Foreign policy of the Gorbachev era. Domestic policy. Reasons for the collapse of the USSR

At the post of Secretary General M.S. Gorbachev paid great attention to the foreign policy of the USSR. It is no coincidence that his authority in the West is quite high to this day. Among the successes he achieved in foreign policy, it should be said, first of all, about the destruction of the "Iron Curtain", the end of the Cold War and the end of the nuclear confrontation.

In 1985-1988, Gorbachev made radical changes in the foreign policy of the USSR. At the XXVII Congress of the CPSU (February - March 1986), he published the Soviet program for building a nuclear-free world by the year 2000. In the same year, during a visit to India, he signed the Delhi Declaration on the principles of a non-violent and nuclear-weapon-free world.

In May 1985, at the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the victory over fascism, Gorbachev for the first time in 20 years mentioned the name of Joseph Stalin in a positive context, which caused a storm of applause from those present. At the first (closed) meeting with the creative intelligentsia, he said that now was not the time to resume the anti-Stalinist campaign: "We will push the people together!"

From November 1985 to December 1988, Gorbachev held 5 meetings with US President Ronald Reagan, during which agreements were worked out to reduce certain types of nuclear and conventional weapons.

For example, during the meeting M.S. Gorbachev with US President Ronald Reagan in November 1985, the parties recognized the need to improve Soviet-American relations and improve the international situation as a whole. The START-1,2 treaties have been concluded. By a statement dated January 15, 1986, M.S. Gorbachev put forward a number of major foreign policy initiatives:

Complete elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons by the year 2000.

Strict control over the storage of nuclear weapons and their destruction at the sites of liquidation.

During Mikhail Sergeyevich's visit to India, the Delhi Declaration on the principles of a nuclear-free and non-violent world was signed.

In addition, it was M.S. Gorbachev is credited with ending the war in Afghanistan and the reunification of Germany.

1.1.1 End of the war in Afghanistan

The new leadership of the country, headed by Gorbachev, realized the full extent of the mistake - the introduction of troops into Afghanistan. Gorbachev understood that this war gave the Soviet Union nothing but "zinc coffins" and world condemnation.

In the summer of 1987, the first, albeit mostly populist steps towards peace were taken. The new pro-Soviet government headed by Najibullah offered the opposing side a truce.

In April 1988, the USSR signed an agreement in Geneva on the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan. Already on May 15, the first military units began to leave the country.

On February 15, 1989, the last Soviet soldiers left Afghanistan. This ceremony was held as solemnly as possible, thus showing that the USSR was not fleeing the country, but only withdrawing its troops from there.

February 15 marks the tenth anniversary of the end of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. On this day, the longest war in its history ended for the Soviet Union, which lasted a total of nine years, one month and eighteen days. 525 thousand soldiers and officers of the Soviet army, 90 thousand servicemen of the State Security Committee and 5 thousand servicemen and employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs passed through this war. In the Afghan war, 14453 soldiers and officers were killed, including 13833 military personnel of the Ministry of Defense, 572 of the KGB and 28 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The number of sanitary losses (wounded, shell-shocked, sick, etc.) is incredibly high - 469,685 people. Losses of military equipment are no less impressive: aircraft - 118, helicopters - 333, tanks - 147, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers - 1314, vehicles for various purposes - about 13 thousand.

To understand the significance of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, consider the events that preceded this. The USSR had very difficult, reaching to military conflicts, relations with China, strained relations with Iran. The security factor took on added urgency due to US actions in the region. The New York Times of July 11, 1971 wrote that "the main feature of the Nixon Doctrine is the desire to maintain political and military involvement in Asian affairs ... waging war at the hands of others, helping with weapons ... Therefore, Washington continues to send and provide assistance Pakistan." Thus, by the beginning of the 1970s, we still had friendly relations only with Afghanistan on the southern borders of the country. But even in this country, events were brewing that soon entailed consequences far beyond the borders of this country.

On July 17, 1973, a military coup took place in Afghanistan, as a result of which King M. Zahir Shah was deposed.

A republic was proclaimed in the country, headed by a former prime minister and member royal family M. Daud. It should be noted that the Soviet experts on Afghanistan did not give due attention to this event. The change of power in our country was considered a typical "Eastern episode". However, this was followed by the actions of certain forces both within the country and abroad. By this time, a national-democratic movement and a socio-political movement, the Islamic fundamentalist movement, had arisen inside the country and began to rapidly gain strength.

During the same period, the United States significantly expanded its penetration into the country. The American publicist F. Bonoski in his book "Washington's Secret War Against Afghanistan" pointed out that back in 1973 the CIA "began to put pressure" on the Afghan government in order to force it to take anti-Soviet positions. In the anti-government conspiracy, stakes were placed primarily on the military section of the "Muslim youth." After the disclosure in December 1973 of a conspiracy of militants against the regime of M. Daoud, its participants found refuge in Pakistan. In secret Pakistani camps, the training of five thousand Afghan fundamentalists was organized, who became the core of the anti-government forces inside Afghanistan. In July 1975, supporters of G. Hekmatyar, B. Rabbani and other leaders of Muslim organizations declared jihad against the "godless regime" of M. Daoud. Armed riots broke out in a number of provinces. However, they failed to raise an armed uprising throughout the country. Thus, the existing opinion that only the April (1978) revolution in Afghanistan caused a long-term civil war, is not confirmed.

The April military coup of 1978 in Kabul, when President M. Daud and his inner circle were shot, and power in the country passed into the hands of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, headed by M. Taraki, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Soviet leadership. Confusion also reigned in Washington. Against the backdrop of the impending events in Iran, the CIA did not pay enough attention to Afghanistan and overlooked the coup that was being prepared. On April 30, 1978, Moscow recognized the new regime in Kabul. The recognition was justified both by ideological and historical traditions. It was beneficial for the Soviet Union to have an obedient, if not an ally, then at least a good neighbor on the southern border. However, the very first year of the development of the April revolution in Afghanistan showed the narrowness of its social base.

The further development of events in this country showed that the instigators of the revolution did not have a clear program of political and economic transformations, there was no practical experience in state building. The ambitions of individual leaders only exacerbated inter-party strife, and socialist slogans intensified the struggle of Muslim fundamentalists against the new government. In March 1979, a counter-revolutionary rebellion broke out in the province of Herat. Armed clashes in other provinces of the country have become more frequent. In connection with the loss of Iran, Washington decides to reorient its foreign policy in this region, trying to make the most of the Afghan events in the fight against the USSR. Military aid to Pakistan is increasing, rapprochement with China is growing. America abandons agreements on the Middle East and stops negotiations on Indian Ocean. After the events in Herat (by the way, two Soviet citizens died here during the mutiny), the government of Afghanistan began to systematically request the government of the USSR for military assistance. There were about two dozen such requests from March to December 1979. The top Soviet leadership repeatedly considered these requests of the Afghan government and, despite the complexity of the situation around and inside this country, always refused to satisfy them. Meanwhile, the situation in Afghanistan was steadily deteriorating. The armed opposition tightened the ring around Kabul, where by this time the struggle between the leaders of the PDPA had sharply escalated.

In September 1979, as a result of inter-party strife, M. Taraki was killed. In October-November 1979, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU almost constantly discusses the problems of Afghanistan. Top officials of the KGB and the Ministry of Defense travel regularly between Kabul and Moscow. Finally, on December 12, 1979, in the office of L.I. Brezhnev again meets the Politburo and, according to the information of the KGB chairman Yu.V. Andropov, Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov and Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko decides to send a limited contingent of Soviet troops to Afghanistan to "render assistance and assistance in the fight against external aggression ... and based on the common interests of both sides in security issues." Today it can be assumed that this decision, firstly, was dictated by the interference of the imperialist countries in the affairs of Afghanistan and could pose a threat to the security of our southern borders; secondly, it was supposed to prevent the formation of the terrorist regime of H. Amin and protect the Afghan people from genocide; thirdly, it took into account the fact that the use of Soviet troops in other countries (Hungary, Czechoslovakia) had previously done without serious domestic and international consequences. Naturally, the political decision on the use of military force was based on international law - an interstate agreement concluded between the USSR and Afghanistan on December 5, 1978, which stated that "in the interests of strengthening the defense capability of the High Contracting Parties, they will continue to cooperate in military area". I think that in the fatal decision there was another aspect that existed in those years, the so-called "leadership", that is, the unlimited powers of the Secretary General, whose decisions were then not subject to discussion. Of course, the very method of making such a fatal decision, complete disregard for on this issue, the opinions of professional analysts, public opinion, and, finally, Soviet legislation, cannot evoke anything but condemnation. But we can reason like this now. And then, in 1979, in our country there were very few people who publicly express a different (from the Politburo) position.

