Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 Reasons for the start and defeat of the Russo-Japanese War: briefly. Translation by Evgenia Galimzyanova

The Russo-Japanese War showed Russia's failure not only in foreign policy, but also in the military sphere. A series of defeats caused irreparable damage to the authority of the authorities. Japan did not achieve a complete victory, having exhausted its resources, it was content with small concessions.

How was the Russo-Japanese War and its main stages? Russian soldiers showed courage, but could not defeat Japan in any way.

Earlier in the article we talked about some problems. In this article, we will consider the general course and results of the war.

Causes of the war

  • Russia's desire to gain a foothold on the "non-freezing seas" of China and Korea;
  • the desire of the leading powers to prevent the strengthening of Russia in the Far East. US and UK support for Japan;
  • Japan's desire to oust the Russian army from China and capture Korea;
  • Arms race in Japan. Increasing taxes for the sake of military production;
  • Japan's plans were to seize Russian territory from Primorsky Krai to the Urals.

The course of the war

January 27, 1904- near Port Arthur 3 Russian ships were pierced by Japanese torpedoes, which did not sink due to the heroism of the crews. The feat of Russian ships Varangian" And " Korean» near the port of Chemulpo (Incheon).


March 31, 1904- the death of an armadillo " Petropavlovsk"With the headquarters of Admiral Makarov and a crew of more than 630 people. The Pacific Fleet was beheaded.

May - December 1904- the heroic defense of the fortress of Port Arthur. The 50 thousandth Russian garrison, having 646 guns and 62 machine guns, repelled the attacks of the 200 thousandth army of the enemy. After the surrender of the fortress, about 32 thousand Russian soldiers were captured by the Japanese. The Japanese lost over 110,000 (according to other sources 91 thousand) soldiers and officers, 15 warships sank and 16 were destroyed.

August 1904- battle under Liaoyang. The Japanese lost more than 23 thousand soldiers, the Russians - more than 16 thousand. Uncertain outcome of the battle. General Kuropatkin gave the order to retreat, fearing encirclement.

September 1904- battle at Shahe river. The Japanese lost more than 30 thousand soldiers, the Russians - more than 40 thousand. Uncertain outcome of the battle. After that, a positional war was waged in Manchuria. In January 1905, a revolution raged in Russia, which made it difficult to wage a war to victory.

February 1905 - Battle of Mukden stretched for 100 km along the front and lasted 3 weeks. The Japanese launched an offensive earlier and confused the plans of the Russian command. Russian troops retreated, avoiding encirclement and losing more than 90 thousand. The Japanese lost over 72,000.

Other events of the Russo-Japanese War

The Japanese command recognized the underestimation of the strength of the enemy. Soldiers with weapons and provisions continued to arrive from Russia by rail. The war again took on a positional character.

May 1905- the tragedy of the Russian fleet off the Tsushima Islands. Admiral's ships Rozhdestvensky (30 combat, 6 transport and 2 hospital) traveled about 33 thousand km and immediately entered the battle. Nobody in the world could not defeat 121 enemy ships on 38 ships! Only the cruiser "Almaz", the destroyers "Brave" and "Grozny" broke through to Vladivostok (according to other sources, 4 ships were saved), the crews of the rest died as heroes or were captured. The Japanese were badly damaged 10 and 3 ships sank.

Until now, Russians, passing by the Tsushima Islands, lay wreaths on the water in memory of 5,000 dead Russian sailors.

The war was ending. The Russian army in Manchuria was growing and could continue the war for a long time. Japan's human and financial resources were depleted (old people and children have already been drafted into the army). Russia signed from a position of strength Treaty of Portsmouth in August 1905.


Russia withdrew troops from Manchuria, handed over to Japan the Liaodong Peninsula, the southern part of Sakhalin Island and money for the maintenance of prisoners. This failure of Japanese diplomacy caused riots in Tokyo.

After the war, Japan's external public debt grew 4 times, Russia's by 1/3.

Japan lost more than 85 thousand killed, Russia more than 50 thousand.

More than 38 thousand soldiers died from wounds in Japan, more than 17 thousand in Russia.

The Russo-Japanese War was lost by Russia. The reasons were economic and military backwardness, weakness of intelligence and command, the great remoteness and stretching of the theater of operations, poor supply, and weak interaction between the army and navy. In addition, the Russian people did not understand why it was necessary to fight in distant Manchuria. The revolution of 1905-1907 further weakened Russia.

Will the right conclusions be drawn? To be continued.

The article briefly tells about the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. This war became one of the most shameful in Russian history. The expectation of a "small victorious war" turned into a disaster.

  1. Introduction
  2. Course of the Russo-Japanese War
  3. Results of the Russo-Japanese War

Causes of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905

  • The main prerequisite for the outbreak of war was the growth of imperialist contradictions at the turn of the century. The European powers sought to partition China. Russia, which did not have colonies in other parts of the world, was interested in the maximum penetration of its capital into China and Korea. This desire went against the plans of Japan. The rapidly developing Japanese industry also demanded the capture of new territories for the allocation of capital.
  • The Russian government did not take into account the increased combat capability of the Japanese army. In the event of a quick and decisive victory, it was planned to significantly reduce the revolutionary mood in the country. The Japanese elite relied on chauvinistic sentiments in society. It was planned to create a Greater Japan through territorial seizures.

