the two fronts of the Red Army united.