In this regard, I will give two examples. It is authentically known that the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense was categorically against the introduction of troops into Afghanistan. But what came of it? General of the Army A. M. Maiorov says: “From a confidential conversation with Ogarkov (Ogarkov N.V. - Marshal of the Soviet Union, in 1977-1984 Chief of the General Staff) I knew that when the issue of bringing troops was decided at a meeting of the Politburo to Afghanistan, he resolutely opposed, declaring: “We will turn against ourselves all Eastern Islamism, and we will lose politically all over the world.” Andropov cut him off: “Engage in military affairs! And we, the party, Leonid Ilyich, will take care of politics." And here is how former Foreign Minister E. A. Shevardnadze answered a journalist's question in December 1991: "What can you reproach yourself for in the Afghan issue?" when the troops were brought in, I and others had to shout that a mistake was being made, a stupid one, with dire consequences. Then I did not find the strength, the courage to say this. After all, I spoke dozens of times at plenums and congresses of the party. I cannot forgive myself, probably my other like-minded people are of the same opinion. It was necessary to tell the truth, they would have suffered, of course. So what - people were dying in Afghanistan. I had to speak, I admit, my conscience torments." The history of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is one of the clearest confirmations of the fallacy of the decision taken in December 1979 by the top leadership of the USSR to invade this country. This is also proof that a war can be started, but it is difficult end.

I have already mentioned that only the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense objected to the introduction of troops into Afghanistan. The motives of the General Staff were very convincing: Afghan leaders must resolve internal conflicts exclusively on their own; the introduction of troops is fraught with a fall in prestige in the eyes of the Soviet people, the people of Afghanistan and the world community; it is quite likely that the Soviet military presence in this country will provoke the outbreak of hostilities; poor knowledge of the customs and traditions of the Afghan people, the characteristics of Islam, national-ethnic and tribal relations will put Soviet soldiers in a very difficult position. Literally a few months after the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the forecast of the General Staff began to come true. The Afghans themselves soon announced the wrong decision of the Soviet government.

Chief military adviser in Afghanistan from 1980 to 1981, Army General A.M. Mayorov recalls his meeting with Colonel-General Hussein, the father of B. Karmal, the head of the Afghan state. For the approval of A.M. Mayorova: "Sooner or later we will win anyway," the Afghan general replied: "No, Afghanistan cannot be defeated. Afghanistan can only be bought. And you are poorer than the oil kings, and poorer than America..." conversation with A.M. Mayorov was voiced by the commander of the Afghan army corps, Colonel Khalil (later he served as the first deputy minister of defense of Afghanistan) and the Minister for Nationalities and Tribes S. Laek in the government of B. Karmal.

Colonel Khalil, for example, said: "The Shuravi troops must be withdrawn from Afghanistan ... There will be no victory. Even after ten, fifteen and twenty holy Ramadans." In the middle of 1980, Academician G.A. Arbatov and political observer of the newspaper "Pravda" Yu.A. Zhukov obtained an appointment with L.I. Brezhnev and made him a proposal for at least a partial withdrawal of a limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Shortly after the party congress, on March 22, at a meeting in the Kremlin chaired by Yu.V. Andropov, where Afghan problems were considered, military experts spoke about the need for a phased withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. There was no response to this proposal. However, in the fall of 1981, the Politburo approved the proposal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko to organize a diplomatic process, the purpose of which would be the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. This constructive position of the Soviet leadership was noticed at the UN. At the end of 1982, during the funeral of L.I. Brezhneva Yu.V. Andropov, the new leader of the party and state, met with Pakistani President Zia Ul-Khan.

During the meeting, the Afghan problem was touched upon. March 28, 1983 Yu.V. Andropov, in a conversation with the UN Secretary General, expressed a desire for a peaceful solution to the Afghan issue. However, the desire of the American administration to extract the maximum political benefits from the Afghan conflict and draw the OKSV into fighting significantly hampered the UN mediation mission. After the death of Yu.V. Andropov in February 1984, the activity of the UN mediation to unblock the Afghan conflict noticeably decreased. In parallel with this, US military assistance to the Afghan opposition began to increase sharply. Moreover, the CIA began to persistently push the Mujahideen to raid the territory of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and such attempts were made. However, due to the gradual lowering of the threshold of confrontation in Soviet-American relations in 1985-1986. light dawned on the Afghan impasse.

In the autumn of 1985 in Moscow, M.S. Gorbachev announced to B. Karmal and other Afghan leaders about his intention to withdraw Soviet troops. Indeed, in October 1986, by decision of the Soviet government, six combat units left Afghanistan: one tank regiment, two motorized rifle regiments and three anti-aircraft regiments with a total number of 8.5 thousand people. Meanwhile, the process of the Geneva talks under the auspices of the UN on the Afghan issue, which began in 1982, continued in 1985-1986, albeit with great difficulties. and finally ended on April 14, 1988 with the signing of a package of agreements by the plenipotentiaries of Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as the USSR and the USA as guarantors of the implementation of the policy of resolving the long-term Afghan conflict.

On May 15, 1988, in accordance with these agreements, a phased withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began. On February 15, 1989, as it was predetermined by the Geneva agreements, the last Soviet units led by General B.V. Gromov left Afghanistan.

1.1.2 German unification

On September 1990, in the Moscow "President Hotel", the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, France, the FRG and the GDR, in the presence of the President of the USSR MS Gorbachev, signed the Treaty on the Final Settlement with regard to Germany. Twenty days later, on October 3, 1990, German unification became a fait accompli. The flag of the GDR was lowered in Berlin, the German Democratic Republic ceased to exist.

The originality of what happened on September 12 was determined not only by the fact that the German question was formally "closed". The international atmosphere was saturated with anticipation of the gigantic transformations that were destined to shake the world in the coming years. In fifteen months the Soviet Union will cease to exist, dividing into its constituent republics. Even earlier, the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance will disappear. Former Warsaw Pact allies will begin their drift towards NATO. A new alignment of forces will emerge in Europe, with consequences that are still unclear and difficult to predict.

The post-war history of Europe was largely shaped by the events unfolding around the German question. The emergence of the Cold War, the split of Europe, the many years of confrontation between the two military-political blocs - NATO and the Warsaw Pact with the accompanying arms race - all this, one way or another, was connected with an attempt to reach a post-war settlement in Germany.

The former allies in the Second World War did not manage to work out coordinated decisions regarding Germany, thereby realizing the basic settlement scheme outlined in 1945 in Potsdam. Their interests diverged too far, the ditch between East and West turned out to be too deep, the ambitions of the political leaders of the leading powers were too ambitious.

German reunification is rightfully regarded by the Germans as their greatest achievement. They realized the chance that history gave them. Chancellor G. Kohl would later call the unification of the country a "gift of history." He understood perfectly well that in a different historical situation there might not have been a "gift". In any case, even at the end of 1989, among political elite Germany was widely believed that the unification of Germany - a matter of distant historical perspective. The FRG took seriously the statements of MS Gorbachev in a conversation with the President of the FRG von Weizsäcker in Moscow in July 1987 and during the visit of the Soviet leader to the FRG in June 1989, when he declared that history would decide the issue of reunification. No one, they say, can say what will happen in 100 years. Von Weizsäcker was taken aback by this answer. At the same time, G.D. Genscher testifies that he himself saw something different in the words of MS Gorbachev - a readiness to consider the German question open, and the state of split as inconclusive. He was right. When reunification becomes a fact in just a year, MS Gorbachev will not express surprise. No one could have expected the story to start working so quickly, he says.

It is known that even in 1989, few people in the West, and even more so in the Soviet Union, considered the real reunification of Germany in the foreseeable future. Achieving German unity was seen by Bonn and its allies as a strategic task. No more. True, E. A. Shevardnadze in his memoirs, published back in 1991, notes, as if in hindsight, that already in 1986 he came to the idea of ​​the inevitability of restoring the national community of Germans. However, publicly, he continued to express the official point of view of the Soviet leadership about the irreversibility of changes on German soil and the immutability of the existence of two German states.