Course of the Russo-Japanese War

  • At the end of January 1904, the Japanese attacked Russian ships based in Port Arthur without declaring war. And already in June, the successful actions of the Japanese led to the complete defeat of the Russian Pacific squadron. The Baltic fleet sent to help (the 2nd squadron), after a six-month transition, was utterly defeated by Japan in the Battle of Tsushima (May 1905). Sending the 3rd squadron became meaningless. Russia has lost the main trump card in its strategic plans. The defeat was the result of an underestimation of the Japanese fleet, which consisted of the latest warships. The reasons were the insufficient training of Russian sailors, obsolete Russian warships at that time, defective ammunition.
  • In military operations on land, Russia also found itself significantly behind in many respects. The General Staff did not take into account the experience recent wars. Military science adhered to outdated concepts and principles of the era of the Napoleonic Wars. It was assumed the accumulation of the main forces, followed by a massive blow. The Japanese strategy, led by foreign advisers, relied on the development of maneuver operations.
  • The Russian command under the leadership of General Kuropatkin acted passively and indecisively. The Russian army suffered its first defeat near Liaoyang. By June 1904, Port Arthur was surrounded. The defense held out for six months, which can be regarded as the only Russian success in the entire war. In December, the port was surrendered to the Japanese. The decisive battle on land was the so-called "Mukden meat grinder" (February 1905), as a result of which the Russian army was practically surrounded, but managed to retreat at the cost of heavy losses. Russian losses amounted to about 120 thousand people. This failure, together with the Tsushima tragedy, showed the futility of further military operations. The situation was complicated by the fact that the "victorious war" caused a revolution in Russia itself.
  • It was the revolution that had begun and the unpopularity of the war in society that forced Russia to enter into peace negotiations. The Japanese economy was significantly damaged by the war. Japan was inferior to Russia both in terms of the number of armed forces and material capabilities. Even a successful continuation of the war would lead Japan to an economic crisis. Therefore, Japan, having won a number of spectacular victories, was content with this and also sought to conclude a peace treaty.

Results of the Russo-Japanese War

  • In August 1905, the Peace of Portsmouth was concluded, containing humiliating conditions for Russia. Japan included South Sakhalin, Korea, Port Arthur. The Japanese gained control of Manchuria. Russia's authority on the world stage has been greatly undermined. Japan has demonstrated that its army is combat-ready and armed with the latest technology.
  • In general, Russia was forced to abandon active operations in the Far East.

Introduction

Conclusion

Bibliographic list

Application


Introduction


At the end of the 19th century, the struggle between two great powers, Japan and Russia, intensified in the Far East. Tsarist Russia showed an increased interest in Korea. The Romanovs were personally interested in the huge "wealth" of Korea, which they wanted to turn to their own advantage. The diplomatic activity of Russia in relation to China led to the fact that an alliance treaty was concluded, according to which Russia received the right to build the Chinese Eastern Railway. By this, Russia strengthened its position in China. In addition, Russia leased the Kwantung Peninsula from China with Port Arthur for a period of 25 years. It becomes the main base of the Russian navy.

Japan reacted negatively to Russian penetration into the Chinese and Korean economies. The largest concerns of Japan considered their sales markets - China and Korea. Being an economically developed country, Japan was active in the Far East.

Japan fought for the redivision of the world. Russia contradicted the interests of Japan, and Japan began to intensively prepare for war with the help of England and the United States, who were afraid of the strengthening of Russia. And Russia treated Japan arrogantly.

The relevance of the work is determined by the similarity of the transitional period that developed in Russia at the beginning of the 20th and 21st centuries. At this time, many researchers, scientists, efforts and interest in Russian history, because without knowledge of the history of their country, stable development of the state is impossible.

The purpose of this work is an attempt to analyze the significance, features of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. in order to identify its influence on the further development of Russian statehood.

To achieve this goal, it is necessary to consider the following tasks:

· consider the causes and prerequisites for the outbreak of war;

· analyze the course of hostilities during the war;

· find out why Russia was defeated in the war with Japan.

The object of study of this course work are the consequences of the policy pursued by the country, which led to the loss of the war.

The subject of research in this work is the key events of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, their role and place in the history of Russia.

In this term paper many sources on this topic were used, such as: Zolotukhin A.P. "History of the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905." - the beginning of the war was taken from this source, with what goals it began and the course of hostilities during the war; Shirokrad A.B. "The Fall of Port Arthur" - this book helped to figure out how Japan was preparing for war. Article Balakin V.I. "Causes and Consequences of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905." - with the help of this article, the reasons for the defeat of Russia and the further state of Russia after the war were clarified.

The practical significance of this course work lies in the fact that these materials can be used both in theoretical and practical classes in the discipline: "History".

The structure of work includes:

Introduction, 3 sections, conclusion, bibliography, appendices. The total amount of work was 23 pages.

russian japanese war treaty

1. Causes and prerequisites for the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.


1.1 The balance of forces of the parties before the start of the war


The words of the Minister of Internal Affairs of Russia V.K. Plehve: "To keep the revolution, we need a small victorious war." There was some truth in these words: a revolution in Russia had been brewing for a long time, and a victorious war could hold back the revolution and bring defeat in the war closer. But the situation developed differently than the autocracy would have liked. The unsuccessful Russo-Japanese War spurred the revolution, and in turn the revolution hastened the defeat of Russia.

Japan was ready for war, had everything necessary to attack Russia first and win the war. For Russia, this was an unexpected step on the part of the Japanese, and of course, she was not initially ready for war.


1.2 Prepare Japan for war


In 1895, the Japanese government, immediately after the end of the war with China, adopted the first program to strengthen its fleet. Japan planned to start building ships of all classes, and first of all, squadron battleships, armored cruisers and destroyers, designed to conduct active offensive operations. Since the Japanese shipbuilding industry was not yet sufficiently developed, the government placed orders for the construction of ships under the 1895 program abroad.

In 1896, the Japanese government, considering the shipbuilding program of 1895 insufficient, additionally adopted a 10-year program that provided for the construction of mainly cruisers and a significant number of destroyers, as well as the equipment of naval bases and ports designed to ensure the combat activities of the Japanese fleet in the Yellow and Japan seas.