However, the social movement for democratization, political pluralism and economic liberalization that unfolded in the Eastern European countries also captured the GDR, and by the autumn of 1989 had acquired an extremely sharp, explosive character there.

The "perestroika" wave, having spread to the GDR, very soon acquired a special German orientation. The movement, which began under the slogan "we are the people," in a short time gave rise to a new slogan - "we are one people." The all-German motif became dominant. The demand for freedom to leave the GDR and the opening of the border between the GDR and the FRG did not remain purely declarative. Hundreds of citizens of the GDR, taking advantage of the possibility of visa-free trips to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other states, began to besiege the embassies of the FRG, demanding to travel to the West. The existing agreements between the GDR and these states did not allow them to allow visa-free travel of citizens of the GDR to the FRG. The situation was heating up.

The German government pressed hard on Budapest, Prague and Berlin, demanding that East German tourists be allowed to travel to the West. Promises of economic assistance and large loans were also used. In August 1989, a secret meeting between Chancellor G. Kohl and the head of the Hungarian government M. Nemeth took place in the Gimnich castle near Bonn. Hungary agreed to the departure of GDR tourists to the FRG and soon opened its border, having received a signal from Moscow that the Soviet leadership would not object to the departure of GDR citizens to the West. Subsequently, G. Kol will tell that he had a telephone conversation with M.S. Gorbachev, from whose words he concluded that the Hungarians acted with the consent of Moscow. He also concluded that all these events were "the beginning of the end of the SED regime".

Soon the government of the GDR gave its consent to the departure of citizens who were in the German embassy in Prague in special trains, provided that they would pass through the territory of the GDR. However, the settlement of the conflict with the "embassy inmates" could no longer contain the further aggravation of the political situation in the GDR. It developed into a national crisis. In Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden and other cities, demonstrations of many thousands did not stop demanding radical changes in the country. The rally wave rolled through the GDR, as well as through other Eastern European countries, sweeping away regimes that proved unable to effectively lead their countries. The situation was not saved by the resignation of E. Honecker in October 1989, immediately after the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the GDR. Present at the celebrations, M.S. Gorbachev left Berlin with gloomy impressions. His conversation with the head of the GDR confirmed the latter's complete insensitivity to the guest's recommendations. And yes, time was wasted. The Soviet leader had more than enough reason to think hard. However, M.S. Gorbachev hardly imagined that the time was not far off when the question of his own fate would arise, although, having built the events in a logical chain, it was already possible to foresee the inevitability of bitter consequences.

The new leadership of the GDR, headed by E. Krenz, was rapidly losing ground under their feet, did not find effective solutions to the erupted political crisis in this difficult situation. It was clear that the use of forceful methods was contraindicated and could only lead to an even greater aggravation, to blow up the situation. Moscow made it clear that the Soviet troops stationed on the territory of the GDR would remain in the barracks and the leadership of the GDR could not count on their support.

G.D. Genscher recalls a conversation with Hungarian leaders during a meeting in Bonn in August 1989. They said that at the meeting of the heads of state of the Warsaw Pact in Bucharest, they proposed to include in the final document a provision on the right of each member state to independently decide on its own social and political system. This proposal was initially not approved, and only the persistent support of M.S. Gorbachev ensured its adoption. G.D. Genscher concluded from this that the leader of the Soviet Union firmly stands on the positions of the Joint Statement of the USSR - the FRG, signed during his visit to Bonn in June 1989, where a provision similar in meaning was recorded. Consequently, it will continue to support the aspirations of the member states of the Warsaw Pact towards greater independence. This encouraged the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany. And he was not mistaken in his expectations. The Warsaw Pact organization was rapidly moving towards self-dissolution.

Meanwhile, events in the GDR were taking a dramatic turn. Permanent demonstrations, tough pressure from the opposition forced the leadership of the GDR to announce on November 9, 1989 the "opening" of the Berlin Wall. Controls at border crossings were lifted, and thousands of East Berliners rushed to western part cities, and the oncoming flow of West Berliners - to the east.

The German government was aware that before taking real steps to unite the two German states, it was necessary to dispel doubts and fears in the camp of its allies, as well as in the Soviet Union. As for the allies, Bonn was confident that they could solve this problem. It was more difficult with the Soviet Union, despite the mutual understanding that had developed by that time with M.S. Gorbachev and E.A. Shevardnadze.

Against such an internal political background, which had developed in the USSR by the beginning of 1990, it was not easy to demonstrate a strong, convincing and effective foreign policy. Nevertheless, the high international prestige of the Soviet Union was still preserved, which forced partners to reckon with its opinion in solving European and world problems.

In the midst of discussions about ways to resolve the problem of German unity in early January 1990, the Soviet leadership turned to Chancellor G. Kohl with a request for urgent food assistance. Of course, the German government responded positively and promptly. Already on January 24, G. Kohl confirmed the readiness to supply to the USSR at reduced prices 52,000 tons of canned meat, 5,000 tons of pork, 20,000 tons butter and other foodstuffs, allocating 220 million German to subsidize these deliveries. This was not the only appeal of the leadership of the USSR for food aid to the FRG and other Western countries. More requests of this kind soon followed, as well as requests for loans. Help obligated, put the leadership of the USSR in an even more difficult position in the negotiations with the FRG.

Meanwhile, in Moscow, the position, strategy and tactics of the upcoming diplomatic contacts on the issues of German unification were being developed. The work was difficult, the range of assessments and opinions was very large. The recommendations of experts offered to management often received their own interpretation there, and when implemented, they acquired a character that was very far from the original intention.

On February 10, G. Kohl, accompanied by G.D. Genscher arrives in Moscow. The Chancellor carefully prepared for this trip. On the eve of the visit, representatives of the US, British and French governments made statements in support of Bonn's unification policy. The new leaders of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria also spoke out for the unification of Germany.

G. Kolya and G.D. Genscher still did not leave anxiety and uncertainty. They knew that at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU held before their visit, politician M.S. Gorbachev and E.A. Shevardnadze was sharply criticized by many members of the Central Committee. The internal situation in the USSR continued to worsen. Will M.S. want and be able to Gorbachev, under the pressure of circumstances, to make concessions to the FRG - this question did not leave the leaders of the FRG.

The negotiations in Moscow turned out, according to the German participants, much more favorably than they had expected. At a meeting in a narrow format, M.S. Gorbachev made a statement that G. Kohl took as a sensation. The page of the Pravda newspaper, where the next day the statement of the Soviet leader was published, will be carefully preserved by the chancellor's assistant H. Telchik, framed and hung on the wall of his office as a valuable souvenir.

What made the German guests so happy? A TASS report published by Pravda on February 11, 1990 stated: M.S. Gorbachev stated - and the Chancellor agreed with him - that now there are no disagreements between the USSR, the FRG and the GDR regarding the fact that the question of the unity of the German nation should be decided by the Germans themselves and determine their own choice, in what time frame, at what pace and under what conditions. they will realize this unity."

Hearing this statement, the chancellor could not help but be delighted, because the Germans actually received carte blanche and complete freedom of hands in intra-German negotiations. Another pleasant surprise awaited the German guest. When G. Kohl spoke about the military status of a united Germany, M.S. Gorbachev responded very flexibly. He understands that neutrality is just as unacceptable for G. Kohl as for others. Neutrality sets boundaries that humiliate the German people. M.S. Gorbachev does not know what the status of a united Germany will be, and this has yet to be thought about and "lost" various possibilities. The chancellor's assistant, H. Telchik, wrote in his diary: "Another sensation: MS Gorbachev does not bind himself with a final decision; no inquiries about the price, and certainly no threat at all. What a meeting!"

The conversation gave one more result - M.S. Gorbachev approved the proposal made the day before by J. Baker to hold talks on the external aspects of German unity in the "2+4" format. He agreed with the chancellor that these questions should be decided by the four powers jointly with the FRG and the GDR.