The third shipbuilding program was adopted at a special meeting of the Japanese Parliament in June 1903 on February 2, 1904, i.e. Just before the start of the war, the Japanese government signed contracts in London with the firms of Vickers and Armstrong for the supply of 2 squadron battleships "Kashima" and "Katori" with a displacement of 16,400 tons each.

"Kashima" was laid down on February 29, 1904 at the Armstrong shipyard in Elsvin, and "Katori" on February 27, 1904 at the Vickers shipyard in Barrow. The battleships were launched on March 22, 1905 and July 4, 1905, respectively. They entered service at the same time - May 23, 1906.

As you can see, neutral England did not give a damn about all international laws and agreements and literally at a frantic pace, in less than a year and a half, commissioned two of the most powerful battleships.

In 1900-1904. significantly increased the power of the Japanese army. It was completed on the basis of the law on universal military service, which applied to persons aged 17 to 40 years. The service of Japanese citizens was divided into real, first-class reserve, second-class reserve (territorial troops) and militia. Since in peacetime the contingent of conscription exceeded the need, recruitment into the army was carried out by lot. Active service in the army lasted three years, and in the navy - four. Then the soldier was enrolled in the reserve of the first category, after four years and four months - in the reserve of the second category, and after another five years - in the militia.

Much attention in Japan was paid to the training of officers. The officers, continuing the samurai traditions, considered themselves as the main stronghold of the empire, as the bearer of the idea of ​​"great Japan", the "exclusivity" of the Japanese nation.

According to the imperial rescript, the officer directly carries out the will of the emperor in the army, treats his subordinates in the same way as the emperor treats his people, and his order is an imperial order, and disobedience is regarded as disobedience to the will of the emperor.

On the basis of the principle of complete obedience to the will of the commander and the strict observance of the order of the officer, the Japanese soldier was brought up. This type of fanatic soldier was glorified by the Japanese press, his valor was sung, and military service was regarded as a great honor, not being compared with any profession. As a rule, the speeches of the leading statesmen of Japan, the throne or anniversary speeches of the representatives of the imperial house could not do without glorification of the army and navy. No holiday was celebrated more magnificently than the Day of the Army and Navy, no one was seen off so solemnly as the soldiers going to the front. Songs were composed about officers and generals, they were given the most honorable places at religious and secular ceremonies.

In order to create the appearance of social closeness of soldiers and officers, promotion and appointment to officer positions of the middle and especially the lower rank of soldiers - peasants who distinguished themselves in the service.

The highest tactical formation of the Japanese army was a division. It was envisaged to create an army in wartime. Before the start of the Russo-Japanese War, three armies appeared in Japan.

The division consisted of two infantry brigades of two regiments each, a regiment of three battalions, and a battalion of four companies. The division had one cavalry regiment of three squadrons and an artillery regiment of two divisions (each division had three six-gun batteries). The division also had a sapper and convoy battalions.

The Guards and the First Capital Divisions were organized in a special way. Each of them included a cavalry brigade, the brigade had two regiments of five squadrons each, an artillery brigade, composed of three regiments of two divisions each (each division had three six-gun batteries). Army artillery was formed from allocated divisions and batteries that were part of the divisions. In wartime, each division was given parts of the reinforcement. A wartime company had a staff of 217 people, a sapper company - 220 people, a field battery - six 75-mm guns, 150 soldiers and officers.

On the eve of the war, Japan began to deploy the army according to the wartime plan. However, to enhance active troops the wartime staff provided for the formation of 52 reserve infantry battalions and 52 reserve batteries (312 guns), and to make up for the loss in active artillery - 19 spare batteries (114 guns) of field artillery.

Conclusion: From the above, we can conclude that Japan was ready for war earlier and had all the necessary weapons, it was helped by developed countries such as England and the United States.


1.3 Russia's preparation for war


The gradual concentration of Russian troops in the Far East began long before the war. Britain's predatory policy in the Far East, which ran counter to the interests of Russian capital, compelled the tsarist government as early as 1885 to reinforce its troops in the Siberian frontier districts. Further strengthening followed in 1887 in connection with the then-imminent conflict between Japan and China. This reinforcement was recognized as necessary "in order not to remain a passive spectator of events and to be able to defend one's interests."

At the same time, "protection" of their interests was conceived in the form of the capture of Northern Manchuria. At the same time, it was recognized as necessary to strengthen the Pacific Fleet. Large funds were allocated to strengthen armaments in the Far East.

The tsarist troops stationed in the Far East were brought to wartime states, and by the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war their number had increased to 30,500 men and 74 guns. The bulk of the troops were the Cossack cavalry.

In anticipation of the intervention in the Shimonoseki treaty, the border districts were reinforced by various formations and mainly by artillery. The Amur Governor-General Dukhovsky was instructed to carry out a number of measures aimed at strengthening local formations and strengthening Vladivostok, Nikolaevsk and Sakhalin. At the same time, Dukhovskoy especially insisted on the formation of units in European Russia from old-time soldiers, since the recruitment of units in Siberia could be carried out mainly at the expense of recruits, who, according to Dukhovskoy, were "the most dangerous politically."

Due to the difficult financial situation, Russia was able to fully carry out measures to strengthen troops in the Far East only in relation to the Amur District. The rest of the activities were scheduled for several years, with fortification work and the development of engineering defense of the Pacific coast for recent years large sums were allocated before the war.

The slowness in preparing for a war in the Far East is partly due to the tsarist government's confidence that the Far East problem would find its solution in a war on the western frontier. The attention of tsarism was not promptly switched from West to East, as a result of which by 1898 the number of troops in the Far East reached only 60,000 people and 126 guns.

The difficult financial condition of tsarist Russia, the rudimentary state of the engineering training of the theater of war, the sparsely populated and impassable roads of the region, as well as the lack of barracks, delayed the concentration of troops in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, accelerated the pace of its armaments and was in a hurry to start a war before the completion of the construction of the Circum-Baikal railway branch by the Russians.

In 1898, when, with the seizure of the Kwantung Peninsula by Russia, relations between Russia and Japan became even more aggravated, a plan was drawn up to strengthen the Russian army in the Far East, providing for the accumulation of 90,000 people and 184 guns by 1903, while the Japanese army by this time , according to the initial assumptions of the Russians, was to increase to 394,000 people and 1014 guns.

The tsarist government was forced to think about accelerating the pace of accumulation of troops in the Far East. This was facilitated by the war against the Chinese popular uprising in 1900-1901, which caused a significant transfer of troops from European Russia, as well as the creation of a number of new formations and the reorganization of units located in the Far East.

The tense situation in the Far East required further strengthening of the Russian army, and the governor Alekseev from the center was ordered "to put our combat readiness in the Far East in full balance with our political and economic tasks in the shortest possible time and without stopping at the necessary expenses." This prescription required the creation of two new corps with a total number of at least 50,000 people, with their concentration in the area of ​​​​the proposed Japanese landing. Strengthening was achieved not by sending organized units from European Russia, but by reorganizing local troops with the inclusion of individual groups soldiers sent from European Russia.

It was decided to transfer two divisions and one brigade to the Kwantung District, as well as to strengthen Port Arthur and Vladivostok. Port Arthur received fortress infantry and fortress artillery. Under the pretext of testing the Siberian railway in 1903, two infantry brigades (10th and 17th corps) with artillery were transferred to the Far East. These brigades were not equipped with sufficient baggage, and therefore were not fully capable of campaigning. The troops on Sakhalin Island were also reinforced. The cavalry was kept in European Russia in case of war in the West and the suppression of the revolution. In addition, it was recognized as impossible to use large horse masses in the highlands of Manchuria. It was decided to limit the Cossack cavalry in Manchuria, located in the border areas.

Thus, by the beginning of the war, Russia had 98,000 men and 272 guns in the Far East in addition to 24,000 men and 48 guard guard guns.

The war found the troops in a period of reorganization: two-battalion regiments were deployed into three-battalion ones, and brigades were deployed into divisions.

The engineering preparation of the theater proceeded just as slowly.

The question of strengthening the proposed theater of war was raised only when the inevitability of the imminent outbreak of war with Japan became obvious. The main attention was paid to strengthening the fortresses of Port Arthur and Vladivostok, as well as to the construction of some fortifications in the possible operational directions of the future enemy. The isolated position of Port Arthur required its serious strengthening, which would give the fortress the opportunity to hold out for a more or less long time in anticipation of the proceeds.

The project for the fortifications of Port Arthur of the first stage provided for a two-year construction period, but various circumstances (the Chinese popular uprising of 1900, during which the Chinese workers fled, the cholera epidemic) slowed down the start of work. Started work moved sluggishly.

From 1903, the work was carried out more successfully, but it was already too late: the program for the construction of the Port Arthur fortress was not completed, just like the program for the construction of fortifications on the Jinzhou Isthmus.

As for Vladivostok, by the beginning of the war it was to some extent secured from an accelerated attack.

Within the country, tsarism was unable to secure a firm footing for itself. Dissatisfaction with the autocracy grew.

In area foreign policy The tsarist government managed to achieve some success. By strengthening the alliance with France, Russia achieved a partial re-equipment of its artillery with the best models of guns, but absolutely nothing was done to organize the production of machine guns. The trade agreement with Germany unleashed the hands of tsarism and allowed for the transfer of troops from the western border to the east. China declared its neutrality. However, the presence of troops of the Chinese generals Yuan Shih-kai and Ma behind the Pechili border required the Russians to strengthen the right flank of the deployment to the detriment of the grouping in the most important eastern sector of the theatre.

As for occupied Manchuria, it must be said that the police regime and the cruel exploitation of the Chinese population caused a hostile attitude on the part of the latter, which also affected the actions of the Russian army.

Conclusion: Thus, neither militarily nor politically, tsarist Russia was ready for war.

2. The course of hostilities during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.


2.1 The course of hostilities during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904


On the eve of the war, Japan had a relatively small, but well-trained and equipped with the latest weapons personnel army and navy. Russia kept only 100 thousand people in the Far East. on the territory from Lake Baikal to Port Arthur. The Russian fleet had 63 ships, many of which were obsolete.

The Russian war plan was based on the idea of ​​gaining time for the concentration and deployment of forces in the Liaoyang region. For this, part of the troops was supposed to hold back the advance of the Japanese army, gradually retreating to the north, as well as to hold the fortress of Port Arthur. Subsequently, it was planned to go on the general offensive, defeat the Japanese army and land on the Japanese islands. The fleet was tasked with seizing dominance at sea and preventing the landing of Japanese troops on the mainland.

The Japanese strategic plan provided for seizing supremacy at sea by a surprise attack and destruction of the Port Arthur squadron, then landing troops in Korea and South Manchuria, capturing Port Arthur and defeating the main forces of the Russian army in the Liaoyang area. In the future, it was supposed to occupy Manchuria, the Ussuri and Primorsky Territories.

Japan, despite concessions to Russia, January 24, 1904 severed diplomatic relations. On the night of January 27, Japanese destroyers, taking advantage of the carelessness of the Russian command, suddenly attacked the Russian squadron, stationed on the outer roads of Port Arthur. Japan declared war on Russia.

day of the same date large group Japanese cruisers and destroyers were blocked in the Korean port by the Russian cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Koreets . Our ships, in battle with superior enemy forces, still could not make their way into the ocean. Not wanting to surrender to the enemy, the Varyag cruiser was sunk, and the Korean was blown up.