The very next day, February 12, the first and only conference of foreign ministers of NATO and the Warsaw Pact met in Ottawa. It was devoted to the problem of "open skies", confidence-building measures in the military field. However, she entered history for a completely different reason. G.D. Genscher set himself the task of reaching a formal agreement on the start of negotiations in the "2+4" format already at this conference. J. Baker actively supported him. The foreign ministers of Great Britain and France did not object either. E.A. Shevardnadze was unprepared for such a rapid pace of progress in negotiations, but ultimately agreed to the publication of a joint statement by six ministers on the start of negotiations to discuss "the external aspects of achieving German unity, including the security of neighboring states."

The time trouble in which the participants in the talks put themselves in, having succumbed to the persistent aspirations of the FRG government to complete them by the autumn of 1990, began to be felt more and more. The signing of the Treaty on the Unification of the FRG and the GDR was scheduled for August 31, the Treaty on the Final Settlement with regard to Germany was scheduled for September 12, the celebrations in Berlin on the occasion of German unification were scheduled for October 3, the CSCE summit meeting for November 20, and for December 2 - elections to the German Bundestag. Chancellor H. Kohl sought to ensure that the elections were already held in a united Germany. This would give him undeniable advantages over his Social Democratic competitors.

The situation escalated from day to day. The negotiators were pressured by the obligation they assumed to complete the work by the deadline without fail. To agree on contractual formulations in such conditions meant dooming oneself to the risk of inevitable flaws, the appearance of fuzzy, approximate texts. Yet many key provisions of the final document of the "six" were still open.

On the evening of July 14, German Chancellor G. Kohl and Foreign Ministers G.D. flew to Moscow. Genscher and Finance T. Weigel, accompanied by a delegation of German experts. The next day, in the mansion of the USSR Foreign Ministry on the street. Alexei Tolstoy (now Spiridonovka), negotiations began, which were supposed to dot the issue of the status of a united Germany and its relations with the Soviet Union. They were preceded by a two-hour meeting with M.S. Gorbachev with G. Kohl in the presence of only assistants and translators. She, as well as the whole trip, is described in detail in the memoirs of the chancellor, his assistant H. Telchik and other German participants. The recording of this conversation itself was published in the German collection of documents.

The quintessence of the conversation was the actual agreement of the Soviet president that the FRG should remain in NATO after unification. The formula he proposed provided, however, that for the transitional period, as long as Soviet troops remained on German soil, the territory of the GDR would not be included in the sphere of NATO.

The first part of the President's statement pleased G. Kohl. He took what he heard as a "breakthrough." However, the second part made him wary. He saw in the words of the interlocutor a sign that a united Germany would still not gain full sovereignty, and in the course of subsequent negotiations on the conditions for the stay of Soviet troops, the USSR would be able to retain in its hands the possibilities for pressure on the issue of Germany's membership in NATO. The chancellor wanted complete clarity and persistently sought it from M.S. Gorbachev. He received only an indirect answer. The President said that a joint flight to the Caucasus is ahead. In the mountain air, much, they say, is seen more clearly.

G. Kolya was not satisfied with such an uncertain prospect. He continued to insist and declared that he would fly south only if, as a result of the talks, Germany received full sovereignty. The stubbornness of the guest bordered on arrogance and clearly jarred the President. He did not give a direct answer, but he offered to fly to the Caucasus anyway. It became clear to G. Kolya that consent would be obtained. On the same day, both delegations flew to Stavropol.

V.M. Falin, who at that time held the post of head of the international department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, testifies that on the night before the arrival of G. Kohl, he talked on the phone with M.S. Gorbachev and outlined to him his vision of the upcoming negotiations, especially pressing on the fact that the president did not give consent to the inclusion of a united Germany in NATO. M.S. Gorbachev replied that he would try to do what he could, but, in his opinion, "the train has already left."

The president's recognition speaks volumes. By the time of the meeting in Arkhyz, the outcome of the negotiations was actually a foregone conclusion. The internal situation in the USSR, the situation in the GDR and other states of Eastern Europe, the hard pressure from the Western partners left the Soviet state leadership with an extremely limited set of means and options for action. By accepting the rules of the game dictated by the policy of "new thinking" and refusing any steps that could cause the slightest aggravation of the situation and criticism abroad, the leaders of the USSR further narrowed the political corridor of their actions. The stream of events carried them with increasing speed, and they had less and less chance, and perhaps even desire, to get out of it. Until December 1991, when the flag of the Soviet Union was lowered in the Kremlin, and M.S. Gorbachev resigned as president of the still mighty state, a year and a half remained. However, all the actions of the country's top leadership already bore the stamp of some kind of detachment and even doom.

Nevertheless, in Arkhyz, negotiations were rather tense on a number of issues. M.S. Gorbachev sought final and clear confirmation of the provisions important for the USSR in the forthcoming settlement. In particular, it was said that foreign NATO troops would not be deployed on the territory of the former GDR, and nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles would not be deployed there. The Chancellor agreed to this. The president insisted on reducing the size of the Bundeswehr and received G. Kohl's consent to a "ceiling" of 370 thousand people (the chancellor categorically refused to make more significant reductions). Convinced the chancellor that Germany needed to pay the costs of staying the Western Group of Forces (WGF) on German territory (albeit for four, not five years and on a smaller scale than he had hoped) and for her withdrawal to her homeland, including the construction of apartments for military personnel ZGV.

All this was to balance the agreement on the membership of a united Germany in NATO and on the deployment of parts of the Bundeswehr not integrated into NATO in the former GDR immediately after the unification.

The meeting in Arkhyz practically opened the way for the completion of the P-6 talks. And so it was universally accepted. The results of the meeting aroused particular enthusiasm in the political circles of Germany, turning the hope for an early unification of the country into firm confidence.

The next day, July 17, the third meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Six opened in Paris. E.A. Shevardnadze and G.D. Genscher arrived in the French capital directly from Mineralnye Vody under the impression of just concluded negotiations. The agreements reached in Arkhyz predetermined the course of the Paris meeting. There was really nothing to argue about. Work on the final document of the "six" was rapidly moving towards completion. The German participants became more convinced that everything would be over on time, before October 3, and the set goals would be achieved. In Paris, the still open issue of signing a German-Polish border treaty was also agreed, which was supposed to reinforce on a bilateral basis the provisions on the final nature of the German borders agreed by the "six" for the Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany. To this end, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Skubishevsky was invited to the meeting of the Six.

Rapid progress in the negotiations E.A. Shevardnadze motivated by the fact that significant progress has been made within the CSCE, as well as in the process of transforming the Warsaw Pact and NATO. This conclusion, however, turned out to be correct only for the Warsaw Pact Organization, whose members were practically on the verge of self-dissolution, which in fact became the finale of the "transformation". As for NATO, after the declaration of intent proclaimed in London, specific cases took on a very peculiar direction. NATO not only retained all the basic guidelines and characteristics of the military-political bloc, but also "transformed" by attracting new members and expanding its sphere of action to the east of Europe. In the summer of 1990, no one even dared to hint at the possibility of such an expansion of NATO. Moreover, there were assurances that NATO structures would not move beyond the border line between the FRG and the GDR. In just a couple of years, these assurances were forgotten.

The results of the talks of the "six" made it possible to confirm the date of their completion and the signing of the Treaty on the final settlement - September 12 in Moscow. At the level of experts, the text of the treaty was being finalized. In parallel, preparations were underway for the Soviet-German Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Partnership and Cooperation, which was agreed to be initialed on the same day - September 12, as well as the Agreement between the USSR and the FRG on certain transitional measures and the Treaty on the stay and withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany. The history of these negotiations is full of sharp, even dramatic moments, but this is an independent topic.

There was controversy around the Treaty on the Final Settlement until the last moment. By mid-August, the German side had thrown into the negotiation process the question of suspending the rights and responsibilities of the four powers from the moment of the actual unification of Germany. The fact is that these rights and responsibilities under the Treaty on the Final Settlement should have exhausted themselves with ratification and its entry into force. In Bonn, however, they did not want a united Germany to remain under quadripartite control for even a short time before the treaty came into force.

August 16-17 G.D. Genscher, during negotiations in Moscow, achieved agreement with this wish. The Soviet minister yielded to the perseverance of G.D. Genscher and in another question. He accepted the proposed scheme for formalizing the German obligation to reduce the Bundeswehr, which provided that the corresponding statement would be made at the talks in Vienna, and not at the meeting of the Six. The leadership of the FRG did not want to make this obligation a part of the final peace settlement, preferring to "write" it into the general agreement on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe.