Only with the arrival in February 1904 in Port Arthur of Admiral S.O. Makarov's defense of the naval base was thoroughly strengthened, and the remaining ships of the squadron greatly increased their combat capability. But, on March 31, the battleship Petropavlovsk , on which Makarov S.O. was, hit a mine and sank in a matter of minutes. The fleet remaining in Port Arthur switched to passive defense.

In early February, units of the 60,000th Japanese 1st Army landed in Korea and in mid-April started fighting in southern Manchuria with the Russians of the 20,000th eastern detachment of the Manchurian army. Under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, our troops retreated, which gave the Japanese the opportunity, having landed another landing, already in southern Manchuria, to attack the Russian fortifications and capture Jingzhou, thereby cutting off Port Arthur from the land army. And in mid-May, the 3rd Japanese army, created to capture Port Arthur, landed in Talienvan Bay.

The 1st Siberian Corps, sent to help Port Arthur, after an unsuccessful battle at Vafangou with superior forces of the 2nd Japanese Army, was forced to retreat to the north.

In July, the Russian squadron attempted to break through from Port Arthur to Vladivostok. In the Yellow Sea there was a battle with the squadron of Admiral Togo. Both squadrons suffered serious damage. During the battle, Rear Admiral Witteft and almost his entire staff were killed. As a result of the ensuing confusion of orders, the Russian ships randomly retreated, some broke into the ports of foreign states and were interned there.

The ships of the Vladivostok squadron were active throughout the war, made daring raids on the coast of Japan, and sank ships with strategic military cargo. The cruisers of the Vladivostok detachment were sent to meet the breaking through 1st Pacific squadron, but in the Korean Strait they engaged in battle with the squadron of Admiral Kamimura. In a fierce battle, the cruiser Rurik was sunk.

The Japanese navy fulfilled its task and secured dominance at sea and the unhindered transfer of troops to the mainland.

In August 1904, General Kuropatkin began to pull his strike units back to Liaoyang - where the 3 Japanese armies advancing from the coast, Vyfangou and from Korea were supposed to meet. On August 25, 1904, a major battle began at Liaoyang, which was notable for its particular bloodshed. The forces of the Japanese army amounted to 125 thousand against 158 ​​thousand Russians. No decisive results were ultimately achieved; the Japanese lost 23 thousand, and the Russians - 19 thousand people, and despite the successful actions of the Russian troops, Kuropatkin considered himself defeated and began a systematic, well-organized retreat north to the Shahe River.

Having increased his army to 200 thousand people, General Kuropatkin, not having a sufficiently clear plan of action, launched an offensive against the 170 thousandth troops of Marshal Oyama. On October 5-17, 1904, a counter battle took place on the Shahe River, which ended in vain. Both sides suffered heavy losses and, having exhausted their offensive capabilities, went on the defensive. Here, for the first time, a continuous front over 60 km long was formed.

Strategically, Oyama won the decisive operation, frustrating the last Russian attempt to relieve Port Arthur. But still, the balance of power began to take shape in favor of the Russians and the position of the Japanese army became difficult. In this regard, the Japanese made attempts to capture Port Arthur as soon as possible.

The struggle for Port Arthur began at the end of July 1904, when the Japanese army, which landed on the Liaodong Peninsula, approached the outer contours of the fortress. On August 6, the first assault began, lasting 5 days, ending in the defeat of the Japanese. The Japanese army was forced to proceed to a long-term siege of the fortress. Until September, when the second assault began, siege work was carried out and the enemy artillery regiment was replenished with siege howitzers. In turn, the defenders of Port Arthur improved defensive structures.

A stubborn struggle unfolded for the dominant heights, which were of great importance in the defense system of the fortress. After fierce fighting, the Japanese managed to capture Mount Long. Attacks on Mount Vysokaya ended in vain. This ended the second assault on the fortress. On October 17, after a 3-day artillery preparation, the Japanese carried out the third assault on the fortress, which lasted 3 days. All enemy attacks were repulsed by Russian troops with huge losses for him. On November 13, Japanese troops (over 50 thousand people) launched a fourth assault. They were courageously resisted by the Russian garrison, which by this time numbered 18 thousand people. Especially heavy fighting took place behind the High Mountain, which fell on November 22. Having occupied Mount Vysokaya, the enemy began shelling the city and the harbor with howitzers. In November, most of the battleships and cruisers sank.

The siege of the fortress lasted almost eight months. The combat-ready units still held the defense, 610 guns could shoot, there were enough shells and products, no more than 20 out of 59 fortified knots of the fortress were lost. But the general strategic situation in other sectors of the front by this time was clearly not in favor of the Russian troops. And due to the cowardice of General Stessel and the new head of the land defense, General A.V. Fock December 20, 1904 Port Arthur was surrendered to the Japanese.

Conclusion: As a result of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, Port Arthur was surrendered to the Japanese.


2.2 The course of hostilities during the Russo-Japanese War in 1905


The city was not successful for the Russian army, Russia lost the military base of Port Arthur.

Taking advantage of the respite in the battles, Kuropatkin A.R. reorganized the troops and increased the total number of his troops to 300 thousand and on January 25-28, 1905 launched a new offensive, trying to crush all 3 armies of Marshal Oyama (total number of 220 thousand). The most stubborn fighting took place in the area of ​​the village of Sandepu. The offensive was carried out by units of only the 2nd Russian army, the Japanese command pulled up reserves, as a result, the advance of the Russian troops was stopped. Private successes were not developed and the armies withdrew to their original lines.

And on February 19, 1905, the Japanese army itself launched a counteroffensive. The well-known in history battle of Mukden unfolded, which lasted until February 25. And although the forces of the Russian troops amounted to 330 thousand people against 270 thousand Japanese, the Russian troops could not achieve victory in the battle. Both military groupings, dug in, met each other on a line 65 km long. And although after two weeks of fierce battles, the Japanese soldiers entered Mukden, Oyama's attempt to surround the Russians was not successful. During the battle, the right flank of the Russians was thrown back so far that Kuropatkin had no choice but to withdraw from the battle and retreat to the Sypin positions, defeated, but not put to flight.

The Russian army had not experienced such a defeat for a long time, although during the hostilities it inflicted quite significant damage on the Japanese army and bled it so much that they could not organize the pursuit of the Russian troops.

Operation near Mukden completed fighting on the Manchurian front. As a result of the entire land campaign, Japan was able to retain almost the entire southern part of Manchuria. The Japanese victory was significant, but not so impressive as to force Russia to immediately make peace.

The last headquarters of the tsarist government were the newly formed 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons sent from the Baltic to the Far East in October 1904. The 2nd Pacific squadron of Rozhdestvensky, in 7 months of an unprecedented campaign for that time, having overcome over 18,000 miles in May 1905, approached the Korea Strait. In its narrowest part, between the islands of Tsushima and Iki, the squadron was already waiting for Japanese ships deployed for battle under the command of Admiral Togo.

The Tsushima battle began on May 27, 1905. The Japanese concentrated all their firepower on the leading Russian battleships. Russian ships courageously fought back, inflicting significant damage to Japanese ships. Admiral Rozhdestvensky was seriously wounded. The forces were not equal and the Russian squadron lost control, the formation broke up and the battle broke up into duels between individual Russian ships with superior enemy forces. The battle continued into the sunset. At night, attacks by Japanese destroyers inflicted particularly heavy damage on the Russian squadron. As a result of day and night fighting, the Russian squadron ceased to exist as an organized, combat-ready force. Most of the squadron's ships were sunk. Some were forced to surrender to superior enemy forces. 1 destroyer and 3 cruisers went to foreign ports and were interned there. Only 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers broke through to Vladivostok.

As a result of the Tsushima battle, the Russian squadron lost over 5 thousand people killed. 27 warships were sunk, surrendered and interned. The Japanese squadron also suffered losses, but they were much smaller.

In the land theater of operations, after Mukden, there were practically no active hostilities.

Conclusion: In 1905, there was the Mukden battle, in which the Russian troops were defeated. Russia was in no hurry to make peace with Japan, because it still hoped for the strength of its army.


3. Treaty of Portsmouth


3.1 The results and significance of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905


In the course of the armed struggle in the land and sea theaters, Japan achieved major successes. But despite the victories won, the morale of the Japanese troops gradually weakened. Immediately after the Battle of Tsushima, Japan turned to the United States with a request for peace mediation. The American ambassador in St. Petersburg was instructed to persuade Russia to negotiate.

July 1905 in Portsmouth (USA) opened a peace conference. Negotiations began in favorable conditions for Japan. Before the opening of the conference, the Anglo-American imperialists agreed with Japan on delimiting spheres of influence in the Far East. Only the firm position of the delegation forced Japan to moderate its demands. In view of the depletion of its resources, Japan was afraid of the resumption of hostilities and therefore was forced to refuse indemnities and be content with the southern part of Sakhalin.

The peace treaty signed on August 23, 1905 recognized Korea as a sphere of Japanese interests. Both sides pledged to withdraw their troops from Manchuria, Russia ceded Port Arthur and the railway to Changchun station. Part of Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel passed into the possession of Japan. Russia undertook to give the Japanese the right to fish along the Russian shores in the Sea of ​​Japan, the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, and the Bering Sea.

The bitter experience of the Russian-Japanese war was taken into account in the reorganization of the army and navy, which was carried out in 1908-1910.

The war brought the peoples of Russia and Japan a deterioration in their financial situation, an increase in taxes and prices. State debt Japan increased by 4 times, its losses amounted to 135 thousand killed and died from wounds and diseases and about 554 thousand wounded and sick. Russia spent 2347 million rubles on the war, about 500 million rubles were lost in the form of property that went to Japan and sunk ships and vessels. Russia's losses amounted to 400 thousand killed, wounded, sick and captured.

And yet, victory in the war with Russia brought significant economic benefits to Japan. After the Russo-Japanese War, when Japan became the de facto master of South Manchuria, capturing the Chinese region developed by Russian efforts, the Chinese population in this region experienced all the "charms" of the occupation regime, turning on their own land into "second-class" people and cheap labor . However, despite the defeat in the war, Russia remained a serious military and political force, which was difficult for the Japanese government to ignore. But the victory in the war inflamed the ambitions of the then Japanese elite and, as a result, led Japan to a crushing defeat and a national catastrophe, but already in the Second World War.

From the standpoint of today, the sophisticated propaganda of the then Japanese government looks especially cynical, about the desire to "save China from enslavement by the Western powers", but in fact, hatching strategic plans to destroy the existing infrastructure of Russian support for the integrity of the Chinese states. In practice, immediately after, under the terms of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, Japan introduced a strict colonial regime and began to create a military foothold for the occupation of all of Manchuria and the further seizure of the interior provinces of China.

For Russia, historically more significant than economic and human losses was the beginning of the first Russian revolution, the onset of which accelerated the defeat in the war. The main result was that the war pushed Russia onto the path of transformation and further revolutionary changes, exacerbating many of the problems and contradictions inherent in autocratic power.

Reasons for the defeat of Russia:

All the numerous reasons for the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. can be classified into three main groups:

reasons emanating from the nationwide system and the situation within the country;

reasons depending on the low level of military organization;

additional reasons.