In Moscow, the issue was also once again considered, which was destined for many years after the reunification to become a serious irritant in relations between the government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the heirs of the latifundists and former Nazis, deprived of their property in accordance with allied decisions in the period 1945-1949. On the Soviet side, the position was confirmed, according to which the measures taken in those years were not subject to revision. G.D. Genscher did not object to this, although he referred to the need to leave the German judiciary the opportunity to compensate the property of persons who themselves lost it as a result of Nazi persecution. It was about objects that, after being confiscated from the victims of persecution, passed to the Nazis, and then were seized from them on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement.

G.D. Genscher also opposed the inclusion of this issue directly in the text of the Treaty on the Final Settlement. Nevertheless, the German minister had to agree that letters to the foreign ministers of the four powers confirming the irreversibility of the measures taken in 1945-1949 were attached to the treaty.

The issue of compensation for Soviet citizens deported to Germany during the period of temporary occupation of part of Soviet territory, as well as for prisoners of concentration camps, was not resolved. G.D. Genscher was against the inclusion of this issue in the Treaty on the final settlement, and E.A. Shevardnadze was not persistent and agreed to make it the subject of a separate settlement. Subsequent negotiations dragged on for many months, and only in 1992 the issue was resolved, although the amount of compensation turned out to be minimal, not corresponding to the severity of the moral and physical suffering that befell Soviet citizens in fascist captivity.

On September 11, 1990, the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain, France, and also two German states flew to Moscow. The next day the work of the "2+4" conference was to be completed and the Treaty on the Final Settlement with regard to Germany, agreed by that time, to be signed.

The days preceding this meeting were probably the hottest in Soviet-German diplomatic contacts. The issues of financing the withdrawal of troops and their stay in Germany, the fate and cost of real estate and other property of the Western Group of Forces turned out to be extremely difficult. The Soviet side, having calculated their needs, called the amount of 35-36 billion German marks. The German government was ready to allocate 8 billion marks. The negotiations sometimes acquired a dramatic character; M.S. Gorbachev and G. Kohl. Feeling the danger of disruption of the last round of "2 + 4" negotiations, the German government was forced to revise its proposals in the direction of increasing payments. Literally on the eve of the Moscow meeting, the amounts of funding from the German budget were finally agreed upon. G. Kohl confirmed his readiness to allocate 3 billion marks for the stay of Soviet troops, 1 billion marks for transportation costs, 8.5 billion marks for the construction of apartments for the soldiers of the Western Group of Forces, 200 million marks for the retraining of servicemen. In addition, a 3 billion interest-free loan was allocated. The issue of the value of the ZGV property remained unresolved.

The elaboration of financial issues, like all the "2 + 4" negotiations, took place in an atmosphere of tight time pressure created by the FRG, which, of course, did not contribute to finding optimal solutions. The impression remained that the position of the FRG retained reserves that could be opened up with the proper perseverance and stubbornness on the Soviet side. However, in Moscow they were in a hurry, they did not want to postpone the signing of the treaty, believing that the delay would only exacerbate the internal discussion and strengthen opposition to the developed documents on the unification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from its territory.

Already after the participants of the meeting had gathered in Moscow, on the evening of September 11, the last "mini-crisis" arose at the talks. The British delegation demanded an amendment to the text of Article 5 of the treaty, allowing, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the military contingents of other NATO states to be redeployed to the territory of the former GDR for maneuvers and exercises. The Western partners decided, apparently, "at the end" to wrest the last concession from the Soviet Union, clearly overstepping the bounds of political decency in the process. The Soviet side opposed it, since the new proposals, in essence, blew up the agreements reached in Arkhyz.

The functions of a mediator in settling the resulting diplomatic incident were assumed by G.D. Genscher, extremely concerned about the possible negative consequences of the British initiative. For the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, the disruption of the planned schedule for completing the negotiations was completely unacceptable, and the German minister set to work with his usual energy. During the night bilateral meetings and the morning meeting of the ministers of the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany, a draft protocol was prepared, according to which issues related to temporary redeployment were transferred to a "reasonable" and "responsible" decision by the German government, taking into account the security interests of the parties to the agreement.

Diplomatic contacts continued on the morning of September 12, which delayed the start of the P-6 meeting by almost two hours. After some hesitation, the Soviet leadership nevertheless agreed to the proposed text of the protocol record, and the foreign ministers of the six powers finally put their signatures on the document drawing the final line under the Second World War.

However, the history of negotiations on the unification of Germany did not end there. The signed treaty was to be ratified. As expected, this turned out to be far from a routine procedure. In the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, a significant part of the deputies were opposed to ratification. The government had to make great efforts to convince the deputies of the need for ratification. It was not until March 1991 that the procedure for approving the treaty by Parliament was completed.

1.2 Domestic politics

All domestic politics Gorbachev was imbued with the spirit of perestroika and glasnost. He first introduced the term "perestroika" in April 1986, which at first was understood only as the "restructuring" of the economy. But later, especially after the XIX All-Union Party Conference, the word "perestroika" expanded and began to denote the entire era of change.

Gorbachev's first steps after his election largely followed those of Andropov. First of all, he abolished the "cult" of his office. In front of TV viewers in 1986, Gorbachev rudely cut off one speaker: "Let's persuade Mikhail Sergeyevich!"

The media again started talking about "putting things in order" in the country. In the spring of 1985, a decree was issued to combat drunkenness. The sale of wine and vodka products was halved, and thousands of hectares of vineyards were cut down in the Crimea and Transcaucasia. This led to an increase in queues at liquor stores and more than five times the consumption of moonshine.

The fight against bribery has resumed with renewed vigor, especially in Uzbekistan. In 1986, Brezhnev's son-in-law Yury Churbanov was arrested and later sentenced to twelve years in prison.

At the beginning of 1987, the Central Committee introduced some elements of democracy in production and in the party apparatus: alternative elections of party secretaries appeared, sometimes open voting was replaced by a secret one, and a system of electing heads of enterprises and institutions was introduced. All these innovations in the political system were discussed at the XIX All-Union Party Conference, which took place in the summer of 1988. Its decisions provided for the combination of "socialist values" with the political doctrine of liberalism - a course was proclaimed towards the creation of a "socialist legal state", it was planned to conduct a separation of powers, the doctrine of the "Soviet parliamentarism". For this, a new supreme body of power was created - the Congress of People's Deputies, and it was proposed to make the Supreme Council a permanent "parliament".

The electoral legislation was also changed: the elections were supposed to be held on an alternative basis, to make them two-stage, one third of the deputies to be formed from public organizations.

The main idea of ​​the conference was the transfer of part of the power of the party to the government, that is, the strengthening of Soviet authorities, while maintaining party influence in them.

Soon, the initiative to carry out more intensive reforms passed to the people's deputies elected at the I Congress, at their suggestion, the concept of carrying out political reforms has been slightly modified and expanded. The III Congress of People's Deputies, which met in March 1990, considered it appropriate to introduce the post of President of the USSR, at the same time, Article 6 of the Constitution, which secured the monopoly communist party on power, this allowed the formation of a multi-party system.

Also, in the course of the perestroika policy, a reassessment of some moments in the history of the state took place at the state level, especially regarding the condemnation of the personality cult of Stalin.

But at the same time, dissatisfied with the policy of perestroika gradually began to appear. Their position was expressed in her letter to the editors of the newspaper "Soviet Russia" Leningrad teacher Nina Andreeva.

Simultaneously with the implementation of reforms in the country, a seemingly long-resolved national question appeared in it, which resulted in bloody conflicts: in the Baltic states and in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Simultaneously with the implementation of political reforms, economic reforms were also carried out. The main direction of the socio-economic development of the country was recognized scientific and technical progress, technical re-equipment of mechanical engineering and activation of the "human factor". Initially, the main emphasis was placed on the enthusiasm of the working people, but nothing can be built on "bare" enthusiasm, so in 1987 an economic reform was carried out. It included: expanding the independence of enterprises on the principles of cost accounting and self-financing, gradually reviving the private sector of the economy, abandoning the monopoly of foreign trade, deeper integration into the world market, reducing the number of sectoral ministries and departments, reform Agriculture. But all these reforms, with rare exceptions, did not lead to the desired result. Simultaneously with the development of the private sector of the economy, state-owned enterprises, faced with completely new ways of working, were not able to survive in the emerging market. Causes and Consequences of the Failure of Perestroika as a Comprehensive Political and Economic Reform

The political behavior of M.S. Gorbachev must certainly have some kind of universal formula. After all, if a person invades various areas life, but equally unsuccessfully, then here, in addition to the specific causes of failure, there must be a certain fundamental vice, even turning good into evil.