The internal situation in the country

Russia had enough forces and means to win the war even after the disasters of Port Arthur, Mukden and Tsushima. The country's military and material resources were enormous, especially since it was only towards the end of the war that the rusty state and military mechanism was reorganized on a military footing. If the war had continued for another year or two, then Russia would have had the opportunity to reduce the war to at least a draw. However, the tsarist government was interested in the speedy conclusion of peace. The main reason for this was the revolution that had begun in the country. That's why State Council decided to conclude peace as soon as possible, even in such unfavorable conditions, in order to untie the hands of the government to fight the first bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1905-07 that had begun.

When peasant unrest, protests of the proletariat take place in the country, anti-government sentiments grow in the army and the whole society, and even armed uprisings occur in cities, in such conditions the government has no other choice but to stop the external war as soon as possible and direct all its forces to resolving the situation. inside the country.

In 1905 Russia was a knot of contradictions. In the field of social class relations, the most acute were the agrarian question, the position of the working class, and the national question of the peoples of the empire. In the political sphere, there is a contradiction between the government and the emerging civil society. Russia remained the only one of the major capitalist powers that had neither a parliament, nor legal political parties, nor the legal freedoms of citizens. Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War exposed its technical and economic backwardness compared to the advanced countries, and in the face of growing confrontation between the groupings of imperialist states, such a lag was fraught with the most serious consequences.

Most researchers of the theme of the Russian-Japanese war, starting with V.I. Lenin, who described the defeat in the war as the military collapse of tsarism, saw the root cause of the nominal defeat in the state system, in the Russian autocracy. Indeed, tsarism created bad generals, ruined the army, controlled the external and domestic policy. But after all, the centuries-old history of autocracy in Rus' also knew brilliant victories.5

Conclusion: Thus, the contradictions between the needs of the country's development and the inability to provide it in the conditions of autocratic Russia became more and more irreconcilable. In the autumn-winter of 1905, the whole society began to move. At this time, various streams of the revolutionary and liberal movements merged. The first Russian revolution of 1905-07 began.

Conclusion


In the course work, many reasons were considered that led to the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. The root causes were the reactionary and incapacity of tsarism and the high military command, the unpopularity of the war among the people, the army's poor readiness for military operations, insufficient material and technical support, and so on.

There are many reasons. These are purely military, and economic, and political, and social. And each of these reasons individually, and even in a group, would not have led Russia to that tragedy. The history of our country knows many cases when victories were won with "stupid" generals, and with unusable weapons, and with the opposition of many countries, and in times of revolutions and crises. In any difficult and unfavorable conditions, victory was still possible. But in that war, a huge variety of factors like a mosaic formed into a single picture. But then the question arises why all these factors were formed in one place and at one time. Simple enum historical facts and even their analysis does not give us an answer. Was it a fatal coincidence, an accident? Or in that chain of events, you can trace some kind of pattern. But one pattern is striking - all events led to defeat, and everything conducive to victory was destroyed, whether it was the death of progressive commanders or problems with weapons, the aggravation of the foreign policy situation or the heating of the situation inside the country. And there is only one conclusion - if events lead to defeat, then this defeat is necessary. What happened in Russia in the national consciousness by the beginning of the 20th century. Despite the fact that both culture and society continued to live and develop, something important began to disappear from the national consciousness, something that is more significant than culture and education - a certain system of values, spirituality began to degenerate. And it was the internal degradation of the people that created the autocratic system, a weak tsar, stupid generals, an inert system of power, oppression of the people, and so on. And no reforms could help here and fundamentally change something. That is why Stolypin's reforms failed, a revolutionary situation was aggravated, military defeats took place, all this happened in order to cause a concussion of the whole society, so that something would change in self-consciousness. Development does not always go straight up, very often shocks, crises, disasters are needed to realize something important.

So, the events of 1904-1905. only links in a large chain of events in the history of our country. Russia was defeated in the Russo-Japanese War, because. it was necessary for the whole country to get out of the decline of national consciousness, in which Russia found itself by the beginning of the 20th century.

Bibliographic list


1. Balakin V.I. Causes and consequences of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. // "New and recent history"2004 N 6

Vinogradsky A.N. Japanese-Russian war. Causes, theater of war and means of the parties. SPb., 1904, p.3.

Zolotukhin A.P. History of the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 M. 1980

Levitsky N.A. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 M., 2003

International relationships in the Far East. M., Politizdat. 1991

Minutes of the Portsmouth Peace Conference and the text of the agreement between Russia and Japan, concluded in Portsmouth on August 23 (September 5), 1905. St. Petersburg, 1906, p.101-104.

Fedorov A. History Russia XIX early XX I.M., 1975

Shirokorad A.B. Fall of Port Arthur. Publishing house AS Moscow 2003 ERMAK, p. 184-191.

Application


Annex A


Table the balance of forces of the parties before the start of the war.

Russian squadron Pacific Ocean in Port Arthur Japanese Combined Fleet Squadron battleships 7 6 Armored cruisers 1 6 Large armored cruisers (over 4000 tons) 4 4 Small armored cruisers 2 4 Mine cruisers (advisos and minelayers) 4 2 Seagoing gunboats 7 2 Fighters (destroyers) 22 19 Destroyers - 16 Artillery: 12" 20 24 10" 8 - 8" 10* 30 6" 136 184 120 mm 13 43

* Including 4 9" (229mm) guns on gunboats

Annex B


Tables of ships, rifles and cannons of the Japanese army.