In good intentions M.S. Nobody, perhaps, doubts Gorbachev, even those who today portray the president as an insidious politician and intriguer, almost a conspirator and a candidate for dictatorship.

Let us recall why M.S. Gorbachev had to start. The country trailed behind the world's political socio-economic, scientific and technical processes, gradually turning from a great power into a third-rate state, the power of which is measured mainly by its nuclear missile potential. It was clear that it would be incredibly difficult to bring the country out of stagnation.

Born on March 2, 1931 in the village of Privolnoye, Stavropol Territory, in a family of peasants. In his youth, the future head of state worked in the Stavropol Territory Komsomol, and then in the local committee of the CPSU, and in 1973 he ended up in Politburo Central Committee of the CPSU.

March 11, 1985, after the death of the Secretary General Chernenko, Mikhail Sergeevich was proposed for the post of General Secretary, because he spoke well of him Andropov, and companion Brezhnev- Suslov. In addition, the arrival Gorbachev became, in a sense, a departure from the gerontocracy in the leadership of the Soviet Union (the last leaders of the state were all old and sick).

The leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev began tragically (it ended, however, also not in the best way) - April 26, 1986 happened The Chernobyl accident. Chernobyl being at the junction of three Slavic republics - the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR - as if it became a symbol of a future split and, as if, was deliberately rigged (now there are many supporters of the theory that the disaster was, perhaps by accident, caused by the subversive activities of Western countries in the territory Soviet Union). The cause of the accident is known - cooling failure nuclear reactor, its subsequent overheating and explosion. However, the reasons for the failure are still not known for certain. On the eve of the May Day holidays, Gorbachev ordered that the scale of the accident be kept secret so that the demonstrations in Kyiv and Minsk would go according to plan, which was an absolutely inhumane act, given the risk to people's health.

In 1987, Secretary General Central Committee of the CPSU signed an extremely disadvantageous to the Soviet Union missile elimination treaty medium and short range, in which the Union destroyed three times more nuclear weapons than the United States. The reason for this act is either the short-sightedness of the head of the country, or the fear of the new American missile defense system ( SOI, which turned out to be a bluff). On the other hand, the Nobel Prize for Peace received by Gorbachev later and the first ever fee of one million dollars make one wonder if this was a bribe of an unprecedented scale.

On April 23, 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev initiated a series of large-scale reforms in the economy and domestic policy of the USSR, which later became known as " perestroika". And by January 1987, perestroika had become the official ideology of the Soviet Union.

The main change was the change in the course of socialist development. Gorbachev announced a new democratic socialism and the rejection of building communism. The new socialism has become a mixture Soviet ideology And Western democracy. All were rehabilitated dissidents and other victims of political repression, proclaimed " publicity" And freedom of speech, the possibility of engaging in private business under state control ( cooperatives), and industrial enterprises were transferred to self-financing.

This is where the positive aspects of the restructuring ended. Economic reform was hesitant and inconsistent, often alternating with radical measures. So, Gorbachev himself later recognized the anti-alcohol campaign (or rather its methods) as erroneous. The law on private enterprise turned into a fight with grandmothers selling flowers and seeds in the park on weekends. Cancellation of censorship contributed not only to the emergence of figures with their own vision of the future of the country, but also to the dissemination of literature and the press of frankly obscene content. Wherein national policy became more rigid. In 1988, an interethnic conflict arose in Azerbaijan ( Nagorno-Karabakh), conflicts began to brew in Kazakhstan, Ukraine and the Baltic states.

The external debt of the USSR, against the backdrop of problems with oil supplies, grew by 1990 to $ 70 billion.

February 15, 1989 from Afghanistan all Soviet troops were withdrawn, and afghan war essentially ended in a draw. According to many historians and political scientists, decisive measures could have resolved the conflict in favor of the Soviet Union two or three years earlier, and the situation that has developed in Afghanistan today could have been prevented.

Foreign policy Gorbachev characterized by the establishment of friendly relations with the States and all Western Europe However, against the background of the internal crisis, it did not look very positive, and even slightly suspicious. One way or another, it must be admitted that under Mikhail Gorbachev cold war came to an end, and the "stronghold of world socialism" lost in it.

On the other hand, after these events, bipolar world system, has become monopolar with a single superpower- United States of America. The Soviet Union began to lose allies not only among the Eastern European and Asian countries, but also among its own republics (and the Constitution of the USSR did not formally prohibit their withdrawal from the Union).

On March 15, 1990, a new position was created - President of the USSR, which was occupied by Mikhail Sergeevich, which was a psychological turning point in the idea of ​​the Soviet Union as a state.

In 1990, three Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) declared their independence at once. Moreover, Russia itself (RSFSR), by decision of the Secretary General on June 12, 1990, proclaimed its sovereignty. After that, the “parade of sovereignties” began, and the USSR began to gradually fall apart, although many of its citizens did not notice this for a whole year.

The events of August 1991 ( augustovsky putsch) completed the collapse of the greatest state in the world.

December 25, 1991 11 republics of the Soviet Union in Belovezhskaya Pushcha Byelorussian SSR signed Belovezhskaya agreement, according to which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceased to exist.

Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev (born 1931) - Soviet and Russian statesman and public figure, President of the USSR. The period of his reign from 1985 to 1991 is called "perestroika".

The future reformer was born into a peasant family. In 1950 he entered Moscow University. Since 1952 - a member of the Communist Party.

After graduating from the university, he returned to his homeland, where his career began, first along the Komsomol, and then the party line.

Mikhail Sergeevich quickly rose through the ranks and in 1978 became secretary of the Central Committee. Since 1985 - the head of the party and the state.

The main activities of Gorbachev

Domestic policy:

• political reforms - the Supreme Council was transformed into a parliament, the liquidation of the CPSU monopoly on power, a two-level system of supreme legislative power, the creation of the Cabinet of Ministers;
• restructuring of the economy - the introduction of elements of a market economy, the beginning of private entrepreneurship, publicity, the abolition of party censorship.

Foreign policy:

• ending the war in Afghanistan;
• "new political thinking": a course towards peaceful relations and cooperation between countries;
• dissolution of the Warsaw Pact;
• Mikhail Sergeevich is one of the most controversial figures recent history Russia.

The course he proclaimed for acceleration, restructuring and democratization was caused by the deplorable state of the economy and the need for reform. The result of his activity was the birth of a new Russia, but the price for the transformation of the country was the collapse of the Soviet Union, the impoverishment of the masses, and social differentiation. The “parade of sovereignties” ended with the Belovezhskaya agreements on the dissolution of the USSR. M.S. Gorbachev, as president of a non-existent country, was forced to resign.

The results of Gorbachev's rule

• Democratization of the Soviet social and political system;
• freedom of speech and press;
• the collapse of the socialist camp and the USSR;
• interethnic conflicts in Kazakhstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Moldova;
• rapprochement with the West and the USA;
• hyperinflation and economic recession.

At the 27th Party Congress held in February-March 1986, the reform strategy was approved.

1985 is a landmark year in the history of the state and the party. The Brezhnev era is over.
In March 1985 Gorbachev was elected as the new General Secretary. He consolidated his control in the Politburo, secretariat and state apparatus, removing several potential opponents from there and moving the influential Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko to the honorary post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Many government ministers and first secretaries of regional party committees were replaced by younger people.

The time has begun for changes, attempts to reform the party-state body. This period in the country's history was called "perestroika" and was associated with the idea of ​​"improving socialism."
The 27th Congress of the CPSU was held in February-March 1986. It approved the reform strategy and adopted a new party program, including the acceleration economic growth and improving the living conditions of the population. Initially, Gorbachev leaned toward administrative politics, such as improved labor discipline and an anti-alcohol campaign. But later Gorbachev proclaimed a course of "perestroika" - the restructuring of the economy and, ultimately, the entire socio-political system. However, these reforms did not have sufficient economic justification, were not carefully worked out and were limited to the ideas of Lenin and Bukharin during the NEP (1921–1928).

The first noticeable change in society was the policy of publicity (freedom of speech and openness of information). Numerous social groups have emerged that are engaged in various types of cultural, sports, entrepreneurial and political activities.

Some members of the Politburo, headed by E.K. Ligachev, were wary of the reforms, considering them ill-conceived, hasty and harmful to the country. Gorbachev's actions caused a wave of growing criticism among the population as well. Some criticized him for slowness and inconsistency in the implementation of reforms, others for haste; everyone noted the inconsistency of his policy. So, laws were adopted on the development of cooperation and almost immediately - on the fight against "speculation"; laws on the democratization of enterprise management and, at the same time, on the strengthening of central planning; laws on the reform of the political system and free elections, and immediately on “strengthening the role of the party”, etc.

In the summer of 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a resolution "On the concept of transition to a regulated market economy." Several groups of economists have developed their programs, including S.N. Shatalin and G.A. Yavlinsky at the end of August 1990 proposed their radical reform program “500 days”. Under this program, it was supposed to decentralize the economy, then the subsequent privatization of enterprises, the abolition of state control over prices, and unemployment was allowed.

But the Ryzhkov-Abalkin program was adopted for implementation. It was a moderate concept, developed under the guidance of the director of the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences L.I. Abalkin, the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.I. Ryzhkov took part in the development. The public sector remained in the economy for a longer period with mandatory state control over the private sector. But the reforms of the economy did not lead to improvement, on the contrary, the incomes of the population decreased, production decreased, which in turn caused an increase in social discontent. The amount of external debt was approaching $70 billion, output was declining by almost 20% a year, and inflation rates exceeded 100% a year. The Soviet budget was highly dependent on world oil prices, so world oil prices were artificially brought down. In order to save the economy, the Soviet leadership, in addition to reforms, needed serious financial assistance from the Western powers. At a July meeting of the leaders of the seven leading industrialized countries, Gorbachev asked them for help, but no help was forthcoming. In such an environment, a new union treaty was being prepared for signing in the summer of 1991.

Foreign policy

Gorbachev called for "new thinking" in international relations, he tried at all costs to improve relations with the West in order to reduce high military spending.

The new thinking was to replace the practice of great power rivalry and argued that universal human values ​​should take precedence over the goals of the class struggle. Therefore, Soviet diplomacy began to acquire a more open character, but in essence this meant unilateral concessions on the part of the USSR. Gorbachev spoke of the Europeans and the European continent as "our common house”, referring to the new peace-loving character of Soviet foreign policy. Thanks to the new approach, the public of the European NATO countries (especially the FRG), North America and other regions began to treat the USSR with great trust and goodwill.

The USSR tried to reach new agreements with the United States in the field of arms control. The new Soviet strategic doctrine emphasized its defensive intentions, declaring "reasonable sufficiency" rather than superiority in arms as the goal. At the same time, the new Soviet leader did not notice that, despite the softening of the positions of the USSR on major international problems, the position of Western leaders towards the Soviet Union did not become more compromise. All arms limitation treaties were signed on terms unfavorable for the USSR. Subsequently, it turned out that the West used the "new Gorbachev thinking" in order to move its military bases to the very borders of Russia.

In July 1985 Gorbachev announced a moratorium on the further deployment of medium-range missiles (SS-20) in Europe. In March 1987, Gorbachev adopted the Western "zero option" formula, i.e. complete dismantling of such missiles in Europe. In December 1987, Gorbachev and US President Reagan signed an agreement in Washington to eliminate all ballistic missiles with a range of 500 to 5500 km.

Since 1987, the collapse of the socialist system of Eastern Europe began, and by the fall of 1989 in all the countries of the Warsaw Pact (starting with the formation of a new government in Poland, which was headed by the Solidarity movement), there was a change of leadership. In some countries this happened without bloodshed, in others, like in Romania, the regime was overthrown by force of arms. There was a "velvet" revolution in Czechoslovakia, popular uprisings in the GDR, Bulgaria and Romania. The Berlin Wall was destroyed and the process of German unification began. The US and the FRG agreed to make serious concessions, in particular, to discuss the question of the neutrality of a united Germany, which meant its withdrawal from NATO. But Gorbachev agreed to the unification of Germany without leaving NATO.

In 1989, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the countries of the socialist bloc began. In February 1990, the military organs of the Warsaw Treaty Organization were abolished, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe was intensified.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan ended on February 15, 1989. The volume of aid to allied countries began to decrease, the military presence of the USSR in Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua ceased. The USSR stopped supporting Libya and Iraq. Relations with South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and Israel have improved.
Gorbachev tried to normalize relations with China. With the assistance of the USSR, Vietnamese troops were withdrawn from Kampuchea, and Cuban troops from Angola. In July 1986, Gorbachev offered China cooperation in railway construction and sharing water resources the Amur River and agreed with the Chinese position on the main disputed border issues. The number of Soviet troops located along the Chinese border was reduced.

The consequences of the new thinking consisted in the fact that, on the one hand, its main result was the weakening of the threat of a world nuclear missile war. On the other hand, the Eastern bloc ceased to exist, the Yalta-Potsdam system international relations was destroyed, leading to a unipolar world.

Domestic policy.

In late 1986, Gorbachev embarked on economic reforms. In a country that had not yet survived the shock of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster, a large-scale anti-alcohol campaign was launched. Alcohol prices were raised and its sale was limited, vineyards were mostly destroyed, which gave rise to a whole range of new problems - the consumption of moonshine increased sharply (accordingly, sugar disappeared from stores) and all kinds of surrogates - the budget suffered significant losses. Drug use has increased. Food and consumer goods became "scarce" while the black market flourished.

By the autumn of 1987, it became clear that, despite attempts at reform, the country's economy was in deep crisis. The country's economic growth slowed down, and Gorbachev put forward the slogan "accelerate socio-economic development." To encourage the workers, wages were increased, but without increasing production, this money only contributed to the final disappearance of goods and increased inflation.
In order to secure the support of the intelligentsia, Gorbachev returned A.D. Sakharov from exile in Gorky. Sakharov's release was followed by the release of other dissidents, and Jewish "refuseniks" were allowed to emigrate to Israel. A campaign of "de-Stalinization" of society was launched. In late 1986 and early 1987, two iconic anti-totalitarian works appeared - an allegorical film by Tengiz Abuladze Repentance and a novel by Anatoly Rybakov Children of the Arbat.

Perestroika activated the growth of nationalism in the periphery. So, in the Baltic republics - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - nationalist-minded popular fronts were created, whose leadership demanded economic autonomy, the restoration of the rights of national languages ​​and cultures, and stated that their countries were forcibly included in the Soviet Union.

At the end of 1987, the population of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region held mass demonstrations, at which a demand was made for unification with Armenia. They were supported by a powerful popular movement in Armenia itself. The Armenian government formally demanded independence for Nagorno-Karabakh, but the Azerbaijani authorities categorically rejected these demands. In Georgia, a conflict broke out between Georgians and minorities of Abkhazians and Ossetians, who did not want to be part of the republic and demanded autonomy and inclusion in Russia.

Under these conditions, disagreements within the party leadership escalated. They were often simplistically portrayed as a clash between reformers and conservatives. But the conflict went much deeper. so-called. the so-called conservatives (which included Ligachev and Ryzhkov) believed that more order, discipline, and more efficiency were needed. They advocated the fight against corruption, but the basic parameters of the Soviet state and its economy were to be preserved. The radical wing (led by A. Yakovlev) called for the establishment of market relations in the country and the decentralization of production, for the radical democratization of the state and society, i.e. for drastic reforms. BN Yeltsin, secretary of the Moscow party organization, called for the elimination of "privileges". And although the conflict between Gorbachev and Yeltsin became more and more obvious, Gorbachev saw him as a potential ally in the fight against those who did not support his reform ideas.

The clash between the two groups reached a climax after the publication on March 13, 1988 in the main party newspaper Pravda of an article by Nina Andreeva, which argued that perestroika endangered socialism, and Stalin's achievements were unfairly downplayed. Many in the Politburo sympathized with Andreeva's theses. For some time it seemed that Gorbachev might lose control of the apparatus, but on April 5 Pravda published a "refutation" written by a group of authors headed by A.N. Yakovlev. Andreeva's letter was called an "anti-perestroika manifesto" and the course towards perestroika was confirmed.

political reform.