Ships built for Japan overseas

Class of shipsQuantityConstruction siteSquadron battleships4England1st class armored cruisers6England, FranceUnarmored cruisers5England, USAMine cruisers3JapanMine fighters (destroyers) 11EnglandDestroyers with displacement over 100 tons23France, GermanyDestroyers with displacement over 800 tons31France, GermanyJapanDestroyers35

Comparative data of rifles

Rifle data Murat (Mod. 1889) Arisak (Mod. 1897) Mosin (Mod. 1891) Caliber, mm 86.57.62 Rifle length, mm with bayonet 149016601734 without bayonet 121012701306 Barrel length, mm 750800800 Rifle weight, kg. with a bayonet ... 4.34 without a bayonet 3.913.94.3 Number of cartridges in the magazine 855 Initial speed, m / s. …704860Sighting range, m. …24002200

Japanese cannon data

Gun data Field Mountain Caliber, mm7575 Barrel length, mm/klb2200/29.31000/13.3 Threaded part length, mm1857800 Barrel weight with bolt, mm32799 VN angle, deg. -5; +28-140; +33Angle GN, deg. Both guns do not have a swivel mechanismHeight of the line of fire, mm. 700500Stroke width, mm1300700Wheel diameter, mm14001000System weight, kg in combat position880328 in stowed position with limber1640360Rate of fire, rds. /min 33


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Main events, causes, dates, results, course of the war

Event: Japan attacked Russian ships in Port Arthur without declaring war. Japanese siege of Port Arthur begins

Causes: Japan sought dominance in Korea and Manchuria

Results: the beginning of the war

Event: battle of Liaoyang

Causes: the Russians planned to give a decisive rebuff to the Japanese

Results: The battle ended in nothing, only fairly battered the forces of both sides

Event: after a long siege and heroic defense, Port Arthur is taken

Causes: the command allowed Port Arthur to be cut off from communication with Russia and did not give him proper support

Results: the entire Russian squadron died in Port Arthur

Event: battle of Sandepu

Causes: the Russians tried to attack and resist the advance of the Japanese

Results: the Russians suffered more damage than the Japanese and retreated

Event: colossal pitched battle at Mukden (land)

Causes: attempt by both armies to attack

Results: Japanese victory

Event: Tsushima Naval Battle (Tsushima)

Causes: Russia transferred reinforcements from the Baltic Fleet. However, the remoteness of the Russian troops from the center of the country, poor communication, the low attention of the highest ranks to this war and the technical lag behind the Japanese played their role.

Results: impressive Japanese victory. The tragic death of the Russian squadron

Event: Japanese invasion of Sakhalin Island

Causes: the island itself was of little use to Japan, its capture was carried out in order to intimidate the enemy in future peace negotiations

Results: South Sakhalin remained a possession of Japan

Event: conclusion of peace in Portsmouth between Japan and the Russian Empire

Causes: Russia weakened, lost most of the fleet and could not fight. Japan also suffered huge losses and did not have the resources to continue fighting.

Results: Japan gained dominance in Korea and Manchuria, as well as part of Sakhalin. But these achievements did not at all correspond to the ambitions that Japan had before the start of the war.

At the beginning of the 20th century, active development of new lands was going on in the Far East, which provoked a war with Japan. Let's figure out what are the reasons for the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905.

Background and causes of the war

IN late XIX At the beginning of the 20th century, Japan experienced a period of powerful development. Contacts with England and the USA allowed her to raise the economy to a new level, reform the army, and build a new modern fleet. The "Meiji Revolution" made the Empire rising sun leading regional power.

At this time, Nicholas II came to power in Russia. His reign began with a crush on the Khodynka field, which left a negative imprint on his authority among his subjects.

Rice. 1. Portrait of Nicholas II.

To raise the authority needed a "small victorious war" or new territorial expansion to demonstrate the greatness of Russia. The Crimean War marked the territorial claims of Russia in Europe. IN Central Asia Russia ran into India, and conflict with Britain had to be avoided. Nicholas II turned his attention to China, weakened by wars and European colonization. There were also long-term plans for Korea.

In 1898, Russia leased the Liaodong Peninsula with the fortress of Port Arthur from China, and the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) began. The development of the territories of Manchuria by Russian colonists was actively going on.

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Rice. 2. Construction of Port Arthur.

In Japan, realizing that Russia claims the lands that are within their sphere of interest, the slogan "Gashin Shotan" was put forward, calling on the nation to endure the increase in taxes for the sake of a military clash with Russia.

Based on the foregoing, it should be noted that the first and main reason for the outbreak of war was the clash of the colonial ambitions of the two countries. Therefore, the war that arose was of a colonial-aggressive nature.

The reason for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was the rupture of diplomatic ties between the two states. Having failed to agree on the sphere of colonial expansion among themselves, both empires began to prepare to resolve the issue by military means.

The course of the war and the results

The war began with the active actions of the Japanese army and navy. First, Russian ships were attacked in Chemulpo and Port Arthur, and then the landing force was landed in Korea and on the Liaodong Peninsula.

Rice. 3. The death of the cruiser Varyag.

Russia was actively defending, waiting for the approach of reserves from Europe. However, poor infrastructure and supplies prevented Russia from turning the tide of the war. Nevertheless, the prolonged defense of Port Arthur and the victory of the Russian troops at Liaoyang could bring Russia victory in the war, since the Japanese had practically exhausted their economic and human reserves. But General Kuropatkin each time, instead of attacking and defeating the enemy army, gave orders to retreat. First, Port Arthur was lost, then the battle of Mukden took place, the Russian Second and Third Pacific squadrons were defeated. The defeat was obvious and the parties moved on to peace negotiations.

The consequence of the defeat in the war was an even greater deterioration in the authority of the king among the people. This resulted in the First Russian Revolution, which lasted until 1907 and limited the power of the tsar through the creation of the State Duma.

Thanks to S. Yu. Witte, Russia managed to make peace with minimal territorial losses. Japan was given South Sakhalin and left the Liaodong Peninsula.

What have we learned?

From the article on history for grade 9, we learned briefly about the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. It should be noted that the main reason was the clash of colonial interests, which could not be resolved through diplomacy.

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