In an attempt to seize the initiative, Gorbachev called a party conference in June 1988. The conference approved proposals to democratize the political institutions of the Soviet Union and make perestroika irreversible. In October, the Supreme Soviet elected Gorbachev head of state.
In the autumn of 1988, Gorbachev stepped up the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union on a wide range of international issues.

Elections and revolution.

On March 26, 1989, elections were held for delegates to the First Congress of People's Deputies. The campaign aroused great interest among the population and was marked by heated discussions. In the Baltic republics, the popular fronts won. Yeltsin was elected a member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (initially he did not get the votes; the seat in the Supreme Soviet was ceded to Yeltsin by Alexei Kazannik), although in Moscow he received a majority of the votes.

Against this background, the growth of nationalism continued in the country and numerous inter-ethnic clashes took place in Kyrgyzstan (Osh), Uzbekistan (Fergana), Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Baltic states, etc.
At the end of March 1989, Abkhazia announced its secession from Georgia. In Tbilisi, informal organizations began multi-day unauthorized protests. In April, the political situation sharply escalated, the rally took on an anti-Soviet orientation, and a demand was made for Georgia to withdraw from the USSR. On April 8, 1989, the Criminal Code was supplemented with a new article 11.1 on criminal liability for public calls to overthrow or change the Soviet state system. But the processes could no longer be stopped. On April 9, the troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense dispersed the demonstrators, using tear gas and sapper shovels; about 20 people died as a result of the stampede.

At a meeting of the Central Committee of the party on April 25, Gorbachev postponed the elections to local councils from autumn 1989 to early 1990, so that the apparatus would not face a new defeat.

I Congress of People's Deputies was convened at the end of May 1989. He elected a new Supreme Soviet and approved Gorbachev as its chairman. The radical reformers won a political victory at the congress: Article 11.1 was repealed; a commission was set up to investigate the events in Tbilisi, and some prominent conservatives were accused of corruption. The discussions, which lasted two weeks, were broadcast live on television and riveted the attention of the entire country.

At the same time, more than 300 delegates to the Congress of People's Deputies formed an opposition bloc called the Interregional Deputy Group. This group, whose leadership included Yeltsin and Sakharov, worked out a platform that included demands for political and economic reforms, freedom of the press, and the dissolution of the Communist Party.

In July 1989, hundreds of thousands of miners in the Kuzbass and Donbass went on strike, demanding higher wages, better working conditions, and the economic independence of enterprises. Faced with the threat of a general strike, Gorbachev agreed to the miners' demands. They returned to work, but retained their strike committees.

In domestic politics, especially in the economy, there are signs of a serious crisis. The shortage of food and consumer goods has increased. Since 1989, the process of disintegration of the political system of the Soviet Union has been in full swing.

As a result of the elections in February-March 1990, coalitions of radical democrats came to power in Moscow and Leningrad. Yeltsin was elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR.

By 1990 the economy was in a severe recession. The demands for economic and political autonomy from the republics and the weakening of the power of the center were growing. Decreased output of vital important species products, the harvest was harvested with great losses; there was a shortage even of such everyday goods as bread and cigarettes.

Gorbachev was unable to overcome these difficulties. In February 1990, the Communist Party gave up its monopoly on power. In March, the Supreme Soviet amended the constitution to introduce the presidency and then elected Gorbachev president of the USSR for a five-year term. The July 28th Congress of the CPSU was held in discussions, but did not adopt a serious program of reforms. Losing real power, Gorbachev began to irritate the population more and more with endless empty arguments about perestroika against the backdrop of a rapidly collapsing economy and the union state. Yeltsin and other members of the opposition defiantly left the ranks of the party.

In early 1991, new banknotes of 50 and 100 rubles were put into circulation without prior notice to replace the old banknotes, prices in state stores were doubled. These measures undermined the last confidence of the population in the state.

In a referendum on March 17, 76% of the votes were cast for the preservation of the USSR. However, the governments of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Armenia and Moldova, instead of an all-Union referendum, held their own referendum on secession from the Union.

In June at Russian Federation Direct presidential elections were held, in which Yeltsin won. By the end of June, Gorbachev and the presidents of the nine republics where an all-Union referendum was held developed a draft union treaty that provided for the transfer of most of the powers to the republics. The official signing of the treaty was scheduled for August 20, 1991.

On August 19, Gorbachev, who was in Crimea, was placed under house arrest at his residence in Faros. The Vice President, Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior, leaders of the army and the KGB, and some other top party and state officials announced that because of Gorbachev's "illness" a State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP) was being introduced.

The population of the capital supported Yeltsin, some units of the army and the KGB also went over to his side. On the third day the coup failed and the conspirators were arrested.

After the collapse of the putsch, Yeltsin issued a decree dissolving the Communist Party, confiscating its property, and placing the main state functions in Russia in the hands of the president. Taking advantage of the putsch, most of the presidents of other republics did the same and announced their withdrawal from the Union.

In the autumn of 1991, the last period in the history of the Soviet Union began. Production was practically paralyzed, and republican parties and governments fell into factions, none of which had a cogent political or economic agenda. Ethnic conflicts began. The country's leadership has lost all the levers of government. The Soviet Union ceased to exist on December 8, 1991.

Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich was born on March 2, 1931. Place of birth - the village of Privolnoye, Stavropol Territory. Coming from a family of peasants, he already mastered the profession of a combine operator while studying at school. He graduated from school with a silver medal, after which he was able to enter the Faculty of Law at Moscow State University. As a student, he met Raisa Titarenko. She is known today as Raisa Gorbacheva, the wife of the first and only president of the USSR.

Shortly after the start of his studies, Gorbachev became the head of the Komsomol organization of the faculty. Mikhail Gorbachev whose biography at its beginning was similar to the biography of many Soviet people embarked on the path to power. While still a student, Gorbachev became a member of the CPSU. In 1955, after completing his studies, he was appointed to the post of secretary of the Stavropol city committee of the Komsomol. Until 1967, he held serious leadership positions in the regional committee of the Komsomol. Having continued his education, he graduated from the Stavropol Agricultural Institute in absentia, having received the specialty of an economist - agronomist.

Gorbachev built a successful career in the party. High yields also had a positive effect on his reputation. He did a lot to introduce more rational methods of labor in agriculture. However, after 1978, his life was connected only with the capital of the USSR. He deals with the problems of agriculture already on a national scale, being the secretary of the Central Committee.

It is worth saying that Gorbachev's chances of obtaining supreme power were not at all great. But, a whole series of deaths of the top leaders of the party, which occurred in the first half of the 80s, changed the situation. With the support of the secretaries of the Central Committee (Ligachev, Ryzhkov), young leaders of communist organizations and influential members of the Politburo, Gorbachev began a struggle for power, which was crowned with success in 1985, it was then that Gorbachev came to power.

Gorbachev's reforms were supposed to end the stagnation in the economy. However, many of them were not well thought out. The loudest resonance was caused by such actions as acceleration, money exchange, introduction of cost accounting. Most of the population perceived these reforms, if not with enthusiasm, then with a certain understanding. However, Gorbachev's dry law caused general discontent and sharp rejection. By the way, this law had an effect completely opposite to what its creators hoped for. Counterfeit vodka appeared in the country. And the practice of moonshine has spread everywhere. In 1987, Prohibition was repealed. However, fake vodka and moonshine have not disappeared.

Gorbachev's perestroika was remembered by people not only as a period of weakening censorship, but also as a difficult time, when, due to an ill-conceived domestic policy, the wealth of the bulk of Soviet citizens noticeably decreased. Ethnic conflicts flared up in Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, Baku. The Baltic Republics already in those years headed for secession from the USSR. Gorbachev's foreign policy was called the "policy of new thinking." Thanks to her, international tension subsided.

Gorbachev took the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1989. In 1990, he became president of the USSR. Gorbachev is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his enormous contribution to the reduction of international tension. However, the Soviet Union at that time was in the deepest crisis. After the putsch in August 1991, the country ceased to exist. The Belovezhskaya Accords were signed, and Gorbachev resigned. The time of Gorbachev's rule is estimated differently today.

The message that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had died appeared on the Internet on May 22, 2012. But the information about Gorbachev's death was clearly exaggerated. After all, Mikhail Sergeevich himself refuted it. Gorbachev's funeral never took place.